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Abstract
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) as a promising cryptographic primitive in public-
key cryptography is faced with many challenges from inherent incompatible con-
struction difficulties and demands of real-world applications.
This thesis starts from the study of efficiency and expressiveness of attribute-
based encryption. The feature of flexibility of attribute-based encryption causes
additional computational overheads in encryption and decryption and increases the
length of ciphertexts and private keys. The dilemma between efficiency and expres-
siveness of attribute-based encryption encourages novel techniques in ABE scheme
construction. A new ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) scheme
supporting access policies of an AND-gate and a threshold with short ciphertexts is
proposed. Such a scheme offers succinct ciphertexts with further expressiveness and
allows encryptors to assign attributes into types of mandatory and optional when
designing an access policy.
An insightful observation of key construction in CP-ABE systems leads to an
interesting topic of key-delegation abuse. This issue shows a property of CP-ABE
schemes that without further restriction any valid user private key can be used
to delegate new keys with less access privilege. Considering possible severe conse-
quence, a new CP-ABE scheme with key-delegation abuse resistance is proposed.
Such a scheme prohibits illegally generating new keys by any kind of splitting or
combining user private keys.
The thesis then investigates a new challenge of access policy update in ABE
systems. The access policies in private keys or ciphertexts in ABE systems cannot
be changed; however, the ability of modifying existing policies is highly desired for
real-world applications. Schemes with efficient attribute addition and revocation
mechanism are proposed. Such schemes allow encryptors to add (or revoke) at-
tributes to (or from) access policies of existing ciphertexts via a proxy server and
remain the ciphertexts sent to users with constant size.
The thesis further conducts research into real-world scenarios. The scenario
of Fog Computing is first considered and a traceable CP-ABE scheme with key-
delegation abuse resistance is proposed to solve private key delegation and key du-
plication problem. The second considered scenario is the problem of preserving
certain attributes when applying the proposed access policy update mechanism. We
propose two innovative CP-ABE schemes and their variants for scenarios in Fog
Computing and access policy update with attribute preservation.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) challenges cryptographers to construct efficient,
expressive and versatile one-to-many encryption schemes. The notion was intro-
duced by Sahai and Waters [SW05] shortly after the first concrete identity-based
encryption (IBE) [BF01a] scheme was proposed. An IBE system is a special public
key encryption system where messages are encrypted with public keys and recov-
ered with secret keys. Identities of users, which are usually strings and known by
each other, took the role of public keys in IBE so that messages can be encrypted
without key establishment – i.e., given a ciphertext CTID encrypted with identity
ID and a private key skID′ generated for identity ID
′, one can recovers the mes-
sage from CTID using skID′ if and only if ID is identical to ID
′. This condition
of being equivalent of identities in decryption restricts IBE in the type of inflexible
one-to-one encryption, which led to a natural question proposed by Sahai and Wa-
ters [SW05]: Is it possible to redefine the identities of users so that the decryption
condition can then be extended to richer types of functions or more expressive ac-
cess controls? They answered the question positively by replacing identities of users
by descriptive attributes. The encryption was then no longer based on strings of
inseparable identities but relatively independent attributes, which made it possible
to successfully decrypt one ciphertext using one of many different private keys that
satisfy the decryption condition.
ABE schemes features a one-to-many encryption mode with integrated access
control that complies with the developing Internet: first, it resolves the dilemma
between the security of sensitive data and the capability to manage its access control
in many scenarios; second, its flexibility as one step further beyond traditional “all
or nothing” encryption can efficiently adapt the dynamic environment. In addition,
ABE can be further extended for numerical computation access control or utilities
of further complex functions, as functional encryption, to meet future challenges.
This research focuses on constructing efficient ABE schemes with improved ex-
pressiveness and different versatilities. Specifically, our research addresses “road-
blocks” to real world applications faced by different variants of ABE, such as com-
putational overheads, inherent defects in key management and adjustable access
control management. This research also focuses on the applications and deploy-
ments of different ABE schemes in assorted challenging scenarios.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Objective
In this section, we present our motivations and corresponding objectives.
1.1.1 Efficiency and Expressiveness
With the development of communication networks, there is a trend for users to
transmit sensitive data on the Internet. To distribute a message to a specific set
of users, a trivial method is to encrypt it under each user’s public key or iden-
tity in traditional cryptosystem. As expected, ciphertext size and computational
cost of encryption or decryption algorithms are linear with the number of receivers.
Therefore, it is less attractive or even intolerable when the number of receivers is
large.
On the other hand, establishing a specific access control policy can also be de-
ployed for sensitive data transmission since most of the recipients can be categorised
according to many common attributes, such as gender, age range, and position. This
type of expressive access control is usually enforced by employing a trusted server
to store data locally, of which the security becomes increasingly difficult to be guar-
anteed due to replications caused by the distributed fashion of data storage. Hence,
sensitive data is required to be stored in an encrypted form and the access control
becomes pointless.
Attribute-based encryption tackles the problem by enforcing encrypted data to
be decrypted with a secure access control mechanism. ABE expands the tradi-
tional understanding of public-key cryptography by allowing the public-key to be
not atomic but associated with sets of attributes. In an ABE system, users’ keys
and ciphertexts are labelled with sets of descriptive attributes and decryption condi-
tions. A ciphertext can be decrypted only if the attributes of the ciphertext and/or
the user’s key satisfies certain conditions where user keys are always issued by a
trusted party. However, the way ABE enforces access control brings inconvenience
to the construction of encryption schemes. The user keys and ciphertexts in ABE
system contain more components according to labelled attributes, which itself causes
computational and storage overheads.
Although the one-to-many encryption mechanism of ABE is an advanced solu-
tion compared to traditional approaches, it results in falling back in efficiency when
applied into real world scenarios with a large amount of attributes being labelled to
keys and ciphertexts if the construction of keys and ciphertexts cannot be optimised.
The complexity of access policies that an ABE scheme can support, which we call
the expressiveness of an ABE scheme, grows higher to adapt more sophisticated sce-
narios, and becomes a obstacle to further optimization. More logical and numerical
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computations the supported access policy are required, more delicate and complex
keys and ciphertexts components have to be constructed, which makes a dilemma
between efficiency and expressiveness in ABE research. One of the main objectives
of this thesis is to optimize the construction of ciphertexts so the scheme can be
more expressive with its efficiency remained.
1.1.2 Inherent Property in Key Management
The encryption process of a public key encryption system requires an encryptor to
pick some uniform randomness to hide the message. The encryptor combine this
randomness with the public key components, compute a shared secret and encrypt
the message with the secret. This shared secret can then be computed by the
secret key with other ciphertext components in the decryption process to recover
the message. If there are many recipients for one message, the message will then be
encrypted several times for each recipient. The flexibility of ABE offers a promising
feature to public key encryption that a message only needs to be encrypted once
when there are many recipients with different user keys. The nature of this one-to-
many feature is that the shared secret can be computed using any user keys as long
as the access policy is satisfied.
Take ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) as an example,
where the user keys are issued with a set of attributes while the ciphertexts are
encrypted with an access policy. The encryption process generates a shared secret for
the encryption and then compute other ciphertext components regarding attributes
that are possibly needed in the access policy. A user key issued with a set of
attributes includes one or many key components for each attribute. If a user private
key satisfies the access policy the shared secret can then be computed by combining
necessary key and ciphertext components regarding required attributes. Therefore,
to decrypt different ciphertexts with one user key different key components will be
used. This usage of keys, that the components of a key are separately used when
decrypting different ciphertexts, does not lead to security issues and is commonly
accepted in most ABE encryption works.
However, this usage of keys, which can be considered as splitting a key into
many sub-keys when decrypting different ciphertexts, could give rise to some key
management concerns. If new sub-keys are maliciously generated from split key
components even if from different private keys, this property could sabotage the
basic security requirement of ABE that all user keys must be issued by a trusted
authority, usually a private key generator (PKG). One of the main objectives of this
thesis is to review this inherent property, establish security model for its abuse and
construct ABE schemes that can resist attacks from it.
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1.3 Adjustable Access Control Management
Data sharing via the Internet has brought many new challenges to data encryption.
One of them is that the access control system needs to adapt a more dynamic
environment. The access privilege of a user could change from time to time, as well
as the intended recipient of a message. If a user has lost his/her access privilege
of the shared data or an encryptor needs to share the data to a different set of
recipients, the user’s access privilege needs to be re-issued or the access control
needs to be re-assigned, even with the utility of ABE where the decryption of a
ciphertext is decided by an access policy.
For example in a CP-ABE system, the access policy that a ciphertext is en-
crypted with cannot be changed once the encryption process is completed. As de-
scribed above, the encryption process in CP-ABE needs to compute the encrypted
data as well as other ciphertext components for attributes that could be needed
in the access policy. All of these attribute-related ciphertext components are com-
puted associated with the randomness picked during the encryption process. If the
access policy has changed and new attributes are included into the access policy
it is difficult to compute corresponding ciphertext components without decrypting
the ciphertext since the randomness cannot be computed. However, decrypting the
ciphertext and re-encrypt the data would result in computation overheads, which is
also restricted by many other facts such as network bandwidth, availability of the
encryptor, computation capability of the encryptor’s device etc.
A mechanism that can adjust the access policy is then highly desired to adapt
the dynamic situation. One of the main objectives of this thesis is to construct ABE
schemes with adjustable access control management of which the access policy of a
ciphertext can be efficiently updated.
1.2 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are summarised below:
• Flexible CP-ABE supporting AND-gate and Threshold with Short Ci-
phertext We propose a CP-ABE scheme which produces constant-size cipher-
texts and supports an AND-gate and threshold access policies. The resulting
scheme works for access policies of an AND-gate and a threshold: the sender
chooses an ad hoc set S1 of attributes and another ad hoc set S2 of attributes
with a threshold value t1, and only users who hold all the attributes in S1 as well as
at least t1 of the attributes in S2 can decrypt. Our new scheme is proven secure
against selective chosen plaintext attacks in the standard model, under the as-
sumption that the augmented multi-sequence exponent decisional Diffie-Hellman
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(aMSE-DDH) problem is hard to solve.
• Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption with Key-Delegation Abuse
Resistance We propose a CP-ABE scheme in which users cannot illegally gener-
ate new private keys of a subset of the users’ original sets of attributes. The access
structure used in our CP-ABE is constructed by an AND-gate. In our scheme, a
ciphertext with the access structure A, which consists of a single AND gate whose
input are attributes described by a set of attribute set S, can only be decrypted
by a private key of a set of attributes W when S ⊆ W .
• Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption Supporting Access Pol-
icy Update We present the notion of Ciphertext-policy Attribute Based Encryp-
tion supporting Access Policy Update. We present a new security model to capture
these requirements, together with two constructions supporting AND-gate access
policy provably secure under augmented assumptions. We also present the proofs
of security of our constructions as well as proofs of intractability of augmented
assumptions.
• Applications and Extensions We propose an application of our CP-ABE
scheme against the property of key-delegation abuse in Fog Computing. A trace-
able CP-ABE scheme, which is a CP-ABE scheme that is equipped with a traitor
tracing mechanism, is constructed based on our CP-ABE with key-delegation
abuse resistance scheme. We also propose an advanced access policy update mech-
anism with which the encryptor can preserve certain attributes in an access policy
that cannot be revoked in following access policy update.
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 gives a brief review of relevant background material. It starts with
mathematical definitions in the area of Groups, Fields, Elliptic Curves and Pair-
ings. It then goes through several related cryptographic primitives and complexity
assumptions. Backgrounds on security models for attribute-based encryption are
also provided in this chapter.
Chapter 3 surveys many previous ABE schemes to present the state-of-the-art
with reference to this thesis.
Chapter 4 analyses the dilemma between efficiency and expressiveness in ABE.
A solution of a CP-ABE scheme that has constant-size ciphertext and supports the
access policy of an AND-gate and an threshold is proposed in this chapter. It is
proven secure in the standard security model for CP-ABE against selective chosen
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plaintext attacks. The proposed scheme based on the augmented multi-sequence
exponent assumption originally appeared in “Flexible Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-
Based Encryption Supporting AND-Gate and Threshold with Short Ciphertexts”,
joint work with Willy Susilo, Yi Mu and Fuchun Guo [JSMG17b].
Chapter 5 examines the property of key-delegation abuse in ABE systems. For-
mal security models for the key-delegation abuse problem are defined. A solution of a
CP-ABE scheme where user private keys cannot be split or combined to illegally gen-
erate new keys is proposed. The proposed scheme based on the Decisional Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman problem originally appeared in “Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption with Key-Delegation Abuse Resistance”, joint work with Willy Susilo,
Yi Mu and Fuchun Guo [JSMG16b].
Chapter 6 studies the issue of access policy update mechanism in ABE systems.
A new notion of CP-ABE supporting access policy update is introduced. Formal
security models for CP-ABE with attribute addition and revocation against selec-
tive chosen plaintext attacks are defined. Solutions of CP-ABE schemes that has
access policy update mechanisms, regarding attribute addition and revocation, are
proposed. The proposed schemes based on two augmented multi-sequence exponent
assumptions originally appeared in “Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Supporting Access policy Update”, joint work with Willy Susilo, Yi Mu and Fuchun
Guo [JSMG16a].
Chapter 7 presents applications of proposed and new CP-ABE schemes in
specific scenarios. It starts with application of CP-ABE with key-delegation abuse
resistance for traceable CP-ABE in Fog Computing. It then gives new solutions
for CP-ABE with access policy update mechanism in the scenario where certain
attributes need to be preserved. The proposed scheme with tracing functionality
originally appeared in “Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption against Key-
Delegation Abuse in Fog Computing”, joint work with Willy Susilo, Yi Mu and
Fuchun Guo [JSMG18]. The other proposed scheme support access policy update
with preserved attributes originally appeared in “Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption Supporting Access Policy Update and Its Extension with Preserved At-
tributes”, joint work with Willy Susilo, Yi Mu and Fuchun Guo [JSMG17a].
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and discusses some possible directions of future
work.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
We present related mathematical background and cryptographic primitives that are
used in this thesis.
2.1 Mathematical Background
Related mathematical background are presented in this subsection.
2.1.1 Fields and Groups
Definition 2.1. A group is a set with an operation (G, ◦) such that
• (G, ◦) is closed:
∀g, h ∈ G : g ◦ h ∈ G,
• (G, ◦) has an identity:
∀g ∈ G : ∃e ∈ G, g ◦ e = e ◦ g = g,
• the operation ◦ is associative:
∀g, h, u ∈ G : (g ◦ h) ◦ u = g ◦ (h ◦ u),
• every element in G has an inverse:
∀g ∈ G : ∃h ∈ G, g ◦ h = h ◦ g = e.
If G is finite and has n elements, then we call n the order of G and we write
#G = n. If G is infinite, we say that G has infinite order and we write #G =∞.
Definition 2.2. An Abelian group is a set with an operation (G, ◦) such that
• (G, ◦) is a group,
• the operation ◦ is commutative:
∀g, h ∈ G : g ◦ h = h ◦ g.
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Definition 2.3. A cyclic group is a set with an operation (G, ◦) such that
• (G, ◦) is an abelian group,
• (G, ◦) has a special element, called generator, from which every other element can
be obtained by repeated application of the group operation:
∀h ∈ G : ∃g ∈ G, x ∈ N, h = g ◦ g ◦ · · · ◦ g︸ ︷︷ ︸
x−1 times of operation ◦
.
If the operation ◦ is multiplication then every element of G can be written as
h = gx
, whilst if ◦ is addition then every element h of G can be written as
h = x · g.
Definition 2.4. A field is a set of two operations (F, ◦, •) such that
• (F, ◦) is an abelian group with identity denoted by e,
• (F \ {e}, •) is an abelian group,
• (F, ◦, •) satisfies the distributive law:
∀g, h, u ∈ F : (g ◦ h) • u = (g • u) ◦ (g • h).
Definition 2.5. A finite field is a set of two operations (F, ◦, •) such that
• (F, ◦, •) is a field,
• (F, ◦, •) has finite group order.
2.1.2 Elliptic Curves and Pairing
Miller [Mil85] introduced Elliptic Curves for constructing public key cryptographic
systems.
Definition 2.6. Let K be a finite field Fq where q = pn for a prime p > 3 and an
integer n ≥ 1. An elliptic curve is a plain curve over a finite field which consists of
the points satisfying the equation Y 2 = X3 + aX + b where a, b ∈ K, along with a
distinguished point at infinity ∞, denoted by O. It has the following property:
• Coefficients a, b ∈ K satisfying the discriminant M= −16(4a3 + 27 · b2) 6= 0;
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Definition 2.7 (Bilinear Map). Let G1, G2 and GT be three cyclic groups of the
same order. A bilinear map e(·, ·)is a mapping from the product G1 × G2 into GT
such that
• e(·, ·) is bilinear:
∀g ∈ G1, h ∈ G2, a, b ∈ Z : e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab,
• e(·, ·) is non-degenerate:
∀g ∈ G1, h ∈ G2 : e(g, h) 6= 1,
• e(·, ·) is efficiently computable.
Remark 2.8. A bilinear map group system is a tuple S = (N = |G1|,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·))
where N is usually a prime number, composed of objects as described above.
Definition 2.9 (Generic Bilinear Group Model). The generic bilinear group model
of a bilinear map system S is a tuple (ψ1, ψ2, ψT , σ1, σ2, σT , σe) such that
• ψ1 is an injective random mapping from G1 to {0, 1}m where m > 3 log(p).
• ψ2 is an injective random mapping from G2 to {0, 1}m where m > 3 log(p).
• ψT is an injective random mapping from GT to {0, 1}m where m > 3 log(p).
• σ1 is an oracle that takes input ψ1(x) and ψ1(y) and outputs ψ1(xy) for all x, y ∈
G1.
• σ2 is an oracle that takes input ψ2(x) and ψ2(y) and outputs ψ2(xy) for all x, y ∈
G2.
• σT is an oracle that takes input ψT (x) and ψT (y) and outputs ψT (xy) for all
x, y ∈ GT .
• σe is an oracle that takes input ψ1(x) and ψ2(y) and outputs ψT (e(x, y)) for all
x ∈ G1, y ∈ G2.
2.2 Cryptographic Primitives
Related cryptographic primitives are reviewed in this section.
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2.2.1 Hash Functions
Definition 2.10. A cryptographic hash function is a function which takes input a
message of an arbitrary length bit string and outputs a hash value of a fixed length
bit string H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l that satisfies the following three properties [RS04] :
Preimage Resistant: It should be hard to find a message with a given hash value.
Collision Resistant: It should be hard to find two messages with the same hash
value.
Second Preimage Resistant: Given one message it should be hard to find an-
other message with the same hash value.
2.2.2 Secret Sharing
2.2.2.1 Attribute and Attribute Universe
An attribute is denoted by A. Let {A1, . . . , An} be the set of all attributes, which
is then called attribute universe denoted by P with size n = |P|.
2.2.2.2 Access Structure
Definition 2.11 (Access Structure [B96]). Consider a set of parties Q = {Q1, Q2,
. . . , Qn}. A collection A ⊆ 2Q is said to be monotone if, for all W , W ′, if W ∈ A
and W ⊆ W ′, then W ′ ∈ A. An access structure (resp., monotonic access structure)
is a collection (resp., monotone collection) A ⊆ 2Q \ ∅. The sets in A are called
the authorised sets, and the sets not in A are called the unauthorised sets. Notation
W |= A is used to represent the fact that W ∈ A, and the case of W 6∈ A is denoted
by W 6|= A.
Definition 2.12 (AND-gate Access Structure). An access structure A is said to
be an AND-gate access structure if there exists a set of parties S1 ⊂ Q such that
W ∈ A if and only if S1 ⊆ W ⊆ Q.
Definition 2.13 (Threshold Access Structure). An access structure A is said to be
a threshold access structure if there exists a set of parties S1 ⊂ Q with some positive
integer t1 such that W ∈ A if and only if |W ∩ S1| ≥ t1 for W ⊆ Q.
Definition 2.14 (AND-gate and Threshold Access Structure). An access structure
A is said to be an AND-gate and threshold access structure if there exists two disjoint
sets of parties S1, S2 ⊂ Q with some positive integer t1 such that W ∈ A if and only
if |W ∩ S1| ≥ t1 and S2 ⊆ W .
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Definition 2.15 (Access Tree [GPSW06]). Let T be a tree where each non-leaf node
represents a threshold gate described by its children and a threshold value, which is
satisfied if the number of satisfied children nodes is at least the threshold value, and
each leaf node represents an AND-gate of a single party from Q. Hence T is said
to be satisfied by a set W of parties if and only if parties of the AND-gates of leaf
nodes needed to satisfy the threshold gate of the root of T are included in W . An
access structure A is said to be an access tree access structure if there exists an
access tree T involving several parties in its leaf nodes such that W ∈ A if and only
if W satisfies T .
Definition 2.16 (Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme (LSSS) [B96]). A secret-sharing
scheme Π over a set of parties Q is called linear (over Zp) if
• The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
• There exists a matrix MΠ with l rows and n columns called the share-generating
matrix for Π. For all i = 1, . . . , l, the i’th row of MΠ we let the function ρ
defined the party labelling row i as ρ(i). When we consider the column vector
v = (s, r2, . . . , rn), where s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared, and r2, . . . , rn ∈ Zp are
randomly chosen, then Mv is the vector of l shares of the secret s according to Π.
The share (Mv)i belongs to party ρ(i).
It is shown in [B96] that every linear secret sharing-scheme according to the
above definition also enjoys the linear reconstruction property, defined as follows:
Suppose that Π is an LSSS for the access structure A. Let W ∈ A be any authorised
set, and let I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , l} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ W}. Then, there exist
constants {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that, if {λi} are valid shares of any secret s according
to Π, then
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s. Furthermore, it is shown in [B96] that these constants ωi
can be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-generating matrix MΠ.
2.2.3 Definitions in Functional Encryption
We begin by describing the syntactic definition of Functional Encryption for a func-
tionality F . The functionality F describes the functions of a plaintext that can be
learned from the ciphertext. More precisely, a functionality is defined as follows
[BSW11].
Definition 2.17. A functionality F defined over (K,M) is a function F : K×M→
{0, 1}∗ described as a (deterministic) Turing Machine. The set K is called the key
space and the set M is called the plaintext space. We require that the key space K
contain a special key called the empty key denoted ε.
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A functional encryption scheme for the functionality F enables one to evaluate
F (k,M) given the encryption of M ∈ M and a secret key skk for k ∈ K. The
algorithm for evaluation F (k,M) using skk is called decrypt. More precisely, a
functional encryption scheme is defined as follows.
Definition 2.18. A functional encryption scheme for a functionality F defined
over (K,X) is a tuple of four probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (Setup, Enc,
KeyGen, Dec) satisfying the following correctness condition for all k ∈ K and M ∈
M [BSW11]:
Setup(1λ). This is a randomised algorithm performed by an authority in order to
create a new FE scheme. The setup algorithm takes no input other than the
implicit security parameter λ. It outputs the public parameters params and a
master secret key msk.
Enc(params, M). The encryption algorithm takes in the public parameters params,
the plaintext M ∈M. It outputs a ciphertext CT .
KeyGen(msk, k). The key generation algorithm takes as input the master secret msk
and k ∈ K. It outputs a private key skk associated with k. This algorithm
must be run by the trusted authority, usually a private key generator (PKG).
Dec(params, CT , skk). The decryption algorithm takes as input the public param-
eters params, a ciphertext CT , and a private key skk. It outputs y as the
result.
We require that y = F (k,M) with probability 1.
2.2.3.1 KP-ABE Definition
A key-policy attribute-based encryption system consists of four algorithms: Setup,
Enc, KeyGen, and Dec [GPSW06].
Setup(1λ,P). The setup algorithm takes in the security parameters λ and the at-
tribute universe P . It outputs the public parameters params and a master
secret key msk.
Encrypt(params, M , W ). The encryption algorithm takes in the public parameters
params, the message M , and a set of attributes W . It outputs a ciphertext CT
such that only users with whose private keys associated with access policies
that can be satisfied by the set of attributes W can decrypt M . We assume
that the ciphertext implicitly contains W .
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KeyGen(msk, A). The key generation algorithm, which is run by a PKG, takes as
input the master secret msk and an access structure A. It outputs a private
key sk associated with A.
Decrypt(params, CT , sk). The decryption algorithm takes as input the public pa-
rameters params, a ciphertext CT , which contains a set of attributes W , and
a private key sk, which is a private key for an access structure A. If the at-
tribute set W satisfies the access structure A then the algorithm will decrypt
the ciphertext and return a message M .
2.2.3.2 CP-ABE Definition
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption encryption system consists of four
algorithms: Setup, Enc, KeyGen, and Dec [BSW07].
Setup(1λ,P). The setup algorithm takes in the security parameters λ and the at-
tribute universe P . It outputs the public parameters params and a master
secret key msk.
Encrypt(params, M , A). The encryption algorithm takes in the public parameters
params, the message M , and an access structure A over the universe of at-
tributes. It outputs a ciphertext CT such that only users with whose private
keys associated with attribute sets which satisfy the access structure A can
decrypt M . We assume that the ciphertext implicitly contains A.
KeyGen(msk, W ). The key generation algorithm, which is run by a PKG, takes as
input the master secret msk and a set of attributes W . It outputs a private
key sk associated with W .
Decrypt(params, CT , sk). The decryption algorithm takes as input the public pa-
rameters params, a ciphertext CT , which contains an access structure A, and
a private key sk, which is a private key for a set of attributes W . If the at-
tribute set W satisfies the access structure A then the algorithm will decrypt
the ciphertext and return a message M .
2.3 Security Models for Attribute-based Encryp-
tion
This subsection gives detailed security models for KP-ABE and CP-ABE.
14 CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
2.3.1 IND-CPA Security Models for Key-Policy Attribute-
Based Encryption
We now give the security definition for KP-ABE system – Indistinguishability under
chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). This is described by a security game between
a challenger and an adversary for a security parameter λ ∈ N. The game proceeds
as follows:
Setup The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters
params to the adversary.
Phase 1 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to
access structures A1, . . . , Aq1 .
Challenge The adversary declares a challenge set of attributes W ∗ and two equal
length messages M0 and M1. The challenger flips a random coin β ∈ {0, 1},
and encrypts Mβ with W
∗, producing CT ∗. It gives CT ∗ to the adversary.
Phase 2 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to
sets of attributes Aq1+1, . . . , Aq with the restriction that none of these can be
satisfied by the set of attributes W ∗.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess β′ for β.
The advantage of an adversary in winning this game is defined to be
AdvIND-CPAA,KP-ABE = |Pr[β′ = β]−
1
2
|.
Definition 2.19. A key-policy attribute-based encryption system is chosen-plaintext
attacks secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage
in this security game.
2.3.2 IND-sCPA Security Models for Key-Policy Attribute-
Based Encryption
We now give the security definition of Indistinguishability under selective chosen
plaintext attacks (IND-sCPA) for KP-ABE system. This is described by a security
game between a challenger and an adversary for a security parameter λ ∈ N. The
game proceeds as follows:
Init The challenger defines an attribute universe P of size n and gives it to the
adversary A. A chooses a challenge set of attributes W ∗ and gives it to the
challenger.
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Setup The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters
params to the adversary.
Phase 1 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to
access structure A1, . . . , Aq1 with the restriction that none of these can be
satisfied by the set of attributes W ∗.
Challenge The adversary declares two equal length messages M0 and M1. The
challenger flips a random coin β ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts Mβ with W ∗, producing
CT ∗. It gives CT ∗ to the adversary.
Phase 2 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to
access structure Aq1+1, . . . , Aq with the same restriction that none of these
can be satisfied by the set of attributes W ∗.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess β′ for β.
The advantage of an adversary in winning this game is defined to be
AdvIND-sCPAA,KP-ABE = |Pr[β′ = β]−
1
2
|.
Definition 2.20. A key-policy attribute-based encryption system is selective chosen-
plaintext attacks secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible
advantage in this security game.
2.3.3 IND-CPA Security Models for Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption
We now give the security definition of IND-CPA for CP-ABE system. This is de-
scribed by a security game between a challenger and an adversary for a security
parameter λ ∈ N. The game proceeds as follows:
Setup The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters
params to the adversary.
Phase 1 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to sets
of attributes W1, . . . , Wq1 .
Challenge The adversary declares a challenge access structure A∗ and two equal
length messages M0 and M1. The challenger flips a random coin β ∈ {0, 1},
and encrypts Mβ with A∗, producing CT ∗. It gives CT ∗ to the adversary.
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Phase 2 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to sets
of attributes Wq1+1, . . . , Wq with the restriction that none of these satisfies
the access policy A∗.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess β′ for β.
The advantage of an adversary in winning this game is defined to be
AdvIND-CPAA,CP-ABE = |Pr[β′ = β]−
1
2
|.
Definition 2.21. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system is chosen-
plaintext attacks secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible
advantage in this security game.
2.3.4 IND-sCPA Security Models for Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption
We now give the security definition of IND-sCPA for CP-ABE system. This is
described by a security game between a challenger and an adversary for a security
parameter λ ∈ N. The game proceeds as follows:
Init The challenger defines an attribute universe P of size n and gives it to the
adversary A. A chooses a challenge access structure A∗ and gives it to the
challenger.
Setup The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters
params to the adversary.
Phase 1 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to sets
of attributes W1, . . . , Wq1 with the restriction that none of these satisfies the
access policy A∗.
Challenge The adversary declares two equal length messages M0 and M1. The
challenger flips a random coin β ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts Mβ with A∗, producing
CT ∗. It gives CT ∗ to the adversary.
Phase 2 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to
sets of attributes Wq1+1, . . . , Wq with the same restriction that none of these
satisfies the access policy A∗.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess β′ for β.
The advantage of an adversary in winning this game is defined to be
AdvIND-sCPAA,CP-ABE = |Pr[β′ = β]−
1
2
|.
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Definition 2.22. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system is selective
chosen-plaintext attacks secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a
negligible advantage in this security game.
2.4 Complexity Assumptions
Complexity assumptions that will be used in this thesis are presented in section. Let
S = (p,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·)) be a bilinear group system, g1 be an arbitrary generator
of G1 and g2 be an arbitrary generator of G2.
2.4.1 Basic Assumptions
Definition 2.23 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption [BF01a] ). Suppose a chal-
lenger chooses a, b, c, z ∈ Zp at random. The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption
is that no polynomial-time adversary is to be able to compute e(g1, g2)
abc given the
tuple (A = ga1 , B = g
b
1, C = g
c
1) with more than a negligible advantage where the
probability is taken over the random choice of the generator g1 and g2.
Definition 2.24 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption [GPSW06]).
Suppose a challenger chooses a, b, c, z ∈ Zp at random. The Decisional Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman assumption is that no polynomial-time adversary is to be able to
distinguish the tuple (A = ga1 , B = g
b
1, C = g
c
1, Z = e(g1, g2)
abc) from the tuple
A = ga1 , B = g
b
1, C = g
c
1, Z = e(g1, g2)
z) with more than a negligible advantage where
the probability is taken over the random choice of the generator g1 and g2.
Definition 2.25 (Decision Linear (D-linear) Assumption [NYO09]). Suppose a chal-
lenger chooses a, b, c, d, z ∈ Zp at random. The Decision Linear assumption is that
no polynomial-time adversary is to be able to distinguish the tuple (ga, gb, gac, gbd, gc+d)
from the tuple (ga, gb, gac, gbd, gz) with more than a negligible advantage where the
probability is taken over the random choice of the generator g.
Definition 2.26 (Subgroup Decision Problem for 3 Primes (3P-SDP) Assumption
[LOS+10]). Suppose a challenger chooses a, z1 ∈ Zp1 , z2 ∈ Zp1p2 , b ∈ Zp3 at random.
The Subgroup Decision Problem for 3 Primes is that no polynomial-time adversary
is to be able to distinguish the tuple (ga1 , g
b
3, g
z1
1 ) from the tuple (g
a
1 , g
b
3, (g1g2)
z2) with
more than a negligible advantage where the probability is taken over the random
choice of the generators g1, g2, g3 of subgroups Gp1 ,Gp2 ,Gp3, respectively, from a
composite order group G with |G| = p1p2p3.
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2.4.2 General Diffie-Hellman Exponent Problem
Let SS = (p,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·)) be a symmetric bilinear group such that G1 = G2 =
G. Let g ∈ G be a generator of G, and set gT = e(g, g) ∈ GT . Let s, n be two
positive integers and P,Q ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn]s be two lists containing s n-variate
polynomials over Fp. Thus, P and Q can be written as P = (p1, p2, . . . , ps) and Q =
(q1, q2, . . . , qs), and impose that p1 = q1 = 1. For a set Ω, a function h : Fp → Ω and
vector (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Fnp , the notation h(P (x1, . . . , xn)) stands for (h(p1(x1, . . . , xn)),
. . . , h(ps(x1, . . . , xn))) ∈ Ωs. We use a similar notation for the s-tuple Q. Let f ∈
Fp[X1, ..., Xn]. The computational and decisional (P,Q, f)-General Diffie-Hellman
Exponent (GDHE) Problems are defined as follows.
Definition 2.27 ((P,Q, f)-GDHE Problem [BBG05]). Given the tuple
H(x1, ..., xn) =
(
gP (x1,...,xn), g
Q(x1,...,xn)
T
)
∈ Gs ×GsT ,
compute gf(x1,...,xn).
Definition 2.28 (Decisional (P,Q, f)-GDHE Problem [BBG05]). Given H(x1, ..., xn)
∈ Gs × GsT as above, and T ∈ GT which is picked at random, decide whether
T = gf(x1,...,xn).
2.4.2.1 Complexity Lower Bound of Decisional (P,Q, f)-GDHE Problem
in Generic Bilinear Groups
To state the lower bound on the decisional (P,Q, f)-GDHE Problem, the definition
of the dependencies between a polynomial f ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn] and the sets (P,Q)
of s-tuples of n-variate polynomials over Fp is needed [BBG05].
Definition 2.29. Let P = (p1, p2, . . . , ps), Q = (q1, q2, . . . , qs) ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn]s
be two s-tuples of n-variate polynomials over Fp where p1 = q1 = 1. A polynomial
f ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn] is dependent on (P,Q), which we denote by f ∈ 〈P,Q〉, when
there exists a linear decomposition f =
∑
1≤i,j≤s ai,j · pi · pj +
∑
1≤i≤s bi · qi, where
ai,j, bi ∈ Zp.
For a polynomial f ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn], we let df denote the total degree of f . For
a set P ⊂ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn]s we let dP = max{df |f ∈ P}. We then state the following
lower bound in the framework of the generic group model. Let (ψ1, ψ2, ψT , σ1, σ2,
σT , σe) be the generic bilinear group model of a symmetric bilinear group system
SS = (p, G, GT , e(·, ·)). Thus, ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ for random encoding group elements
from G to {0, 1}m where m > log(p) and σ1 = σ2 = σ as the oracle that computes
group operation in G.
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Theorem 2.30 (Complexity Lower Bound of Decisional (P,Q, f)-GDHE Problem
[BBG05]). Let P,Q ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn]s be two s-tuples of n-variate polynomials over
Fp and let f ∈ Fp[X1, . . . , Xn]. Let d = max(2dP , dQ, df ). Let (ψ, ψT , σ, σT , σe) be
defined as above. If f 6∈ 〈P,Q〉 then for any A that makes a total of at most q
queries to the oracles its advantage in solving Decisional (P,Q, f)-GDHE Problem
is bonded as
Adv
Decisional(P,Q,f)−GDHE
A ≤
(q + 2s+ 2)2 · d
2p
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Chapter 3
Previous Attribute-Based
Encryption Schemes
Fuzzy IBE [SW05] was the first attribute-based encryption scheme: given a cipher-
text CT encrypted with a set of attributes S, one can decrypt it only if the set of
attributes W with which his/her private key is associated has more than t attributes
that also belong to S, where t is a threshold value. Fuzzy IBE was a natural ex-
tension of previous IBE schemes that requires identical matching of identities from
private keys and ciphertexts in decryption. Although the error-tolerance property
allowed an interesting application of IBE using biometric identities, the latent pos-
sibilities of the various descriptive attributes drew the one-to-many cryptographic
primitive – attribute-based encryption. However, fuzzy IBE could only support de-
cryption when a “threshold” policy with a prefixed threshold value is satisfied. The
need of flexible access control policies that can be supported by attributed-based
encryption urged the pursuit of efficient ABE schemes with more expressiveness.
More and richer types of ABE schemes were proposed afterwards. Most of them
can be divided into two main categories: Key-policy ABE schemes and Ciphertext-
policy ABE schemes. In Fuzzy IBE, the requirement of decryption is based on how
many attributes both the sets of attributes associated with a private key and a
ciphertext have. Thus, the protection strategy is not clear since the forced require-
ment can be seen as have been put in private keys, so that only ciphertexts with sets
of attributes that can satisfy the requirement can be decrypted, or vice versa. In or-
der to achieve more expressive access control, the deployment of protection strategy
is then explicitly assigned to private keys or ciphertexts. Besides the categorization
of protection strategy deployment, ABE schemes can also be classified by different
supplemental functionalities that emerged and motivated in practical applications.
These functionalities include Revocation mechanism, Accountability and so on.
In this chapter we survey important previous ABE schemes according to the
classifications of basic ABE schemes of KP-ABE and CP-ABE, and ABE schemes
supporting supplemental functionalities.
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3.1 Previous Basic Attribute-Based Encryption
Schemes
Basic ABE schemes resolve the problem of data confidentiality in its one-to-many en-
cryption scenario, tackle the core issue of collusion attacks and smooth the dilemma
between computation overhead and access control expressiveness. Collusion attacks
belong to a special type of attacks that users collude their private keys and try to
decrypt ciphertexts beyond their total access privileges. It is a fundamental security
requirement for ABE schemes to resist collusion attacks.
Most of previous basic ABE schemes can be categorised as KP-ABE schemes
or CP-ABE schemes according to where the access control protection strategy is
deployed. If the protection strategy is deployed at private keys, the ABE scheme is
called key-policy ABE scheme where a private key for a user is generated assocaited
with an access policy while a ciphertext that is encrypted with a set of attributes
satisfying the access policy can be decrypted. If the protection strategy is deployed
at ciphertexts, the ABE scheme is called ciphertext-policy ABE scheme where a
ciphertext on a message is encrypted with an access policy while a private key for a
user that can decrypt needs to be associated with a set of attributes satisfying the
access policy. A brief examination to these schemes will be given in this section.
3.1.1 Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Goyal et al. [GPSW06] proposed the first key-policy attribute-based encryption
scheme in 2006. KP-ABE is an altered form of Fuzzy IBE. It encrypts messages
with sets of attributes and generates users’ private keys based on expressive access
policies. If attributes of the encrypted data satisfies the access structure in user’s
private key sk, an user can recover the message through the decrypt algorithm.
In KP-ABE, the KeyGen algorithm is different from Fuzzy IBE as it gener-
ates user private keys according to the access structure. Take Goyal et al.’s work
[GPSW06] as an example of a KP-ABE scheme supporting access trees. In its
KeyGen algorithm, it adopts secret sharing and chooses a polynomial qx for Node
x in access tree structure such that qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)), where parent(x) is
x’s parent node and index(x) is the index number of node x that is given by x’s
parent node, in a top-down manner from the root node r. Then as qr(0) is set equal
to the master key y, the master key y is distributed among the user’s private key
components which are corresponding to the leaf nodes that represents attribute. In
the Dec algorithm, it uses attributes of encrypted data to run decryptnode function
in the decryption algorithm, which inputs encrypted data, user’s private key, and
nodes of the access structure in user’s private key; adopts bottom-up manner in the
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access tree structure and decrypt the ciphertext recursively. Finally, it will get a
bilinear formula and use polynomial interpolation to get the message.
The scheme consists of four algorithms of the KP-ABE scheme. It will be
described as follows.
GSPW06 KP-ABE Scheme [GPSW06]
Setup(λ) : The authority chooses several uniformly random numbers t1, . . . , tn, y
from Zp. The published public parameters are params =
(
T1 = g
t1 , . . . ,
Tn = g
tn , Y = e(g, g)y
)
. The kept master key is msk = (t1, . . . , tn, y).
KeyGen(params,msk,A) : The authority generates private key components for each
leaf node x in the access tree structure A. The private key components are
Dx = g
qx(0)
ti , where i is equal to a leaf node attribute in the access tree structure.
These components will be merged into the user’s private key sk, and be sent
to an user.
Enc(M,S, params) Encryptor chooses a random number s from Zp and encrypts
a message M ∈ G2 with a set of attributes AC , and then he generates the
ciphertext as CT = (S,E = MY s = e(g, g)ys, {Ei = gtis}∀i∈S).
Dec(CT, sk) This algorithm inputs the encrypted data, user’s private key, and nodes
of the access structure in user’s private key. It deploys a decryptnode(sk, CT ,
x) function for bilinear map computation. If i is equal to the leaf node x
attribute, decryptnode(sk, CT , x) outputs e(Dx, Ei) = e(g, g)
s·qx(0). If node
x is a leaf node but there is no i ∈ AC matching node x’s attribute, the
decryptnode(sk, CT, x) outputs invalid. If node x is not a leaf node, it will call
itself multiple times decryptnode(sk, CT, z) for all children nodes z of node x,
and use lagrange coefficient to compute e(g, g)s·qx(0). Finally, the decryption
algorithm obtains e(g, g)ys = Y s by running decryptnode(sk, CT, r) at root
node, if and only if the encrypted data satisfies the access structure of private
key. And the message M = E
Y s
can be obtained.
In 2007, a KP-ABE scheme supporting non-monotonic access structure is pro-
posed by Ostrovsky et al. [OSW07] where there are two values for each attribute as
positive and negative. Compared with the “GSPW06” KP-ABE scheme, Ostrovsky
et al.’s work can express more complex access policies and offer more delicate key
management. A trade-off for the advanced expressiveness is that the scheme doubles
the size of ciphertexts and private keys adding overheads for both encryption and
decryption. Lewko et al. [LSW10] then improved Ostrovsky et al.’s basic construc-
tion with new techniques and designed the most efficient non-monotonic KP-ABE
scheme. They also achieved user revocation in their improved scheme.
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Most of the above KP-ABE schemes have their ciphertexts grow linearly with
the size of the embedded set of attributes. The exceptional one, unfortunately,
only supports access policies of thresholds. In 2011, Attrapadung et al. [ALdP11]
proposed the first KP-ABE scheme supporting non-monotonic access structures that
has constant-sized ciphertexts. A trade-off for the succinct ciphertxts is that the
size of private keys is quadratic to the number of attributes involved in their access
policies.
For applications such audit log sharing, KP-ABE scheme provides a powerful
tool for encryption with fine-grained access control, which also supports delegation
of secret keys. Unfortunately, with a drawback that the access policy is built into
the secret key, it is inconvenient for encryptors in a KP-ABE scheme to decide who
can decrypt a ciphertext. In a certain degree, the control of the access of ciphertexts
however depends more on the PKG.
3.1.2 Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
The concept of CP-ABE was brought up by Goyal et al. [GPSW06] in 2006. In a
CP-ABE scheme, a data owner encrypts messages and enforces access policies over
attributes. A user is able to decrypt a ciphertext if his/her private key is associated
with attributes that satisfy the access policy. Bethencourt et al. [BSW07] proposed
the first CP-ABE scheme in 2007. Their construction can support access policies
constructed from a monotonic access tree. Although their work achieved fine-grained
access control, the security proof is provided in generic group model.
In the same year, Cheung and Newport [CN07] proposed the frist CP-ABE
scheme that is proven secure under the standard model. Their work supports access
policies of AND-gate and each attribute can be assigned to two values, as positive
and negative to indicate if a user owns an attribute, while access policies are always
involved with all attributes requesting if a potential decryptor should own or not
own an attribute or an extra “do not care” value to indicate the attribute which does
not appear in the AND-gate. Intuitively, the public parameters include three sets of
components as Ti, Tn+i, and T2n+i corresponding to the three types of occurrences
of each attribute. This scheme is proven secure in IND-CPA secure model under
the DBDH assumption. Compared with Bethencourt et al’s work, the scheme has
advantage in security proof but is less efficient and expressive as that the size of
ciphertexts and private keys grows linearly with the total number of attributes and
the access policy is restricted in logical conjuction.
Subsequently, Nishide et al. [NYO09] and Emura et al. [EMN+09] proposed
different schemes based on Cheung and Newport’s work. Nishide et al. improved
the efficiency and equipped their work with a new feature of hidden access policy.
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Emura et al.’s work offers constant-sized ciphertexts and constant-numbered bilinear
pairing operations supporting access policies of AND-gate on multi-value attributes.
In 2008, Goyal et al. [GJPS08] adpoted bounded tree structure for access policies
in CP-ABE to construct a more expressive scheme that can be proven secure under
standard assumption. They defined a new notion as “Bounded CP-ABE” in their
work and generalised a transformational approach that can trans form any KP-ABE
schemes into CP-ABE using a special structure as they called “universal access tree”.
The access policies in the BCP-ABE scheme can cover all formulas of polynomial-
bounded size, while the depth of the corresponding access tree needs to be bounded
to a fixed number that is defined in Setup phase. In 2009, Liang et al. [LCLX09]
improved the encryption and decryption algorithms of Goyal et al.’s BCP-ABE
scheme and proposed a BCP-ABE scheme with shortened public parameters, private
keys and ciphertexts.
To remove the boundary restricions in [GJPS08, LCLX09], Ibraimi et al. [ITHJ09]
presented a new technique that realises the CP-ABE scheme without Shamir’s
threshold secret sharing. With their new technique, the access policy can then
be defined by an n-ary tree access tree that is represented by “and” and “or” nodes.
In their scheme, the decryption process is friendly to devices with restrained devices
since polynomial interpolations from Shamir’s secret sharing is a computationally-
consuming calculation. There is an improvement in overall computation efficiency
of their work compared with Cheung and Newport’s [CN07].
In 2011, a new methodology was proposed by Waters [Wat11] to realise CP-
ABE that is provenly secure under concrete and non-interactive assumption. In
their scheme, the access policy is constructed by a linear secret sharing scheme over
the descriptive attributes, which includes all previously used access policy structures.
In this efficient scheme, the size of ciphertexts and private keys and the computa-
tion overhead of encryption and decryption process increase linearly with involved
attributes, which makes his scheme achieve the same performance and functionality
as Bethencourt et al.’s work [BSW07].
Lewko et al. [LOS+10] then advanced Waters’ work [Wat11] in encoding tech-
nique and proposed an ABE scheme that achieved adaptive security. In their scheme,
the bilinear pairing system is based on composite order groups, which results in loss
of practical usage.
Many of the schemes proposed in recent years are constructed based on bilin-
ear pairings. A CP-ABE scheme that supports AND-gate without bilinear pairing
system was proposed by Zhang and Zhang [ZZ11]. n-ary lattices is adopted to con-
struct their scheme and offered a strong security proof based on worst-case hardness.
Despite the efficiency of their work, it showed an alternative way of building ABE
schemes from lattices, from which many new schemes were then proposed.
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3.1.2.1 Comparison in Basic Attribute-Based Encryption Schemes
From what has been mentioned above, KP-ABE and CP-ABE schemes are different
in complexity hypothesis, strategic flexibility, and applications. A comparison can
be made as follows.
The first ABE scheme supports only threshold policy and suits when applications
require simple policies. KP-ABE and CP-ABE schemes support complex access
policies and suit when applications require fine-grained access control. In addition,
access policies are embedded into private keys in KP-ABE, so a data owner cannot
assign the access control to ciphertexts. Compared with KP-ABE schemes, CP-ABE
schemes are more suitable for the realistic scenes in favor of data owners. KP-ABE
schemes apply to query applications, such as pay TV system, audit log, targeted
broadcast, and database access. On the contrary, CP-ABE schemes are used for
access control applications, such as social networking site access, and electronic
medical system.
The first ABE scheme and early KP-ABE schemes [GPSW06, OSW07] are based
on the DBDH assumption, while the situation in CP-ABE schemes is more complex.
The construction of CP-ABE will be more complex and its security will be more
difficult to prove if the supported type of access policies goes more complicated.
To achieve the CPA security under the standard complexity assumption, the main
research on the CP-ABE is focused on designing the access structure. According to
different access structures, the research can be divided into three kinds: AND-gate,
access tree, and LSSS matrix. Now a comparison of Access structure, Complexity
assumption, Security model, and Supported policy in different CP-ABE schemes is
made in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Comparison of expression complexity and security assumptions in
different CP-ABE schemes
Scheme Access structure Assumption Model Boolean Op.
[CN07] AND gate DBDH Selective And, Not
[NYO09] AND gate DBDH, D-linear Selective And
[EMN+09] AND gate DBDH Selective And
[BSW07] Unbounded Tree Generic group Adaptive And, Or, Threshold
[ITHJ09] Unbounded Tree DBDH Selective And, Or, Threshold
[GJPS08] Bounded Tree DBDH Selective And, Or, Threshold
[LCLX09] Bounded Tree DBDH Selective And, Or, Threshold
[Wat11] LSSS matrix DPBDHE Selective And, Or, Threshold
[LOS+10] LSSS matrix 3P-SDP Adaptive And, Or, Threshold
The comparison of the size of public parameters and master secret keys in dif-
ferent CP-ABE schemes is given in Table 3.2. The comparison of the size of private
keys and ciphertexts in different CP-ABE schemes is shown in Table 3.3. The com-
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parison of the computational overheads of the encryption and decryption process in
different CP-ABE schemes is made in Tables 3.4. We can draw a conclusion from
these tables: Emura et al.’s [EMN+09] scheme is the shortest in ciphertexts and
private keys, Bethencourt et al.’s [BSW07] in params, and Waters’ [Wat11] in msk.
In addition, in Bethencourt et al.’s [BSW07], params and msk have nothing to do
with system attributes. As for computation overhead, Emura et al.’s [EMN+09]
processes the lowest encryption/decryption overhead, and Ibraimi et al.’s [ITHJ09]
scheme has a lower one than Waters’ [Wat11].
Table 3.2: Comparison of size of public parameters and master secret keys in different
CP-ABE schemes
Scheme params msk
[CN07] (3n+ 1)LG1 + LG2 (3n+ 1)LZp
[NYO09] (2nm+ 1)LG1 + LG2 (2nm+ 1)LZp
[EMN+09] (nm+ 2)LG1 + LG2 (nm+ 1)LZp
[BSW07] 3LG1 + LG2 LZp + LG1
[ITHJ09] (n+ 1)LG1 + LG2 (n+ 1)LZp
[Wat11] (n+ 2)LG1 + LG2 LG1
[LOS+10] (n+ 2)LG1 + LG2 LZp + LG1
n : Total number of attributes in systems;
m: Total number of possible values of an attribute in systems;
AC : The set of attributes involved in the access policy of a ciphertext;
AU : The set of attributes included in a user’s private key;
L∗: Bit length of element in *.
Table 3.3: Comparison of size of private keys and ciphertexts in different CP-ABE
schemes
Scheme sk CT
[CN07] (2n+ 1)LG1 (n+ 1)LG1 + LGT
[NYO09] (3n+ 1)LG1 (2nm+ 1)LG1 + LGT
[EMN+09] 2LG1 2LG1 + LGT
[BSW07] (2|AU |+ 1)LG1 (2|AC |+ 1)LG1 + LGT
[ITHJ09] (|AU |+ 1)LG1 (|AC |+ 1)LG1 + LGT
[Wat11] (|AU |+ 2)LG1 (2|AC |+ 1)LG1 + LGT
[LOS+10] (|AU |+ 2)LG1 (2|AC |+ 1)LG1 + LGT
n : Total number of attributes in systems;
m: Total number of possible values of an attribute in systems;
AC : The set of attributes involved in the access policy of a ciphertext;
AU : The set of attributes included in a user’s private key;
L∗: Bit length of element in *.
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Table 3.4: Comparison of performance in different CP-ABE schemes
Scheme Encryption Decryption
[CN07] (n+ 1)G1 + 2GT (n+ 1)Ce + (n+ 1)GT
[NYO09] (2nm+ 1)G1 + 2GT (3n+ 1)Ce + (3n+ 1)GT
[EMN+09] (n+ 1)G1 + 2GT 2Ce + 2GT
[BSW07] (2|AC |+ 1)G1 + 2GT 2|AU |Ce + (2|S|+ 2)GT
[ITHJ09] (|AC |+ 1)G1 + 2GT (|ω|+ 1)Ce + (|ω|+ 1)GT
[Wat11] (4|AC |+ 1)G1 + 2GT 2|AU |Ce + 3|AU |GT
[LOS+10] (4|AC |+ 1)G1 + 2GT 2|AU |Ce + 3|AU |GT
n: Total number of attributes in systems;
m: Total number of possible values of an attribute in systems;
AC : The set of attributes involved in the access policy of a ciphertext;
AU : The set of attributes included in a user’s private key;
Ce: bilinear paring operation;
S: Least interior nodes satisfying an access structure;
ω: Least subset of attributes satisfying an access structure;
3.2 Previous ABE Schemes Supporting
Supplemental Functionalities
In this section, we survey existing significant ABE schemes supporting supplemental
functionalities related to this thesis, namely accountability and revocation mecha-
nism.
3.2.1 Accountability
At present, accountable ABE schemes can be divided into two kinds: accountable
CP-ABE schemes [LRK09, LRZW09, LHC+11] and accountable KP-ABE schemes
[YRLL09, WCLL12].
3.2.1.1 Accountable Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Li et al. [LRZW09] first proposed the notion of accountable CP-ABE to address
the problem of key abuse in ABE system. In their ciphertext-policy accountable
attribute-based encryption (CP-A2BE) scheme, personal information or user-specific
information is embedded in private keys to ensure user accountability. This user-
related information can be simply a user identity. When a user shares his private
key, his/her identity will then be detected from a pirated device if the shared key
is maliciously used. The tracing algorithm in their work presumes a specific format
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to the key used to trace, which leads to a white-box tracking functionality. In
addition, it has a limited ability to express access policies and it needs public key
certificate authority for issuing certificates for all users, which has a serious impact
on performance.
Later, Li et al. [LRZW09] improved their tracing mechanism for illegal key
sharing among users and proposed the notion of ciphertext-policy accountable and
anonymous attribute-based encryption (CP-A3BE). The concept behind CP-A3BE is
similar compared with CP-A2BE that a user private key will include a user identity.
In the proposed CP-A3BE scheme, tracing functionality was improved to black-box
model and the anonymous feature is also included. The only disadvantage is that
the length of the private keys and ciphertexts are increased.
In 2011, Li et al. [LHC+11] further enhanced their previous work so that the
proposed scheme can support multiple authorities while remain the feature of user
accountability. In their scheme, one can trace the identity of a misbehaving user
who leaks his/her private key and the trust assumptions on both authorities and
users can be reduced. The tracing process is efficient as it has a lower computational
overheads compared with the existing accountable ABE schemes.
3.2.1.2 Accountable Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Key abuse attacks also impede the wide applications of KP-ABE especially in
copyright-sensitive systems.
Yu et al. [YRLL09] proposed the notion of abuse free key-policy attribute-
based encryption (AFKP-ABE) to defend key abuse attacks in KP-ABE. In their
scheme, hidden attributes are introduced to identify single user piracy or partial
colluding users. Their tracing algorithm does not require any specific format of
private keys and enables black-box tracking functionality. Its performance is efficient
if the number of total users is not too large since the size of its secret keys and
ciphertexts is the logarithm of the total number of users. Their scheme is proven
secure under the DBDH assumption and the D-linear assumption.
Recently, Wang et al. [WCLL12] first presented an accountable authority KP-
ABE scheme which is proved secure under the modified Bilinear Decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption in the standard model.
3.2.1.3 Comparison
Regarding trace mode, trace target, security assumption and types of access struc-
ture, a comparison of the CP-A2BE [LRK09], CPA3BE [LRZW09], and AFKP-ABE
[YRLL09] is given in Table 3.5, from which we can draw conclusions below. First, all
of these three schemes can achieve user accountability. Second, as a result of early
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Table 3.5: Comparison of CP-A2BE, CP-A3BE and AFKP-ABE
Scheme Trace mode Trace target Assumption Access structure
[LRK09] White box Authority, user DBDH, CDH And
[LRZW09] Black box user DBDH, D-linear And
[YRLL09] Black box user DBDH, D-linear And, or, threshold
work, the CP-A2BE scheme requires a format specification of private keys in tracing
algorithm, which makes it less feasible in practice. Finally, both the CP-A3BE and
the AFKP-ABE protect the sender’s privacy, but the later can only partially hide
attributes.
3.2.2 Revocation Mechanism
In multi-user encryption systems, a revocation mechanism is a useful tool to manage
malicious behaviours. In ABE system, it is more difficult to realise the revocation
mechanism since it is more complicated than constructing it in traditional public
key cryptosystem or IBE schemes [BGK08, Mic96, ALO98, NNL01, LV09]. For
example, in CP-ABE schemes, different users may hold private keys with the same
attributes, leading to additional difficulties in design of a revocation mechanism.
In attribute-based setting, revocation mechanism can usually be divided into
two kinds: user revocation and attribute revocation. Currently, there are mainly
two ways to realise them [AI09a]: one is the indirect revocation method [BSW07,
PTMW10, BGK08, IPN+09, YWRL10, HN11, XMLC13] and the other is the direct
revocation method [OSW07, AI09b, LLLS10, QM12].
3.2.2.1 Indirect Revocation Method
A revocation mechanism from the indirect revocation method requires the author-
ity to release information for key update periodically to non-revoked users, while
implicitly revoking users as they cannot update their private keys. The advantage
of the indirect method is that the senders do not need to know the revocation list.
The disadvantage is that the key update needs to set up communications from the
authority to all non-revoked users periodically, which may result in a bottle neck if
the update cycle is too short or there are too many users in the system. Many at-
tribute revocable ABE schemes have been proposed based on the indirect revocation
method [BSW07, PTMW10, BGK08, IPN+09, YWRL10, HN11, XMLC13].
Early works [BSW07, PTMW10, BGK08] adopted the concept of expiration
time on each attribute to realise attribute revocation. These schemes have two main
problems. One is the security degradation in terms of the backward and forward
security [HN11]. The other is the scalability problem. To reduce the burden of
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authority, two CP-ABE schemes with immediate attribute revocation with the help
of semi-honest service provider were proposed by Ibraimi et al. [IPN+09] and Yu et
al. [YWRL10]. But their works can only support simple access policies while the
data outsoucing environment requires fine-grained access control.
Later, Hur and Noh [HN11] proposed a CP-ABE scheme with fine-grained ac-
cess control and attribute revocation with the help of the honest-but-curious proxy
deployed in the data service provider. In their scheme, the method of using the
structure of binary tree for efficient revocation [BGK08] is adopted for an efficient
revocation mechanism. Unfortunately, their scheme cannot resist the collusion at-
tack.
In 2013, Xie et al. [XMLC13] proposed a new CP-ABE scheme that supports
efficient user and attribute revocation. They improved the computation overhead in
the key update phase, which is halved comapred with Hur and Noh’s work [HN11].
3.2.2.2 Direct Revocation Method
A revocation mechanism from the direct revocation method requires a sender to
specifies the revocation list when a ciphertext is being encrypted. The advantage
of the direct method is that it does not require all non-revoked users to update
their keys periodically as what happens when the indirect method is adopted. The
disadvantage is that it needs the sender to keep and manage the current revocation
list, which could be a troublesome task. Many attribute revocable ABE schemes
[OSW07, AI09b, LLLS10, QM12] that used the direct mode have been proposed.
In KP-ABE, senders are only allowed to specify a set of attributes to ciphertexts
which makes it not possible yet to construct a direct revocation mechanism. Staddon
et al. [SGGR08] suggested a KP-ABE scheme with direct revocation mechanism.
Their work is restricted to a condition that the number of attributes assigned to the
set of attributes of a ciphertext is equal to half of the size of the attribute universe.
In CP-ABE, a trivial construction of direct revocation mechanism can be built
by using Ostrovsky et al.’s [OSW07]. Since Ostrovsky et al.’s [OSW07] supports
negative clauses, negation of revoked user identities or attributes can then be added
conjunctively to the AND-gate. This trivial solution is low in efficiency since the
length of the ciphertexts scales with the increased revoked users or attributes.
Attrapadung and Imai [AI09b] suggested a different concept of combining broad-
cast encryption with ABE scheme to achieve user revocation. In their proposed
scheme, all the membership lists for each attribute group is maintained by the data
owner to enable the direct user revocation. Subsequently, Liang et al. [LLLS10]
proposed a CP-ABE scheme with efficient revocation mechanism. In their scheme,
linear secret sharing and binary tree techniques are combined and each user is as-
signed a unique identifier for efficient revocation.
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The three typical CP-ABE schemes with direct revocation [OSW07, AI09b,
LLLS10] all support user revocation, and they have no effect on attribute revoca-
tion. In 2012, Wu and Zhang [QM12] first formalised the notion of attribute-based
encryption supporting attribute revocation under direct revocation mode.
Chapter 4
Efficient and Expressive Ciphertext-
Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Supporting Threshold and AND-gate
Most of the existing expressive CP-ABE schemes produce long ciphertexts, which
affects their efficiency and applications. In this chapter, this gap of efficiency and
expressiveness is considered and a CP-ABE scheme that outputs constant-size ci-
phertext and supports access policies of an AND-gate and a threshold is proposed.
The proposed scheme is efficient, expressive and secure. In our construction, the
supported access policy include two sets of attributes S1 and S2 over an attribute
universe and a threshold value t1. The access policy is satisfied if a user owns at
least t1 attributes in S1 and all the attributes in S2. The scheme is IND-sCPA se-
cure proved in the standard model under the augmented multi-sequence of exponents
decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
4.1 Background and Scenario
In the era of big data, CP-ABE becomes a promising technology enabler to meet
the need for sharing and storing sensitive data on the Internet ubiquitously. Al-
though the functionality provided by CP-ABE fits many real world scenarios, the
applications of CP-ABE have been limited due to efficiency drawbacks shared by
most CP-ABE schemes that the size of ciphertexts increases linearly with the num-
ber of involved attributes. This limitation can be seen in a simple comparison
of needed storage space in one-to-many encryption between traditional encryption
and attribute-based encryption. If traditional encryption is adopted, a message
will be encrypted many times according to the number of recipients, of which the
storage space is then increased linearly in the number of recipients. Compared
with attribute-based encryption, if the number of recipients is not large while a
large number of attributes are used to describe access policies, the significance of
attribute-based encryption becomes less attractive.
So far, researchers have tried to construct different schemes for constant-sized
CP-ABE, but the access policies supported by theses schemes can either be a single
AND-gate or a single threshold. If a scheme can only support access policies of
a single threshold, all attributes become optional and decryption process will suc-
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ceed when many enough attributes are included in the used private key while no
specific attribute can be enforced along with the threshold. If a scheme can only
support access policies of a single AND-gate, all attributes become mandatory and
decryption process requires all of the attributes included in an access policy to be
also included in the decryption private key. Currently, there is no CP-ABE scheme
with short ciphertexts addressing further expressive access policies. However, in a
concrete application, access policies may need to be defined with both mandatory
and optional attributes, and hence, a threshold and AND-gate policy.
To illustrate this situation, consider the following outsourcing scenarioa. A client
would like to develop a project, and hence, this client will register to an outsourc-
ing project platform. In this platform, there are many freelancers, who are offering
their service. Each freelancer will gain his/her attribute during the registration
process, and the attribute is something like “IT/software”, “senior programmer”,
“C/C++”, “Java”. When the client outsources his/her job to the outsourcing plat-
form, the client needs to specify the requirements of the freelancer that will do
the task. As an example, the client requires the task to be conducted by a senior
freelancer in IT/software group with at least three expertises of “C/C++ Program-
ming”, “JAVA”, “Mobile App” and “Software Development”. This means, the
corresponding access policy can then be defined by a set of mandatory attributes
{IT group, Senior}, a set of optional attributes {C/C++ Programming, JAVA, Mo-
bile App, Software Development} and a threshold value 3 as showed in Fig. 4.1.
The client should be able to use a CP-ABE scheme with the above access policy
to encrypt the task, and subsequently, the freelancers who satisfy the access policy
should be able to read this message and then do the task.
  
Encrypted
Project
  Mandatory attributes:
IT Group, Senior
  Optional attributes with threshold value 3:
C/C++, JAVA, 
Mobile App, Software Dev.
Access Policy
IT Group,
Senior,
C/C++,
JAVA,
Mobile App.
IT Group,
Junior,
JAVA,
Mobile App.
IT Group,
Senior,
JAVA,
Software Dev.
IT Group,
Senior,
JAVA,
Mobile App,
 Software Dev.
Figure 4.1: An example of users getting access to an encrypted project according
to its access policy.
The first set of attributes describes an AND-gate policy, and the second set of
attributes with the threshold value describes a threshold policy, which need to be
aThis example is illustrated based on the rent-a-coder website: http://www.rent-acoder.com/.
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satisfied if a user wants the details of the project. If the adopted CP-ABE scheme can
only support threshold policy, then no mandatory attributes can be put into access
policies, like the attribute “IT group” and “Senior” in the above example. On the
other hand, if the CP-ABE scheme can only support an AND-gate policy, the project
will then be encrypted repeatedly for all accepted combinations of expertise with
the mandatory attributes. We note that producing constant-size ciphertexts will be
an important and desired property for enabling such a scheme that supports both
mandatory and optional attributes, or else the scheme will be much less practical
as the size of the encrypted metadata (e.g a symmetric key) should be retained.
Trivial Constructions. Since several works have already achieved short ciphertexts
CP-ABE schemes supporting a single AND-gate or a single threshold access policies,
one may think that obtaining a short ciphertext CP-ABE scheme supporting a
threshold and AND-gate policy can be done by a simple combination of the two
schemes. However, the resulting scheme from this approach could be easily attacked
as it is possible to launch a collusion attack with one key satisfying the AND-gate
and another key satisfying the threshold, while actually they do not satisfy the
required combined access policy.
Our Techniques. When constructing a CP-ABE scheme supporting a threshold and
AND-gate access policy with short ciphertexts, the following technical hurdles must
be overcome.
First, the scheme must produce constant-size ciphertexts despite the number
of involved attributes. We exploit the “aggregate” technique from [DP08] and the
“dummy attribute” technique from [HLR10] to form the upper bound of the size of
ciphertexts. To encrypt with a threshold and AND-gate access policy, we construct
two group elements in ciphertexts. One is associated with all optional attributes in
the threshold S1 as well as n−1−|S1|+t1 dummy attributes, where n is the maximal
number of attributes and t1 is the threshold value. The other one is associated with
all mandatory attributes in the AND-gate attribute set S2. In decryption, private
key components are aggregated into two group elements as well for computation.
Second, the collusion attacks must not exist. In our construction, an old-
fashioned technique is adopted that each private key has its sets of components
bound to each other with some random numbers that sum up to a unique fixed
number, which makes components from different keys incompatible. In addition,
we construct different sets of key components based on different generators in each
private key to prevent collusion attacks within a private key itself.
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4.1.1 Related Work
Most of the previous ABE systems produce long ciphertexts, which grow with
the number of attributes involved in encryption process. In recent years, ABE
schemes with constant-size ciphertexts have received much attention for applications
in practical scenarios [ALdP11, CCL+13, LXZZ13, RD13a, AL10, CZF11, EMN+09,
GZC+12, HLR10, RD13b, TDM12].
Emura et al. [EMN+09]proposed the first ABE scheme with constant-size cipher-
texts, which is a CP-ABE scheme supporting an AND-gate policy of multiple-value
attributes. In their scheme [EMN+09], a disadvantage is that a user can decrypt
only if his/her private key is associated with a set of attributes that is identical to
the access policy of the ciphertext. Therefore, their scheme can be seen as an ABE
scheme with private keys and ciphertexts both constrained with an AND-gate policy,
which reduces the flexibility significantly. Similarly, the CP-ABE schemes [TDM12]
also share the same disadvantage as the scheme [EMN+09]. To prevail over this dis-
advantage, Chen et al. [CZF11] proposed a CP-ABE scheme supporting AND-gate
policies that enjoys constant computation cost and constant-size ciphertexts.
Herranz et al. [HLR10] proposed a dynamic (l, n)-threshold CP-ABE scheme
that produces constant-size ciphertexts. In their scheme, an algorithm Aggregate
from [DP08] is adopted for decryption which requires O(l2) exponentiation compu-
tation. Ge et al. [GZC+12] proposed a new (l, n)-threshold CPA-secure CP-ABE
scheme with constant-size ciphertexts. Although their construction can be extended
to a CCA-secure scheme, the size of private keys in their schemes has quadratic
growth based on the number of attributes associated. For more expressive or gen-
eral decryption policies, no existing CP-ABE scheme has short ciphertexts. This fact
can limit the applications of ABE in real life, if only a low bandwidth is available.
Chapter Organisation. This chapter is organised as follows: In Section 4.2, we pro-
vides background definitions related to CP-ABE system. In Section 4.3 the adopted
computational assumption is described, on which the security of our scheme will be
based. In Section 4.4 our CP-ABE construction is presented, where we also proved
its security in standard model. Section 4.5 discusses the efficiency and performance
of the proposed scheme. Section 4.6 contains the proof of the intractability of the
adopted aMSE-DDH problem. The chapter is concluded in Section 4.7.
4.2 The Augmented Multi-sequence of Exponents
Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The security of our scheme is reduced to the hardness of a problem, which we called
the augmented multi-sequence of exponents decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. The
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problem is modified from the (l,m, t)-aMSE-DDH problem defined in [HLR10], of
which the generic complexity is covered by the general Diffie-Hellman exponent
theorem due to Boneh et al. [BBG05], as the problem lies in the scope of their
framework.
Let S = (p,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·)) be a bilinear map group system. Let g0 be a
generator of G1 and h0 be a generator of G2. Let n, s1, s2, t1 be four integers where
n >= s1 + s2 and s1 >= t1. The (n, s1, s2, t1)-augmented multi-sequence of expo-
nents decisional Diffie-Hellman ((n, s1, s2, t1)-aMSE-DDH) problem related to S is
as follows:
Input The vector −→x 2n−1−s1+t1 = (x1, . . . , x2n−1−s1+t1) defines the co-prime polyno-
mials, of which the components are pairwise distinct elements of Zp,
f(X) =
n−s1−s2∏
i=1
(X + xi), g1(X) =
n−s2∏
i=n−s1−s2+1
(X + xi),
g2(X) =
n∏
i=n−s2+1
(X + xi), h1(X) =
2n−1−s1+t1∏
i=n+1
(X + xi),
the values 
g0, g
γ
0 , . . . , g
γ2n−s1+t1−3
0 , g
κ·γ·f(γ)g2(γ)
0 , (4.1.1)
g
α·g2(γ)·γ0
0 , . . . , g
α·g2(γ)·γn−s1−s2+1
0 , (4.1.2)
gω·γ0 , . . . , g
ω·γn
0 , (4.1.3)
g
κγf(γ)g1(γ)
ζ
0 , (4.1.4)
g
g1(γ)·αγ
0
ζ
0 , . . . , g
g1(γ)·α·γ
n−s1−s2+1
ζ
0 , (4.1.5)
g
ωγ0
ζ
0 , . . . , g
ωγn−1
ζ
0 , (4.1.6)
h
g1(γ)·γ0
0 , . . . , h
g1(γ)·γn+t1−3
0 , h
κ·g21(γ)h1(γ)
0 , (4.1.7)
h
α·g1(γ)·γ0
0 , . . . , h
α·g1(γ)·γ2n−1
0 , (4.1.8)
h
ω·g1(γ)·γ0
0 , . . . , h
g1(γ)·ω·γn+s1−1
0 , (4.1.9)
h
ζ·h1(γ)·g1(γ)·γ0
0 , . . . , h
ζ·h1(γ)·g1(γ)·γs2−2
0 , (4.1.10)
h
ζ·α·g2(γ)·γ0
0 , . . . , h
ζ·α·g2(γ)·γ2n−1
0 , (4.1.11)
h
g1(γ)· ζ·h1(γ)−1γ
0 , h
ζκg22(γ)
0 (4.1.12)
where κ, ζ, ω, α, γ are unknown random elements of Zp, element Tb =
e(g0, h0)
κ·f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ) ∈ GT and a random group element T1−b ∈ GT while
b is a fair coin.
Output a bit b′. The problem is correctly solved if the output is b′ = b.
The following statement is a corollary of Theorem 2.30. It provides an in-
tractability bound in the generic model, but in groups equipped with pairings. A
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full proof of its intractability is given in Section 4.6.1. We emphasize on the fact
that, whereas the assumption has several parameters, it is non-interactive, and thus
easily falsifiable [Nao03].
Corollary 4.1 (Generic Security). For any probabilistic algorithm B that makes at
most qG queries to the oracles performing group operations in G1,G2,GT and the
bilinear map e(·, ·), its advantage in solving (n, s1, s2, t1)-aMSE-DDH problem is
bounded as
AdvaMSE-DDHB (λ) ≤
(qG + 12n− 2s1 − s2 + 2t1 + 7)2 · d
2p
where d = max(2(2n+ s1 + 1), 2(2n+ s2 + 2)).
4.3 Construction
In this section, we shall present our ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
scheme.
4.3.1 Introduction to the aggregation algorithm
Before presenting the details of our construction, we introduce the adopted algorithm
Aggregate of [DP08] for the decryption process. This algorithm is given for group
elements in GT [DP08], but it can be seen that it works in any group of prime order.
Aggregate({g
r
γ+xi , xi}1≤i≤l) The algorithm takes as input a list of values {g
r
γ+xi , xi}1≤i≤l,
where g
r
γ+xi ∈ G1, xi are pairwise distinct and r, γ ∈ Zp are unknown. It out-
puts the value
Aggregate({g
r
γ+xi , xi}1≤i≤l) = g
r∏l
i=1
(γ+xi) ∈ G1.
Here we give the details of the algorithm Aggregate. Given xi and g
r
γ+xi for
i = 1, . . . , l, let us define for any (j, k) such that 1 ≤ j < k ≤ l
Bj,k =
(
g
r
γ+xk
) 1∏j
i=1
(γ+xi) =
(
Bj−1,j
Bj−1,k
) 1
xk−xj
.
The algorithm poses B0,k = g
r
γ+xk for k = 1, . . . , l and computes sequentially Bj,k
for j = 1, . . . , l − 1 and k = j + 1, . . . , l using the above induction. The algorithm
finally outputs g
r∏l
i=1
(γ+xi) = Bl−1,l. Note that a successful run of the Aggregate
algorithm requires xj 6= xk for 1 ≤ j < k ≤ l. If there exists xj = xk for some j < k
then Bj−1,j = Bj−1,k, and Bj,k contains a factor of (γ + xj)
2 in the denominator of
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its exponent which makes it infeasible to compute without knowing γ. It can be
seen that the algorithm requires l2 operations of group exponentiation to carry out
the result.
4.3.2 Description
Setup(1λ,P) The PKG chooses a suitable encoding τ sending each attribute in P
onto a (different) element τ(Ai) = δ ∈ Zp. It also chooses a bilinear group system
S = (p,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·)). It picks at random η ∈ Zp and two generators g of G1
and h of G2, and set g′ = g
1
η and h′ = hη.
After that, a set D = {d1, . . . , dn−1} is chosen consisting of n − 1 pairwise
different elements of Zp, which must also be different to the values τ(Ai), for all
attributes in P . For any integer i lower or equal to n − 1, we denote as Di the set
{d1, ..., di}.
Next, the PKG picks at random α, γ ∈ Zp and sets u = gαγ, u′ = g′αγ and
Y = e(gα, h). The master secret key is then msk = (g, α, γ, η) and the public
parameters are
params =
(
P , n = |P|, u, Y, {hαγi , h′αγ
i
}i=0,...,2n−1,D, τ}
)
.
KeyGen(params,W,msk) Given any subset W ⊂ P of attributes, the PKG picks
r1, r2 ∈ Zp at random, computes r3 = 1− r2 ∈ Zp and outputs the private key skW
of (
{g
r1
γ+τ(Ai) , g′
r3
γ+τ(Ai)}Ai∈W , {hr1γ
i}i=0,...,n−2, h
r1−r2
γ
)
.
Enc(params,A,M) Given a threshold and AND-gate access structure of two sets
S1, S2 ⊂ P with s1 = |S1|, s2 = |S2| and a threshold value t1 satisfying 1 ≤ t1 ≤ s1,
and a message M ∈ GT , the sender picks at random κ ∈ Zp and computes
C1 = u
−κ,
C ′1 = u
′−κ,
C2 = h
κ·α·
∏
A∈S1 (γ+τ(A))
∏
d∈Dn+t1−1−s1
(γ+d)
,
C3 = h
′κ·α·
∏
A∈S2 (γ+τ(A)),
Cm = M · Y κ
The value C2 and C3 are computed from the public parameters ({hαγ
i
, h′αγ
i
}i=0,...,2n−1).
The ciphertext is then CT = (A, Cm, C1, C ′1, C2, C3).
Dec(params, CT, skW ) Any user with a set of attributes W such that W |= A can
use the private key to decrypt the ciphertext.
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To decrypt the ciphertext, the user need to compute e(g, h)κ·α = e(g, h)κ·α·r2 ·
e(g′, h′)κ·α·r3 .
First, the user computes e(g, h)κ·α·r2 as follows. Let WS1 be any subset of W ∩S1
with |WS1| = t1. The user computes
Aggregate({g
r1
γ+τ(Ai) , τ(Ai)}Ai∈WS1 ) = g
r1∏
Ai∈WS1
γ+τ(Ai) .
With the aggregated output the user then computes
L1 = e(g
r1∏
Ai∈WS1
γ+τ(Ai) , C2).
Next, a polynomial P(WS1 ,S1)(X) is defined in γ as
P(WS1 ,S1)(γ) =
1
γ
(
V(WS1 ,S1)(γ)− v(WS1 ,S1)
)
.
where V(WS1 ,S1)(γ) =
∏
Ai∈S1\WS1
(γ + τ(Ai))
∏
d∈Dn−1+t1−s1
(γ + d) and v(WS1 ,S1) =∏
Ai∈S1\WS1
τ(Ai)
∏
d∈Dn−1+t1−s1
d.
Since deg V(WS1 ,S1)(γ) = s1−t1 +n−1+t1−s1−1 = n−2, the user can compute
h
r1P(WS1 ,S1)
(γ)
from the values {hr1γi}i=0,...,n−2 in skW . After that, the user computes
L2 =
(
e(C1, h
r1P(WS1 ,S1)
(γ)
) · L1
) 1
v(WS1
,S1)
e(g, h)κ·α·r2 = e(C1, h
r1−r2
γ ) · L2
Second, the user computes e(g′, h′)κ·α·r3 . The user computes
Aggregate({g′
r3
γ+τ(Ai) , τ(Ai)}Ai∈S2) = g′
r3∏
Ai∈S2 γ+τ(Ai) .
With the aggregated output the user then computes
e(g′, h′)κ·α·r3 = e(g′
r3∏
Ai∈S2 γ+τ(Ai) , C3).
Finally, the user recovers the message
M =
Cm
e(g, h)κ·α·r2 · e(g′, h′)κ·α·r3
=
Cm
e(g, h)κ·α
4.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we prove that our scheme is secure against selective chosen-ciphertext
attacks, assuming that the (n, s1, s2, t1)-aMSE-DDH problem is hard.
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Theorem 4.2. Let λ be an integer. For any adversary A against the IND-sCPA
security of our CP-ABE encryption scheme, for an attribute universe P of size n,
and a challenge pair (s1, s2, t1) with s1 = |S1|, s2 = |S2|, 1 ≤ t1 ≤ s1, there exists an
algorithm B of the (n, s1, s2, t1)-aMSE-DDH problem, such that
AdvaMSE-DDHB (λ) ≥ AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
Proof. We firstly discuss the high level idea of the proof. To prove the theorem,
we assume that there exists an adversary A which can break our CP-ABE scheme
with non-negligible advantage. We show how to use this adversary as a black-box to
construct an algorithm B that breaks the (n, s1, s2, t1)-augmented multi-sequence of
exponents decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. The main idea in the proof will be to
use the input of the (n, s1, s2, t1)-aMSE-DDH problem to define the group generators
with some polynomials in γ in their exponents as well as the randomness numbers
so that public parameters and private keys can be simulated.
For the algorithm B breaking the (n, s1, s2, t1)-aMSE-DDH problem, B is given
a bilinear map group system S = (p,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·)), and an (n, s1, s2, t1)-aMSE-
DDH problem instance in S. B thus have four co-prime polynomials f , g1, g2 and
h1 defined by the vector
−→x 2n−1−s1+t1 = (x1, . . . , x2n−1−s1+t1), of orders n − s1 − s2,
s1, s2 and n− s1 − 1 + t1 respectively, and the values
g0, g
γ
0 , . . . , g
γ2n−s1+t1−3
0 , g
κ·γ·f(γ)g2(γ)
0 , (4.1.1)
g
α·g2(γ)·γ0
0 , . . . , g
α·g2(γ)·γn−s1−s2+1
0 , (4.1.2)
gω·γ0 , . . . , g
ω·γn
0 , (4.1.3)
g
κγf(γ)g1(γ)
ζ
0 , (4.1.4)
g
g1(γ)·αγ
0
ζ
0 , . . . , g
g1(γ)·α·γ
n−s1−s2+1
ζ
0 , (4.1.5)
g
ωγ0
ζ
0 , . . . , g
ωγn−1
ζ
0 , (4.1.6)
h
g1(γ)·γ0
0 , . . . , h
g1(γ)·γn+t1−3
0 , h
κ·g21(γ)h1(γ)
0 , (4.1.7)
h
α·g1(γ)·γ0
0 , . . . , h
α·g1(γ)·γ2n−1
0 , (4.1.8)
h
ω·g1(γ)·γ0
0 , . . . , h
g1(γ)·ω·γn+s1−1
0 , (4.1.9)
h
ζ·h1(γ)·g1(γ)·γ0
0 , . . . , h
ζ·h1(γ)·g1(γ)·γs2−2
0 , (4.1.10)
h
ζ·α·g2(γ)·γ0
0 , . . . , h
ζ·α·g2(γ)·γ2n−1
0 , (4.1.11)
h
g1(γ)· ζ·h1(γ)−1γ
0 , h
ζκg22(γ)
0 (4.1.12)
where κ, ζ, ω, α and γ are unknown random elements of Zp. B is also given an
element Tb = e(g0, h0)
κ·f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ) ∈ GT and a random group element T1−b ∈ GT
where b is a fair coin independent of B’s view.
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At a high level, our simulation works as follows. B simulates the joint distribu-
tion consisting of adversary’s view in its attack in the security game, and the hidden
bit β which is not a part of the adversary’s view. We will show that if the input
comes as b = 0, the simulation will be perfect, and so the adversary will launch
its full ability breaking our CP-ABE. We will also show that if the input comes as
b = 1, then the adversary’s view is independent of β, and therefore the adversary’s
advantage is negligible. This immediately implies B distinguishing the distribution
of its input: run the simulator and adversary together, and if the simulator outputs
β and the adversary outputs β′, B outputs b′ = 0 if β = β′, and 1 otherwise.
We now give the details of the simulation. From now on, we will denote by WS
the subset W ∩ S.
Init B defines an attribute universe P = {A1, . . . , An} of cardinal n. A gives B
the challenge access structure A∗ defined by a threshold and AND-gate policy
(S1, t1) ∧ (S2) where S1, S2 ⊂ P of respective cardinal s1, s2 and a threshold
value of cardinal 1 ≤ t1 ≤ s1. Here, we assume S1 = {An−s1−s2+1, . . . , An−s2}
and S2 = {An−s2+1, . . . , An}.
Setup The algorithm B defines g := gf(γ)·g2(γ)0 , h := h
g1(γ)
0 , η := ζ ·
g2(γ)
g1(γ)
; thus,
g′ = g
1
η = g
f(γ)g1(γ)
ζ
0 , h
′ = hη = h
ζ·g2(γ)
0 . B then can compute
– the value u = gαγ = g
αγ·f(γ)g2(γ)
0 with line (4.1.2) of its input values, since
the exponent α ·γ ·f(γ)g2(γ) is a linear combination of {g2(γ) ·α, . . . , g2(γ) ·
α · γn−s1−s2+1} and B knows the coefficients of the exponent polynomial.
– the value u′ = g′αγ = g
αγ·f(γ)g1(γ)
ζ
0 with line (4.1.5), in the same way as
computing u.
– the value Y = e(g, h)α = e(g
f(γ)g2(γ)
0 , h
g1(γ)
0 )
α = e(g
α·f(γ)g2(γ)
0 , h
g1(γ)
0 ) with line
(4.1.2) for g
α·f(γ)g2(γ)
0 and line (4.1.7) for h
g1(γ)
0 .
– elements in {hαγi = hα·g1(γ)·γ
i
0 }i=0,...,2n−1 with line (4.1.8).
– elements in {h′αγ
i
= h
ζα·g2(γ)·γi
0 }i=0,...,2n−1 with line (4.1.11).
To complete the setup phase, B needs to define the encoding of attributes
τ(Ai) and the values of set D.
– The encoding τ is defined as τ(Ai) = xi for i = 1, . . . , n. It can be seen that
the encodings of the first n− s1 − s2 elements are the opposite of the roots
of f(X), the encodings of the attributes in S1 are the opposite of roots of
g1(X), and the encodings of the attributes in S2 are the opposite of roots of
g2(X).
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– The setD = {d1, . . . , dn−1} is defined as di = xn+i for i = 1, . . . , n−1−s1+t1
following dj for j = n−s1 +t1, . . . , n−1 is picked uniformly at random in Zp
repeatedly until it is distinct from {x1, . . . , x2n−1−s1+t1 , dn−s1+t1 , . . . , dj−1}.
We note the values of d1, . . . , dn−1−s1+t1 are the opposite of roots of h1(X).
Finally, B sends to A the simulated public parameters:(
u, u′, Y, {hαγi , h′αγ
i
}i=0,...,2n−1,D, τ
)
.
Phase 1 The adversary A makes private key queries. To respond to a query on
attribute set W ⊂ P , where W 6|= A∗, the algorithm B must produce a tuple
of the form (
{g
r1
γ+τ(Ai) , g′
r3
γ+τ(Ai)}Ai∈W , {hr1γ
i}i=0,...,n−2, h
r1−r2
γ
)
.
Observe that since W 6|= A∗ all allowed queries must satisfy |WS1| < t1 or
|WS2 | < s2. B defines the polynomials for i = 1, 2,
QWSi (X) =
1 |WSi | = 0λi ·∏A∈ωSi (X + τ(A)) |WSi | > 0 ,
where λi =
(∏
A∈ωSi
τ(A)
)−1
, and simulates a private key for W according to
the following cases:
If |WS1| < t1: B picks at random y1c, y3c in Zp, and defines
r1 := (1 + ωy1cγ)QWS1 (γ),
r2 := 1− ωy3cγQWS2 (γ),
r3 := ωy3cγQWS2 (γ).
B then computes the elements for skW :
– For any attribute A ∈ W ,
g′
r3
γ+τ(A) = g
ωγy3c
ζ
·
f(γ)g1(γ)QWS2
(γ)
γ+τ(A)
0 .
Since an attribute A ∈ W must be in WS2 , S1 or P \ (S1 ∪ S2),
(γ + τ(A))|f(γ)g1(γ)QWS2 (γ). The element can be computed with
line (4.1.6) as its exponent polynomial is then a linear combination
of {ω
ζ
, . . . , ωγ
n
ζ
} of degree at most n in γ.
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– For any attribute A ∈ W ,
g
r1
γ+τ(A) = g
ωγy1c·
f(γ)g2(γ)QWS1
(γ)
γ+τ(A)
0 · g
f(γ)g2(γ)QWS1
(γ)
γ+τ(A)
0 .
Since an attribute A ∈ W can be in WS1 , S2 or P \ (S1 ∪ S2), (γ +
τ(A))|f(γ)g2(γ)QWS1 (γ). The first factor can be computed with line
(4.1.3) as its exponent is a polynomial in γ of degree at most n−1, and
the second factor can be computed with line (4.1.1) as its exponent is
a polynomial in γ of degree at most n− 2.
– The value h
r1−r2
γ =
h
ωg1(γ)·(y1cQWS1 (γ)+y3cQWS2 (γ))
0 · h
g1(γ)
QWS1
(γ)−1
γ
0 ,
where the first factor can be computed from line (4.1.9) and the second
factor can be computed from line (4.1.7), since QWS1 (γ) is a polynomial
with independent term 1 by its definition, thus g1(γ)
QWS1
(γ)−1
γ
is a linear
combination of {g1(γ), g1(γ) · γ, . . . , g1(γ) · γt1−1}.
– Elements in {hr1γi}i=0,...,n−2 can be computed as
hr1γ
i
= h
g1(γ)ωy1cQWS1
(γ)·γi+1
0 · h
g1(γ)QWS1
(γ)·γi
0
where the first factor can be computed from line (4.1.9) and the second
factor can be computed from line (4.1.7).
If |WS2| < s2: B picks at random y1c, y3c in Zp, and defines
r1 := ωy1cγQWS1 (γ),
r2 := 1− ωy3cγQWS2 (γ)− ζ · h1(γ) ·QWS2 (γ),
r3 := ωy3cγQWS2 (γ) + ζ · h1(γ) ·QWS2 (γ).
B then computes the elements for skW :
– For any attribute A ∈ W ,
g′
r3
γ+τ(A) = g
ωγy3c
ζ
·
f(γ)g1(γ)QWS2
(γ)
γ+τ(A)
0 · g
f(γ)QWS2
(γ)g1(γ)·h1(γ)
γ+τ(A)
0 .
Since an attribute A ∈ W must be in WS2 , S1 or P \ (S1 ∪ S2), thus
(γ + τ(A))|f(γ)g1(γ)QWS2 (γ). The first factor can be computed from
line (4.1.6) as its exponent is a polynomial in γ of degree at most n−1,
and the second factor can be computed from line (4.1.1) as its exponent
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is a polynomial in γ of degree at most 2n− s1 + t1 − 3.
– For attribute A ∈ W ,
g
r1
γ+τ(A) = g
ωγy1c·
f(γ)g2(γ)QWS1
(γ)
γ+τ(A)
0 .
Since an attribute A ∈ W must be in WS1 , S2 or P \ (S1 ∪ S2), (γ +
τ(A))|f(γ)g2(γ)QWS1 (γ). It can be computed from line (4.1.3).
– Elements in {hr1γi}i=0,...,n−2 can be computed as
hr1γ
i
= h
g1(γ)ωy1cQWS1
(γ)·γi+1
0 ,
which can be computed from line (4.1.9).
– Finally, B needs to compute the value of h
r1−r2
γ from
J1 = h
ωg1(γ)(y1cQWS1
(γ)+y3cQWS2
(γ))
0
J2 = h
ζg1(γ)h1(γ)
QWS2
(γ)−1
γ
0
J3 = h
g1(γ)
ζh1(γ)−1
γ
0
h
r1−r2
γ = J1 · J2 · J3
where J1 can be computed from line (4.1.9); J2 can be computed from
line (4.1.10) since γ|QWS2 (γ)− 1 by the definition of QWS2 (γ); and J3
is given from line (4.1.12).
Challenge Once A sends to B the two messages M0 and M1, B flips a coin β ∈
{0, 1}, and sets
C∗m = T0 ·Mβ.
To simulate the rest of the challenge ciphertext, B implicitly defines the ran-
domness for the encryption as κ∗ = κ/α, and sets
C∗2 = h
κ·g1(γ)h1(γ) = h
κ·g21(γ)h1(γ)
0
which is given in line (4.1.7), and
C∗3 = h
′κ·g2(γ) = h0
ζ·κ·g22(γ)
which is given in line (4.1.12). To complete the ciphertext, B computes
C∗1 = u
−κ′ = g
−κγf(γ)g2(γ)
0
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from line (4.1.1), and
C ′1
∗
= u′
−κ′
= g
−κγf(γ)g1(γ)
ζ
0
from line (4.1.4). B givesA the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ = (C∗m, C∗1 , C ′1
∗, C∗2 , C
∗
3).
Phase 2 After the challenge step A may make other key extraction queries, which
are answered as before.
Guess A outputs a β′. If β′ = β, B outputs 0; otherwise B outputs 1.
Perfect Simulation: When b = 0,
T0 = e(g0, h0)
κ·f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ) ∈ GT ,
observe the challenge ciphertext
C∗m = Mβ · e(g0, h0)κ·f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ)
= Mβ · e(gα·f(γ)g1(γ)0 , h
g2(γ)
0 )
κ
= Mβ · Y κ
∗
.
Thus, CT ∗ is a valid ciphertext for A∗, and the challenge ciphertext issued by B
comes from a distribution identical to that in the actual construction; however,
we must still show that the public parameters and private keys issued by B are
appropriately distributed. But this follows from the fact that the unknown random
numbers γ, κ, ω, ζ, α are chosen uniformly random in Zp as well as other group
elements from the input.
Probability Analysis:
Let I = (−→x 2n−1−s1+t1 , γ, κ, ω, α, Tb, T1−b) be the input of the algorithm B and the
adversary A break our CP-ABE scheme with advantage AdvIND-sCPAA (λ). If b = 0,
then the simulation is perfect, A will guess the bit β correctly with its advantage,
and
|Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− 1
2
| = AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
Else, b = 1 and T0 is uniformly random in GT , thus C∗m is uniformly random and
independent in GT as well. In this case, the value of β is independent from A’s view,
Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1] = 1
2
.
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Thus, we have that
AdvaMSE-DDHB (λ) = |Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1]|
≥ AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
This concludes the proof of Theorem.
4.5 Efficiency and Performance
In this section, some of the previous CP-ABE schemes [CZF11, EMN+09, GZC+12,
HLR10, RD13b, TDM12] with constant-seize ciphertexts and our scheme are com-
pared from the aspects of efficiency. In Table 4.1 , efficiency comparisons are made
in terms of the attribute private key size and master secret key, the computation
overheads of encryption and decryption and the expressiveness of access policy. All
the listed CP-ABE schemes have short and constant-size ciphertexts.
Table 4.1: Comparison of CP-ABE schemes with constant-sieze ciphertexts
Scheme sk msk Enc Dec A.P.
[EMN+09] 2LG1 (nm+ 1)LZp (n+ 1)G1 + 2GT 2Ce + 2G2 ANDm
[HLR10] (n+ |AC | − 1)LG1 LG1 + 2LZp (2n+ 2|AU | − 4)G1 + 2GT 3Ce + (|ω|2 + n− 1)G1 + 4GT Threshold
[CZF11] (n+ 1)LG1 2nLG1 + 2nLZp (|AU |+ 2)G1 + (n− AU + 2)GT 2Ce + ACG1 + 2GT AND∗+,−
[GZC+12] 2n(n+ |AU |)LG1 LZp (n+ |AC |+ 3)G1 + 2GT 2Ce + n(n+ |AC |+ 2)G1 + 2GT Threshold
[TDM12] (n+ 1)LG1 3nLZp |AC |Ce + G1 + 2GT 2Ce + nG1 + GT AND∗+,−
[RD13b] 2LG1 2LG1 (n+ 2)G1 + 2G2 2Ce + 2GT ANDm
ST&A (2|AU |+ n)LG1 LG1 + 3LZp (2n+ 2|AC | − 6)G1 + 2GT 3Ce + (|ω|2 + n− 1)G1 + 5GT
Threshold
&AND
n : Total number of attributes in systems;
m : Total number of possible values of an attribute in systems;
AC : The set of attributes included in the access policy of a ciphertext;
AU : The set of attributes included in a user’s private key;
Ce: The cost of bilinear maps;
ω: Least subset of attributes satisfying an access structure;
G?: Group or the cost of operation in group, for G1 or GT ;
L∗: Bit length of element in *.
It can be seen that the proposed construction enjoys the advantage of the most
complex access policies as well as the succinct master secret key while falls back
in private key length and computational cost of decryption. In terms of computa-
tional overheads in encryption, the proposed construction is comparable to other
schemes. Overall, the proposed construction achieves a new level of complexity of
expressiveness and remains the efficiency in a comparable level.
4.6 Intractability of (n, s1, s2, t1)-aMSE-DDH
In this section, we provide the analysis of the intractability of (n, s1, s2, t1)-aMSE-
DDH problem. The intractability analysis is based on the analysis in generic group
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model in [DP08].
4.6.1 (n, s1, s2, t1)-aMSE-DDH
In this section, we prove the intractability of distinguishing the two distributions in-
volved in the (n, s1, s2, t1)-aMSE-DDH problem (cf. Corollary 4.1, section 4.2). The
proof is conducted in the generic group model: we exploit the framework of Defini-
tion 2.27 and 2.28 for the (n, s1, s2, t1)-aMSE-DDH problem; we then demonstrate
that the problem holds in the generic group model.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. To wrap up Corollary 4.1, we consider our problem in the
weakest case G1 = G2 = G and pose α = α′ζ, ω = ω′ζ, κ = κ′ζ, g0 = g, h0 = hβγ.
Our problem can be reformulated as decisional (P,Q, F )-GDHE Problem where
P =

1, γ, . . . , γ2n−s1+t1−3,
κ′ζ · γ · f(γ)g2(γ),
ζα′ · γ0 · g2(γ), . . . , ζα′ · γn−s1−s2+1 · g2(γ),
ζω′ · γ, ζω′ · γ2 . . . , ζω′ · γn,
κ′ · γ · f(γ)g1(γ),
α′ · γ0 · g1(γ), . . . , α′ · γn−s1−s2+1 · g1(γ),
ω′, ω′ · γ, . . . , ω′ · γn,
β · γ1 · g1(γ), . . . , β · γn+t1−2 · g1(γ),
βκ′ζ · γ · g21(γ)h1(γ)
βα · γ1 · g1(γ), . . . , β · α · γ2n · g1(γ)
βω · γ1 · g1(γ), . . . , βω · γn+s1 · g1(γ),
βζ · γ1 · h1(γ)g1(γ), . . . , βζ · γs2−1 · h1(γ)g1(γ),
βζ · α · γ1 · g2(γ), . . . , βζ · α · γ2n · g2(γ),
β · g1(γ) · (ζ · h1(γ)− 1),
βκ′ζ2 · γ · g22(γ)

Q = (1)
F = β · κ′ · ζ · γ · f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ).
We need to prove the independence of F from 〈P,Q〉. By making all possible
products of two polynomials from P which are multiples of β · κ′, we want to prove
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that the sum of any polynomials from the list R below does not lead to F :
R =

βκ′ζ · γ · A1(γ)g21(γ)h1(γ)
βκ′ζ2 · γ · A2(γ)g22(γ)
βκ′ζ · γ ·B1(γ)f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ)
βκ′ · γ2 ·B2(γ)f(γ)g21(γ)
a1βκ
′ζ · γ · (ζ · h1(γ)− 1) · f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ)
a2βκ
′ · γ · (ζ · h1(γ)− 1) · f(γ)g21(γ)
βκ′ζ2 · γ2 · C2(γ)f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ)h1(γ)
βκ′ζ · γ2 · C1(γ)f(γ)g21(γ)h1(γ)
where a1 and a2 are constant coefficients; A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2 are polynomials in
γ.
After simplifying the list R, it can be seen that if F is not independent of 〈P,Q〉
we can then derive ζ · γ · f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ) from following list R′:
R′ =

ζ · γ · A1(γ)g21(γ)h1(γ) (4.2.1)
ζ2 · γ · A2(γ)g22(γ) (4.2.2)
ζ · γ ·B1(γ)f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ) (4.2.3)
γ2 ·B2(γ)f(γ)g21(γ) (4.2.4)
a1ζ · γ · (ζ · h1(γ)− 1) · f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ) (4.2.5)
a2 · γ · (ζ · h1(γ)− 1) · f(γ)g21(γ) (4.2.6)
ζ2 · γ2 · C2(γ)f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ)h1(γ) (4.2.7)
ζ · γ2 · C1(γ)f(γ)g21(γ)h1(γ) (4.2.8)
where a1 and a2 are constant coefficients; A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2 are polynomials
in γ with 0 ≤ degA1, degA2 ≤ n − s1 − 2 + max(0, t1 − s2); 0 ≤ degB1, degB2 ≤
n+ t1 − 3; 0 ≤ degC1, degC2 ≤ s2 − 2.
Thus, we have the following equation:
ζ · γ · f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ) =
ζ · γ · A1(γ)g21(γ)h1(γ) + ζ2 · γ · A2(γ)g22(γ)+
ζ · γ ·B1(γ)f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ) + γ2 ·B2(γ)f(γ)g21(γ)+
a1 · ζ · γ · (ζ · h1(γ)− 1) · f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ)+
a2 · γ · (ζ · h1(γ)− 1) · f(γ)g21(γ)+
ζ2 · γ2 · C2(γ)f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ)h1(γ)+
ζ · γ2 · C1(γ)f(γ)g21(γ)h1(γ).
Observing the equation, there are two conditions that must be satisfied.
50 CHAPTER 4. EFFICIENT AND EXPRESSIVE CP-ABE
1. The right hand side must have no multiple of ζ2, concerning (4.2.2), (4.2.5) and
(4.2.7).
ζ2 · γ
(
A2(γ)g
2
2(γ) + g2(γ)∆(a1 + γ · C2(γ))
)
= 0
where ∆ = g1(γ)h1(γ)f(γ). It then leads to
−(a1 + γ · C2(γ))∆ = A2(γ)g2(γ)
where degC2(γ) = s2− 2 and deg g2(γ) = s2. Since g1, h1, f and g2 are co-prime
(∆ and g2 are co-prime), we must have
g2(γ)| (a1 + γ · C2(γ)) ,
but deg (a1 + γ · C2(γ)) < deg g2(γ). Thus,
a1 + γ · C2(γ) = 0,
a1 = C2(γ) = A2(γ) = 0.
2. The right hand side must have no multiple without ζ, concerning (4.2.4) and
(4.2.6).
γ ·
(
γ ·B2(γ)g21(γ)f(γ)− a2 · g21(γ)f(γ)
)
= 0
which leads to
a2 = γ ·B2(γ)
where degB2(γ) ≥ 0. Thus,
a2 = B2(γ) = 0.
The equation can then be re-written into
f(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ) =A1(γ)g
2
1(γ)h1(γ) + γ ·B1(γ)g1(γ)g2(γ)f(γ)
+ γ · C1(γ) · g21(γ)f(γ)h1(γ)
Finally, we have
(1− γ ·B1(γ))g2(γ)f(γ) = (γ · C1(γ)f(γ) + A1(γ))g1(γ)h1(γ).
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where 1 − γ · B1(γ) 6= 0, degB1(γ) ≤ n + t1 − 3, deg g1(γ) = s1 and deg h1(γ) =
n− s1 + t1 − 1. Since f , g1, g2 and h1 are co-prime, we must have
g1(γ)h1(γ)|(1− γ ·B1(γ)).
However, deg (1− γ ·B1(γ)) < deg g1(γ)h1(γ) will result in 1− γ ·B1(γ) = 0, which
contradicts with the fact 1− γ ·B1(γ) 6= 0.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a flexible CP-ABE scheme supporting a threshold and
AND-gate access policies which produces constant-size ciphertexts. Compared with
previous CP-ABE schemes with short ciphertexts which allow access policies to be
either a single AND-gate or a single threshold, our scheme can be applied in a larger
number of more general situations. The proposed scheme is proven secure against
selective chosen plaintext attacks in the standard model under the assumption that
the newly introduced augmented Multi-Sequence of Exponents Decisional Diffie-
Hellman problem is hard. The intractability of the aMSE-DDH problem is proved in
the generic group model within the framework of General Diffie-Hellman Exponent
problems in [BBG05].
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Chapter 5
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption with Key-Delegation
Abuse Resistance
In ABE system, users’ access privileges and their private keys are linked. When
new keys can be illegally generated without the PKG the encryption system could
collapse easily, even if the access privilege provided by these new keys are limited.
An insightful observation is that in most existing schemes new private keys for lesser
access right can be generated by (or split from) a valid private key with ease. This
“property” exists in most ABE schemes and we call it “key-delegation abuse”. The
application of ABE system will be hindered if the property of key-delegation abuse
is maliciously exploited. In this chapter, we address the “key-delegation abuse”
problem in Ciphertext-policy Attribute-based Encryption systems. We introduce
a new mechanism to enhance CP-ABE schemes that provide protections against
this key-delegation abuse issue. We formalise the security requirements for such
a property, and subsequently construct a CP-ABE scheme that satisfies the new
security requirements.
5.1 Background and Scenario
“Collusion attack resistance” is a basic security requirement in CP-ABE that a user
with a private key for a set W of attributes cannot generate new and valid private
keys for a set W ′ of attributes if W ⊂ W ′, even with the help from other users. An
interesting question is whether the reverse is also true. Specifically, the question is:
given a private key for attribute set W , can a new key for any subset W ′ ⊂ W be
generated? This important issue receives a very limited attention in the literature.
If the answer is positive, this can lead to some undesirable situation.
To illustrate this situation, consider the following scenario. A media broad-
caster (who is the trusted authority in the cryptographic setting) controls the con-
tents to its subscribers by encrypting the contents with a CP-ABE system. With-
out losing generality, the contents will be encrypted with an attribute set as fol-
lows: {Sport, Biography, Drama, Comedy, Action, Thriller, Fantasy, Sci-Fi,
Documentary,War}. Note that there are ten attributes in the possible set in
this example. Each possible channel is sold for $10/month, and hence, it will cost
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$100/month to subscribe to all channels. To make the package deal more attrac-
tive, the media broadcaster introduces a premium user package. For a premium
user package, the user needs to subscribe to all channels, and hence the ten at-
tributes, and the premium user will be granted two additional channels, namely
{HD,Hollywood − movies}, and the premium price is $100/month for the whole
package. Consider the case where a malicious user, Malva, purchases the premium
package. If the CP-ABE scheme that is adopted allows Malva to create a new pri-
vate key for any attribute, which is a subset to the original attribute set that he has,
then Malva can make money from this case. He will then construct a private key for
the attribute Sport for example, and sells this for $9/month, and for the ten possible
attributes, he will accrue $90/month. Additionally, he can sell any combinations of
the attribute sets (such as {Sport, Fantasy}) and again sell it at a cheaper price
than $20/month. Note that in total, he will make more than $100/month by simply
re-selling a combination of these channels.
We point out that in this case, it is clear that Malva obtains an advanced control
over potential subscribers by selling private keys of different subsets of attributes
and managing his own groups of customers. With this kind of mischief, different
from simply selling decrypted plaintexts, illegal keys are sold which can be used
to decrypt existing and future ciphertexts. In fact, Malva has functioned as an
illegal “trusted authority”, who can cause further influence and deeper damage to
the media broadcast system. From now on, we shall call this “property” in ABE
as the key-delegation abuse, if the adversary can generate a private key for any
subset without revealing his/her entire access rights. It is clear that this property
is undesirable in many scenarios, as outlined above.
To the best of our knowledge, the key-delegation abuse problem in ABE systems
is still not yet well explored in the literature, and hence, it becomes an inherent prob-
lem in ABE. Some existing solutions suggest embedding users’ private information
into their private keys. The malicious users may be wary of constructing new keys
with the risk of leaking important information. On the other hand, the embedded
information could be used for tracking devices or algorithms to pinpoint who ille-
gally generated new keys. However, these approaches have two limitations: 1) they
gave a deterrent solution, while users are still capable to issue new private keys; and
2) they need the constructed new key to trace who the malicious user is.
Our Techniques. We propose a CP-ABE scheme with key-delegation abuse resistance
that supports AND-gate access policies. In our scheme, a private key is generated
with components for all attributes from two sets of bilinear group elements based
on if the attribute is owned by the user. The encryption algorithm will generate
ciphertext components from two different sets of group elements the same way as key
components. Thus, corresponding key and ciphertext components for all attributes
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are forced into bilinear map for decryption where private keys cannot be split or
combined. The scheme we proposed in this section could be also considered as a
basic scheme that can be further extended to traceable CP-ABE applications. For
the details of traceable CP-ABE applications please see Section 7.1.
5.1.1 Related Work
In [HJSS08], Hinek et al. mentioned the problem of key cloning, and another third
party should be involved in each users decryption in their scheme, which makes it
impractical. Then, the problem of building a secure CP-ABE supporting traceabil-
ity has recently been studied in [LRK09, LHC+11, LCW13a, LCW13b]. The access
policies in [LRK09, LHC+11] only support a single AND gate with wild-card. The
traceable CP-ABE proposed in [LCW13b] is as fully secure, highly expressive and
efficient as a conventional CP-ABE such as the one in [LOS+10], but it only supports
tracing ’well-formed’ illegally constructed private keys. Later, [LCW13a] proposed
a new CP-ABE scheme proved fully secure which can trace not ‘well-formed’ ille-
gally constructed private keys. However, traceability cannot prevent “key-delegation
abuse” issue – malicious users can still illegally generate keys in private.
5.1.2 Violating Access Control Policy with “Key-Abuse”
Property
The key-delegation abuse property is that a user who owns a private key for attribute
set W can generate a new private for a subset W ′ ⊂ W . This property exists in
majority of CP-ABE schemes. In the following, we shall demonstrate that this key-
delegation abuse property can lead to some undesirable situation where the access
control policy is violated.
Without losing generality, we shall consider the Cheung and Newport scheme
proposed in [CN07]. Cheung and Newport proposed a CP-ABE scheme [CN07]
(which is referred to as the CN scheme throughout this paper), in which access
structure is restricted to an AND gate, but the i-th attribute is allowed to be either
positive Ai, negative ¬Ai or “don’t care”. In their system, let the attribute universe
be P = {A1, A2, A3, A4, A5} with size n = 5, then the public key is params = (G =
〈g〉, |G| = p, e : G × G → GT , Y = e(g, g)y ∈ GT , {Tk = gtk , Tn+k = gtn+k , T2n+k =
gt2n+k ∈ G}Ak∈P) where y, {tk, tn+k, t2n+k ∈ Zp}Ak∈P are picked at random uniformly,
and the master secret key is msk = (y, {tk, tn+k, t2n+k}Ak∈P).
A private key for attribute set W = {A1, A2, A3} is
skW =
(
D̂ = gy−r, {Di = g
ri
ti }Ai∈W , {Di = g
ri
tn+i }Ai∈P\W , {Fi = g
ri
t2n+i }Ai∈P
)
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where r =
n∑
i=1
ri and {ri}i=1,...,n are picked uniformly at random.
To encrypt a message M with AND gate access policy AS =
∧
Ai∈S Ai where
S = {A1, A2}, we pick κ uniformly at random and then compute
CT =
(
AS , Cm = MY κ, Ĉ = gκ, {Ci = T κi }Ai∈S , {Ci = T κ2n+i}Ai∈P\S
)
.
To decrypt the ciphertext CT using skW , only several group elements of skW
are used as
M = Cm
e(Ĉ,D̂)·
∏
Ai∈S
e(Di,Ci)
∏
Ai∈P\S
e(Fi,C−i)
= Cm
e(gs,gy−r)
n∏
i=1
e(g,g)ri·κ
= Cme(g,g)y·κ =
Cm
Y κ .
Thus, the user who owns skW can generate a new key
sk′ =
(
D̂′ = D̂, {D′i = Di}{Ai}i=1,2 , {F ′i = Fi}Ai∈P
)
to decrypt ciphertexts with AND gate (A1), (A1 ∧ A2), (A2) since sk′ includes all
group elements that will be needed during the decryption algorithm.
From the example, it can be seen that to decrypt ciphertexts with different access
policies, different parts of a private key are used during the decryption, which makes
it plausible to illegally generate new keys. This property of key-delegation abuse
does not break the security of encryption schemes and sometimes is adopted for
applications like key delegation. However, unauthorised key generation can lead to
violation of access control policy.
Chapter Organisation. The paper is organised as follows: Section 5.2 provides the
new security model against key-delegation abuse attacks. In Section 5.3 our CP-
ABE construction is presented, and the security proof is presented in Section 5.4.
Finally, the chapter is summarised in Section 5.5.
5.2 Security Model against Key-delegation Abuse
Attacks
We now give the security definition against Key-Delegation Abuse Attacks in CP-
ABE system. This is described by a security game between a challenger and an
adversary. The game is formalised based on [GLSW08] and proceeds as follows:
Setup The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters
params to the adversary. The attribute universe P and message space M are
also defined during this step.
Queries The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to
different sets of attributes W1, . . . ,Wq ⊆ P . In response, for each query Wj
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for 1 ≤ j ≤ q the challenger runs KeyGen(msk,Wj) to compute the private
key skWj , and send it back to the adversary A. A can query the challenger
adaptively.
Output The adversary chooses a new attribute set W ∗ 6= Wj for 1 ≤ j ≤ q,
generates a new private key sk∗ for attribute set W ∗, a new general decryption
algorithm Dec∗(params, CT, sk), and send them to the challenger.
The adversary wins if
1. Dec∗(sk∗,Enc(params,M,A) = M for all A =
∧
Ai∈S Ai, S ⊆ W
∗ and any message
M ∈M.
2. For all polynomial time decryption algorithms Dec′, for all A =
∧
Ai∈S Ai, S 6⊂ W
∗
and any pair of distinct messages M0, M1 and uniformly random bit b, we have
Pr[Dec′(sk∗,Enc(params,Mb,A)) = Mb] < 1/2 + ε, where ε is negligible.
The advantage of A is defined to be the probability that A wins the security game.
Definition 5.1. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system is secure against
Key-Abuse Attacks if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible ad-
vantage in this security game.
5.3 Construction
In this section, we shall present our CP-ABE scheme. For simplicity, let the universe
of attributes be P := {A1, . . . , An} for some natural number n.
In our construction the key generation algorithm will link the key components
of one user with a specific set of group elements, and then apply the secret sharing
technology to all attributes, so that the key cannot be split or combined to obtain
other valid secret keys. Each private key will be generated including one key com-
ponent per attribute: if the user owns this attribute the key component will be
generated with the set of group elements of ti; otherwise, generated with the set of
group elements of tn+i. The encryption algorithm will take as input an AND gate
and distribute a random exponent κ ∈ Zp according to all attributes: if an attribute
is included in the AND gate there will be only one ciphertext component for this
attribute generated with the set of group elements hi for decryption; otherwise, two
ciphertext components for this attribute will be generated with hi and hn+i.
Setup(1λ,P) : Given a security parameter λ and an attribute universe P of size of
n, the setup algorithm first chooses a bilinear group G of prime order p. It
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then chooses random numbers t1, . . . , t2n, α ∈ Zp, random group generators
g0, h0 ∈ G, and computes
Y = e(g0, h0)
α, h1 = h
t1
0 , . . . , hn = h
tn
0 , hn+1 = h
tn+1
0 , . . . , h2n = h
t2n
0 .
The public parameters params are params = (h1, . . . , h2n, Y, e,G,GT ,P). The
master secret key msk is msk = (g0, t1, . . . , t2n, α).
Enc(params,M,A) : To encrypt a message M ∈ GT with an access structure A =∧
Ai∈S Ai the following steps are taken. A random value κ ∈ Zp is picked
uniformly. The ciphertext is then generated as:
CT =
(
A, Cm = MY κ, {Ci = hκi }Ai∈S, {Ci = hκn+i, C ′i = hκi }Ai∈P\S
)
.
KeyGen(msk,W ) : To generate a private key for attribute set W ⊆ P the following
steps are taken. n − 1 random values r1, . . . , rn−1 are randomly chosen in Zp
and compute rn = α− r1 − · · · − rn−1 ∈ Zp. The private key for the attribute
set W :
sk =
(
W, {Di = g
ri
ti
0 }Ai∈W , {Di = g
ri
tn+i
0 }Ai∈P\W
)
.
Dec(params, CT , sk) : Suppose that a ciphertext, CT , is encrypted with an access
structure A =
∧
Ai∈S Ai and we have a private key for attribute set W , where
S ⊆ W .
Then, the ciphertext can be decrypted by following steps:
∏
Ai∈S∪{P\W}
e(Di, Ci)
∏
Ai∈W\S
e(Di, C
′
i) =
∏
Ai∈W
e(g
ri
ti
0 , h
κ
i )
∏
Ai∈P\W
e(g
ri
tn+i
0 , h
κ
n+i)
=
∏
Ai∈W
e(g
ri
ti
0 , h
tiκ
0 )
∏
Ai∈P\W
e(g
ri
tn+i
0 , h
tn+iκ
0 )
= e(g0, h0)
κ
∑
Ai∈P
ri = e(g0, h0)
ακ.
Cm∏
Ai∈S∪{P\W}
e(Di, Ci)
∏
Ai∈W\S
e(Di, C
′
i)
= MY
κ
e(g0,h0)ακ
= M.
5.4 Security Analysis
We shall prove the following theorems.
Theorem 5.2. If the DBDH assumption holds, our CP-ABE scheme defined in
Section 5.3 is secure in the sense of Definition 2.22.
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Proof. To prove the theorem, let us assume that there is an adversary A that can
break our CP-ABE scheme with non-negligible probability. We show how to use
this adversary to construct an algorithm B which breaks the DBDH assumption.
For the algorithm B breaking the DBDH assumption, we let the challenger set
the groups G and GT of prime p with an efficient bilinear map, e and generator g.
The challenger then flips a fair binary coin µ independent of B’s view. If µ = 0
the challenger sets (A,B,C, Z) = (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc); otherwise (A,B,C, Z) =
(ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z). At a high level, our simulation works as follows. We build
a simulator that simulates the joint distribution consisting of adversary’s view in
its attack in the security game, and the hidden bit β which is not a part of the
adversary’s view.
We will show that if the input comes as µ = 0, the simulation will be perfect,
and so the adversary will launch its full ability breaking our CP-ABE. We will also
show that if the input comes as µ = 1, then the adversary’s view is independent of
β, and therefore the adversary’s advantage is negligible. This immediately implies
B distinguishing the distribution of its input tuple: run the simulator and adversary
together, and if the simulator outputs β and the adversary outputs β′, B outputs
µ = 0 if β = β′, and 1 otherwise.
We now give the details of the simulator.
The input to the simulator is (p,G,GT , e, g, A = g
a, B = gb, C = gc, Z).
Init During the Init phase, the simulator receives the challenge access structure
A∗ =
∧
Ai∈S∗ Ai, where S
∗ ⊆ P , from the adversary A.
Setup First simulator chooses random numbers υ, ν, θ1, . . . , θn, γ1, . . . , γn ∈ Zp.
Next, the simulator computes
g0 = g
υ, h0 = g
ν , hi|Ai∈P = gνθi = h
θi
0 ,
hn+i|Ai∈W ∗ = Bνγi = h
bγi
0 , hn+i|Ai∈P\W ∗ = gνγi = h
γi
0 ,
Y = e(A,B)υν = e(g0, h0)
ab.
Since hi = h
ti
0 and hn+i = h
tn+i
0 for each attribute Ai ∈ P , the simulator
sets ti := θi ∈ Zp for each attribute Ai ∈ P , tn+i := bγi ∈ Zp for each
attribute Ai ∈ W ∗ and tn+i := γi ∈ ZN for each attribute Ai ∈ P \W ∗. Since
Y = e(u0, v0)
α, the simulator also sets α := ab ∈ Zp.
The simulated public parameters are params = (h1, . . . , h2n, Y, e,G,GT ,P).
The master secret key is msk = (g0, t1, . . . , t2n, α).
Phase 1 The adversary A makes private key queries. The simulator responds to
a query on W , where S∗ 6⊆ W , as follows. Observe that there must exist
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an attribute Ak ∈ S∗ such that k 6∈ W . The simulator first chooses such
an attribute k. Next, the simulator chooses r′1, . . . , r
′
n−1 ∈ ZN uniformly at
random and computes r′n = −
∑
i r
′
i. Then the simulator sets ri := br
′
i for each
attribute Ai 6= k ∈ P and rk := ab+ br′k for the attribute k.
Finally, the simulator computes
∀Ai ∈ W,Di = B
υr′i
θi = (gυ)
br′i
θi = g
ri
ti
0
∀Ai /∈ W,Ai ∈ S∗, i 6= k,Di = g
υr′i
γi = (gυ)
br′i
bγi = g
ri
tn+i
0
∀Ai /∈ W,Ai ∈ S∗, i = k,Dk = A
υ
γk · g
υrk
γk = g
(ab+br′k)υ
bγk = g
rk
tn+k
0
∀i /∈ W, i /∈ S∗, Di = B
υr′i
γi = (gυ)
br′i
γi = g
ri
tn+i
0
and passes sk = (W, {Di}Ai∈P) onto A.
Here we check the correctness of the simulated private key.∑
Ai∈P
ri =
∑
Ai 6=Ak,i∈P
ri + rk = b
∑
Ai 6=Ak,Ai∈P
r′i + ab+ br
′
k = ab.
Challenge The adversary A outputs messages M0,M1. The simulator generates a
bit β ∈ {0, 1} and sends A the challenge ciphertext:
CT ∗ =
(
A∗, Cm = Mβ · Zυν , {Ci = Cνθi = hic}Ai∈S∗ ,
{Ci = Cνγi = hcn+i, C ′i = Cνθi = hci}Ai∈P\S∗
)
.
Phase 2 A makes key generation queries, and the simulator responds as in Phase
1.
Guess Finally, the adversary outputs guesses β′. If β = β′, B outputs 0 indicating
that Z = e(g, g)abc; otherwise, it outputs 1.
Perfect Simulation: When µ = 1 and Z = e(g, g)abc, we have
Cm = Mβe(g, g)
abcυν = Mβe(g0, h0)
abc = M · Y c.
Thus, CT ∗ is a valid ciphertext for A∗, and the public key and the challenge
ciphertext issued by the simulator comes from a distribution identical to that
in the actual construction; however, we still must show that the private keys
issued by the simulator are appropriately distributed. To show that the keys
issued by the simulator are appropriately distributed, it suffices to show that,
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from A’s view, the value ga, gb is uniformly random and independent. But this
follows from the fact that ga, gb is chosen uniformly at random in G from the
input.
Probability Analysis: We assume the adversary A breaks our CP-ABE scheme
with non-negligible probability ε. If Z = e(g, g)abc, then the simulation is
perfect, and A will guess the bit β correctly with probability 1/2 + ε. Else,
Z = e(g, g)z is uniformly random in GT , and thus Cm is uniformly random
and independent element in GT . In this case, with probability 1 − 1/p the
value of β is independent from A’s view. Thus, we have that
Pr[B(A,B,C, Z) = 1] ≥ 1
2
+ ε(1− 1/p),
and
AdvDBDHB (λ) ≥ ε(1− 1/p).
This concludes the proof of Theorem.
Theorem 5.3. Our CP-ABE scheme is secure against Key-Delegation Abuse (in
the sense of Definition 5.1) in the generic group model.
Proof. To prove our scheme is secure against key-delegation abuse, the generic group
model is used for conducting a simulation of the security game in Definition 5.1. We
adopt the similar generic bilinear group model of [BBG05, Sho97] to show that as
long as the adversary acts generically there is a negligible probability that he/she can
win the security game against key-delegation abuse with our scheme. This signifies
that if there exists an efficient adversary who can win the security game with our
scheme, the adversary must exploit specific mathematical properties of the paring
group used for implementing our construction.
Concerning the gap between the generic group model and the standard model,
we believe it would be preferable to give a proof in standard model with a reduction
from an adversary winning the security game with our scheme to a well-known
complexity hard problem. We also believe that such reductions will only exist for
more complex schemes (for specific paring groups) under a weaker security notion
compared to our security game against key-delegation abuse attacks since our scheme
is the first construction that meets our proposed security property.
High Level Idea
We first discuss the high level idea of the proof.
In the generic group model, the adversary can only manipulate group elements
by using the canonical group operations, independent of the encoding for group
elements. Thus if the adversary is given group elements gδ1 , . . . , gδt ∈ G as its
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only inputs, then each element of G output by the adversary must be of the form
gπ(δ1,...,δt), where π is a fixed multi-linear polynomial.
Suppose the adversary gives a new private key sk∗ with a decryption algo-
rithm Dec∗(·) for an attribute set W ∗, with which ciphertexts encrypted with
A∗ =
∧
Ai∈W ∗ Ai can be decrypted. Using a standard argument for the generic
group model, we first show that if this is to happen with non-negligible probabil-
ity, then the multi-linear polynomials as described above in the new private key
must also satisfy corresponding constraints. Thus our approach is to assume that
the multi-linear polynomials corresponding to the adversary’s output satisfy the re-
quired constraints, and then obtain a contradiction. We proceed by arguing that in
order to satisfy the constraints, the polynomials must have certain structure (i.e.,
they can only depend on certain given group elements).
First, for a ciphertext CT encrypted under A∗ =
∧
Ai∈W ∗ Ai the new private
key can decrypt M from Cm if it can be used to compute Y
κ = e(g0, h0)
ακ. Thus,
it contains a group element in G for each attribute in P to pair the corresponding
Ci (or C
′
i) in the ciphertext in bilinear map. We denote these group elements by
D∗i for attribute Ai in P and the necessary structure of the new private key can be
presented as (W ∗, {D∗i }Ai∈P).
After narrowing down the necessary construction for sk∗, we note that D∗i needs
to be constructed based on key components D
(j)
i from j-th queried private key sk
(j)
for attribute set Wj since there is no other given group elements related to the
unknown master secret key α for the adversary. Nevertheless, we also note that
because of the difference of the queried attribute sets, for the same attribute Ai the
key components D
(j)
i might be generated based on different sets of group elements,
which makes them irreconcilable to be combined together. Thus, the new private
key sk∗ can only depend on one queried private key skj where W
∗ ⊂ Wj. But this
will result in that sk∗ can be used to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted with Wj that is
an attribute set beyond the supposed W ∗, which contradicts the second condition
in the security game’s definition.
Details of Proof
We consider two random encodings ψ0, ψT of the additive group Zp respectively,
that is injective maps ψ0, ψT : Zp → {0, 1}L, where L > 3 log(p). We write G =
ψ0(x) : x ∈ Zp,GT = ψT (x) : x ∈ Zp. We are given oracles to compute the induced
group action on G,GT and an oracle to compute a non-degenerate bilinear map
e : G×G→ GT . We refer to G as a generic bilinear group.
We now proceed with the proof, following the standard approach for generic
groups with ψ0, ψT ,G,GT defined as above. Let g = ψ0(1)(we will write gx to
denote ψ0(x), and e(g, g)
x to denote ψT (x)).
For any generic-group adversary, the security game against key-delegation abuse
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is considered carried out by a simulator as follows. For each group element seen
or created by the adversary, this simulator keeps track of its discrete logarithm by
means of a multivariate rational functions in the following indeterminate formal
variables: ∑
= {υ, ν} ∪ {ti}Ai∈P ∪ {r
(j)
i }Ai∈P,j∈[q].
The simulation also associates each group element with some rational function.
For each distinct rational function in its collection, it inputs the value of the rational
function to corresponding encoding ψ0 or ψT and gives the result to the adversary
as the encoding of that particular group element. The functions are associated with
the group elements in the simulation as follows:
First, we suppose g0 = g
υ, h0 = g
ν .
• Public parameters params generated by Setup
params = (h1, . . . , h2n, Y ).
1. {νti}Ai∈P , representing hi = h
ti
0 = g
νti .
2. {νtn+i}Ai∈P , representing hi = h
tn+i
0 = g
νti .
• Private key components given by KeyGen. Let skj be the j-th queried private key
for the attribute set Wj.
skj =
Wj, {D(j)i = g r(j)iti0 }Ai∈W , {D(j)i = g r(j)itn+i0 }Ai∈P\W

1. { υ
ti
r
(j)
i }j∈[q],Ai∈Wj , representing D
(j)
i = g
r
(j)
i
ti
0 .
2. { υ
tn+i
r
(j)
i }j∈[q],Ai∈P\Wj , representing D
(j)
i = g
r
(j)
i
tn+i
0 .
We note that in the actual game, the values of the formal variables are chosen
uniformly at random in Zp. Two distinct functions may in that case evaluate to the
same value. The simulation is faithful to the standard interaction in a generic group,
except in the event that two of the distinct functions evaluate to the same value on
a random assignment to the formal variables. For any two distinct functions of the
form listed above, the probability of this happening is at most O(q)/p, since the
degree of distinct multivariate polynomials is at most O(q). Since this probability
is negligible, we ignore this case.
Now the adversary outputs a purported new private key sk∗ for a new attribute
set W ∗ with a suitable decryption algorithm Dec∗(·). We first observe that to
decrypt a ciphertext CT encrypted with an access structure A =
∧
Ai∈S Ai, where
S is equal to or a subset of W ∗. The new private key sk∗ should contain a group
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element for each attribute to pair the corresponding group element Ci (or C
′
i) in the
ciphertext in bilinear map for Y κ = e(g0, h0)
ακ. We denote these group elements
by D∗i and the necessary structure of the new private key can be presented as
(W ∗, {D∗i }Ai∈P). On the other hand, as long as the new private key satisfies the
winning conditions the adversary can construct the new key sk∗ the way it wants
to make it look different, which means the adversary can construct the new private
key component D∗i using a linear combination of the functions listed above.
Here, we note that if the adversary tries to construct D∗i using any functions
other than D
(j)
i , then using this part of D
∗
i in bilinear map will result in meaningless
group element in GT for decryption, which also needs to be eliminated by computing
it separately; since it needs to be eliminated afterwards, we do not include it in
following discussion.
Without loss of general, we assume the new private key sk∗ contains the following
least structure for each attribute Ai:
D∗i = πi(D
(1)
i , . . . , D
(q)
i ) := (D
(1)
i )
βi,1(D
(2)
i )
βi,2 · · · (D(q)i )βi,q
= u
1
ti
∑
Ai∈Wj
βi,jr
(j)
i +
1
tn+i
∑
i/∈Wj
βi,jr
(j)
i
0
where πi(D
(1)
i , . . . , D
(q)
i ) := (D
(1)
i )
βi,1(D
(2)
i )
βi,2 · · · (D(q)i )βi,q represents a function in
G using components D(j)i from queried private keys.
Then we can represent D∗i as
υ
ti
∑
Ai∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i +
υ
tn+i
∑
Ai /∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i .
To win in the game, D∗i needs to meet following conditions:
1.
∑
Ai∈P
∑
j∈[q] βi,jr
(j)
i = α.
2. ∀Ai ∈ W ∗,
∑
i/∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i = 0.
3. ∀Ai /∈ W ∗,
∑
j /∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i 6= 0 and
∑
Ai∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i = 0.
The rest of our proof proceeds by assuming the new private key sk∗ satisfies
the conditions above, and obtaining a contradiction: that the new private key sk∗
can be used to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted with a queried attribute set Wj which
contradicts the second condition in the security game’s definition.
Considering condition 1,
∑
Ai∈P
∑
j∈[q] βi,jr
(j)
i = α. Since
∑
i r
(j)
i = α for j ∈ [q]
and r
(j)
i is chosen uniformly at random in Zp, we have
β1,j = β2,j = · · · = βn,j.
We denote them by βj.
Considering condition 2, for all Ai ∈ W ∗,
∑
i/∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i =
∑
ji/∈Wj βjr
(j)
i = 0.
5.5. SUMMARY 65
Since r
(j)
i is uniformly random chosen in Zp, it can be concluded that
if ∃Ai ∈ W ∗ and i /∈ Wj, βj = 0
which is equivalent to
if βj 6= 0,W ∗ ⊆ Wj.
Considering condition 3, for all Ai /∈ W ∗,
∑
j /∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i =
∑
j /∈Wj βjr
(j)
i 6= 0 and∑
Ai∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i =
∑
Ai∈Wj βjr
(j)
i = 0. Since r
(j)
i is chosen uniformly at random in
Zp, it can be concluded that
if ∃i /∈ W ∗ and Ai ∈ Wj, βj = 0
which is equivalent to
if βj 6= 0,Wj ⊆ W ∗.
So W ∗ equals to a queried attribute set Wj, which results in either the adversary
cannot generate a new key as W ∗ 6= Wj for j ∈ [q] or the new key will be able to
decrypt ciphertexts encrypted with Wj as well since only one queried private key
skj can be used. Therefore, our assumptions cannot be true. The adversary cannot
successfully generate a new private key sk∗ to win the game.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated an important property in ABE schemes, which we
call as the “key-delegation abuse”. When an ABE scheme is not key-delegation
abuse resistant, it means that the private keys that the users have will allow those
users to generate new set of private keys without the need of the trusted authority’s
involvement. To be more specific, the new derivative keys can be generated for
attribute set W ′ from a private key set for W , if W ′ ⊂ W . We outlined some
potential risks in practice, and we also pointed out that the existing schemes in
the literature suffer from this property in certain scenarios. It is indeed interesting
that this issue has not been well studied in the literature despite its importance
for the adoption of ABE in the real situation. We proposed a security notion for
the key-delegation abuse property and presented a new CP-ABE scheme that is key-
delegation abuse resistant. We proved the security of the scheme in both of standard
selective CPA model and the proposed model against key-delegation abuse. The
proposed scheme is constructed in a succinct form, but it produces long ciphertexts,
of which the size grows linearly with the total number of attributes, and requires
extra computational overheads in encryption and decryption compared to other
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efficient schemes that support AND-gate access policies.
Chapter 6
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based
Encryption Supporting Access
Policy Update
In many occasions, the enforced access control on encrypted data needs be updated
and the original encryptor might be required to re-encrypt the message, which is
impractical, since the encryptor might be unavailable. Unfortunately, to date this
issue about access policy update in ABE has not been considered, which implicitly
restricts the adoption of ABE in practice. In this chapter, the problem of efficiently
update existing access policies on ciphertexts is focused on, and ideally this process
of access policy update should not involve any further re-encryption. A new notion of
ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption supporting access policy update (CP-
ABE-APU) is introduced, which enables adding attributes to and revoking attributes
from existing access policies. We formalise the security requirements for this notion,
and subsequently construct two provably secure CP-ABE schemes supporting AND-
gate access policy with constant-size ciphertexts for user decryption.
6.1 Background and Scenario
Attribute-based encryption enforces encrypted data to be decrypted with a secure
access control mechanism that the assigned attributes must satisfy the access policies
associated with ciphertexts or private keys. When a message needs to be securely
distributed to a range of specific recipients, it will be encrypted with an access
policy that can be only satisfied by targeted recipients. The ciphertext can then
be uploaded to the storage server for recipients to download and decrypt. The
storage server does not need to be trusted by receivers but it functions as a proxy,
which performs the task that is assigned a priori. Unfortunately, to date, the access
policy enforced with the ciphertext cannot be changed once the encryption process
is completed. There is no CP-ABE scheme that supports modification of access
policies of ciphertexts. On the contrary, this has become a highly desirable feature
as situation can change from time to time, and without the ability to update the
access policy, CP-ABE may no longer be suitable in many practical scenarios. Hence,
an efficient update mechanism over access policies of ciphertexts must be enabled.
One may think that the above question can be solved trivially by requesting
67
68 CHAPTER 6. ACCESS POLICY UPDATE MECHANISM
encryptors to re-encrypt the messages when the access policies need to be updated.
However, several physical restrictions could make this approach impractical and un-
usable. For example, encryptors may not be available when the update is needed
or encryptors may have no access to sufficient computation power or network band-
width to accomplish the re-encryption.
Alternatively, one may think an attribute-based proxy re-encryption (AB-PRE)
system can be employed for access policy update. A ciphertext-policy attribute-
based proxy re-encryption (CP-AB-PRE) works as showed in Fig. 6.1. When the
access policies of a certain range of ciphertexts need to be updated, re-encryption
keys, one for each ciphertext, will be generated. Each re-encryption key is generated
by a user private key for a specific requirement that is from the old access policy to
a new access policy. The user private key used for re-encryption generation needs
to satisfy the old access policy. When all the re-encryption keys are generated, they
will be uploaded to a proxy. To re-encrypt a ciphertext, the proxy first checks if the
old access policy of the corresponding re-encryption key matches the access policy
of the ciphertext. If it is a match, the proxy then proceeds with the re-encryption.
Much effort have been put into developing and enhancing AB-PRE including
CP-AB-PRE. What AB-PRE provides is an efficient mechanism of re-encryption, to
wit to output the result of decrypting and encrypting to a new access policy without
actually decrypting the ciphertext or knowing the plaintext.
Need to update 
access policies 
of CT1, …, CTq 
Private key attribute 
set does not satisfy 
access policies of 
CTq1+1, …, CTq. 
Need some help from 
other users. 
Re-encrypt 
ciphertexts 
Figure 6.1: An example of user updating access policies of ciphertexts employing
PRE
Nevertheless, AB-PRE does not provide an efficient access policy update mech-
anism not to mention the within restriction that a valid re-encryption key needs to
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be generated when there is a need of access policy update. In real-world scenario the
amount of ciphertexts that need to be updated rises, which leads to a difficult situa-
tion when an authority tries to generate all the re-encryption keys and then uploads
them. In addition, the authority does not necessarily own a private key that satisfies
the old access policies of all the involved ciphertexts. Help from other authorities
or the original encryptors will be needed, which then leads to further sophisticated
situations. It can be seen that to update access policies for a certain amount of
ciphertexts will exceeds the capability of AB-PRE who specialises in re-encryption.
6.1.1 Overview
In this chapter, we aim to equip the notion of Attribute-based Encryption with
access policy update. We present the notion of Ciphertext-policy Attribute Based
Encryption supporting Access Policy Update. In our setting, the encryptor will
produce encrypted data together with components used for access policy update and
send them to a third party, which provides distributed storage servers and functions
as access policy update proxy. This third party does not need to be trusted; it will
store encrypted data for users accessing and execute access policy update algorithm
as requested, which does not give it the ability of decrypting any ciphertexts. We
present a new security model to capture these requirements, together with two
constructions supporting AND-gate access policy provably secure under augmented
assumptions. In our CP-ABE-APU constructions, a long version of ciphertext that
includes a short version will be sent to storage server when a message is encrypted.
The short version consists of 3 group elements and will be later downloaded by
users for decryption. The long version consists of the short version as well as several
extra group elements for the attribute addition and revocation: n − s − 1 group
elements for attribute addition where n represents the total number of attributes
and s represents the number of attributes contained in the AND-aget access policy;
t group elements for attribute revocation, where t represents the maximum allowed
number of attributes for revocation (Table 6.1). The components for access policy
update will only be stored in storage servers, which makes the ciphertext sent to
users for decryption of constant size of 3. We also present the proofs of security of
our constructions as well as proofs of intractability of augmented assumptions.
Table 6.1: Comparison of two constructions supporting access policy update
Scheme
Update Attr. Attr. in policy/ Ciphertext Ciphertext
operation universe Max. revocation for user for server
SAA Addition n s 3 n− s+ 2
SAR Revocation n t 3 t+ 3
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6.1.2 Related Work
The proxy re-encryption scheme was first formalised by Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss
[BBS98]. With the concept of ABE and PRE combined, Liang et al. [LCLS09] pro-
posed the first CP-AB-PRE scheme based on the CP-ABE scheme [OSW07] support-
ing non-monotonic access structures. Then Luo et al. [LHC10] proposed another
CP-AB-PRE scheme with multi-value positive attributes. Aside from this, Seo et
al. [SK12] proposed a CP-AB-PRE scheme which has constant paring operation la-
tency. Liang et al. constructed CP-AB-PRE schemes [LFSW13, LAS+14, LAL+15]
proven secure in CCA security model.
Recently, Susilo et al. [SCG+16] introduced a new notion of recipient-revocable
identity-based broadcast encryption scheme. In their scheme, the encryptor pro-
duces and sends ciphertexts to a proxy for broadcasting, which will also be able to
revoke some identities from the original set of recipients without the knowledge the
plaintext.
Chapter Organisation. The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2, we present
some definitions related to CP-ABE supporting Access Policy Update mechanism
and augmented complexity assumption that are used. We present our CP-ABE
scheme that supports attribute addition in Section 6.3, together with its security
analysis. Section 6.4 deals with CP-ABE that supports attribute revocation, as well
as its security analysis. Section 6.5 gives a detailed comparison and discussion about
proposed schemes regarding efficiency and performance. We presented the analysis
of the intractability of the hard problem that is used to analyse our schemes in
Section 6.6. The analysis is provided in the generic group model. Finally, the
chapter is summarised in Section 6.7.
6.2 Definitions
In this section, we provide definitions for newly proposed notions.
6.2.1 CP-ABE supporting Access Policy Update Definition
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system supporting attribute addition
consists of five algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Update and Decrypt.
Setup(1λ,P). The setup algorithm takes input the attribute universe P as well as
the implicit security parameter. It outputs the public parameters params and
a master secret key msk.
Enc(params, M , A). The encryption algorithm takes in the public parameters params,
the message M , and an access structure A over the universe of attributes. It
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will output a ciphertext CT such that only users whose private keys associated
with attribute sets which satisfy the access structure A can decrypt M . It will
also outputs a ciphertext CTp that will be restored in proxy server for access
policy updates. We assume that the ciphertexts implicitly contains A.
KeyGen(msk, W ). The key generation algorithm takes as input the master secret
msk and a set of attributes W . It outputs a private key sk associated with W .
Update(params, CTp, opt, U). The addition algorithm takes as input the public pa-
rameters params, a ciphertext CT for an access policy A =
∧
Ai∈S A, an oper-
ation indicator opt = Add or Revoke and a set of attributes U with U ∩ S = ∅
if opt = Add or U ⊂ S if opt = Revoke. It outputs a new ciphertext CT ′ for
the new access policy A′ =
∧
Ai∈S∪U or
∧
Ai∈S\U according to opt.
Dec(params, CT , sk). The decryption algorithm takes as input the public param-
eters PK, a ciphertext CT for an access structure A, and a private key sk
associated with a set of attributes W . If the attribute set W satisfies the
access structure A then the algorithm will decrypt the ciphertext and return
a message M .
6.2.1.1 Selective CPA Security Model for CP-ABE supporting Access
policy Update.
We now give the security definition for CP-ABE system – Indistinguishability under
selective chosen plaintext attacks. This is described by a security game between a
challenger and an adversary for a security parameter λ ∈ N. The game proceeds as
follows:
Init The challenger defines an attribute universe P of size n and gives it to the
adversary A. A chooses a challenge access structure A∗ of one attribute set
S ⊂ P with s = |S|, and gives it to the challenger.
Setup The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters
params to the adversary.
Phase 1 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to sets
of attributes W1, . . . , Wq1 with the restriction that none of these satisfies the
access policy A∗.
Challenge The adversary declares two equal length messages M0 and M1 as well
as a attribute set U∗ with t = |U∗| and U∗ ⊂ S or U∗ ∩ S = ∅ according to
“opt” = Add or “opt”= Revoke respectively. The challenger flips a random coin
β ∈ {0, 1}, and encrypts Mβ with A′ =
∧
Ai∈S\U∗ A for “opt”= Add or A
′ =
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∧
Ai∈S∪U∗ A for “opt”= Revoke, producing CT
∗ = Enc(params,A∗,Mβ). It
gives CT ′ = CT ∗ to the adversary if U∗ = ∅, otherwise CT ′ = Update(params, CT ∗,
opt, U∗).
Phase 2 The adversary queries the challenger for private keys corresponding to
sets of attributes Wq1+1, . . . , Wq with the same restriction that none of these
satisfies the access policy A∗.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess β′ for β.
The advantage of an adversary in winning this game is defined to be
AdvIND-sCPAA,CP-ABE-APU = |Pr[β′ = β]−
1
2
|.
Definition 6.1. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system supporting
access policy update is selective chosen-plaintext attacks secure if all polynomial time
adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in this security game.
It is worth noticing that our newly defined security model has two different types
of adversaries considered.
1. When U∗ = ∅, the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ is the direct result of encryption
algorithm without any involvement of access policy update algorithm. It can
be seen that this is essentially the property of IND-sCPA security for CP-ABE
schemes that an adversary who does not hold a private key associated with a
set of attributes satisfying the challenge access policy cannot distinguish which
submitted message was encrypted as the challenge ciphertext.
2. When U∗ 6= ∅, the challenge ciphertext CT ′ is the result of updating U∗ from A′
of the ciphertext of encrypted Mβ. It can be seen that in this situation it prevents
the type of adversaries who obtain private keys associated with any attributes
satisfying access policy before update from learning anything about the plaintext.
6.2.2 Complexity Assumption
Our construction will make use of groups with bilinear maps [BF01b], and two
new computational assumptions, that fit into the General Diffie-Hellman Exponent
framework proposed by Boneh, Boyen and Goh [BBG05].
The security of our schemes are reduced to the hardness of a problem, which we
called the augmented multi-sequence of exponents decisional Diffie-Hellman prob-
lem. The problems are modified from the (l,m, t)-aMSE-DDH problem defined in
[HLR10], of which the generic complexity is covered by the general Diffie-Hellman
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exponent theorem due to Boneh et al. [BBG05], as the problem lies in the scope of
their framework.
First we introduce the assumption which our CP-ABE-AA scheme is reduced
to. Let S = (p,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·)) be a bilinear map group system. Let g0 be
a generator of G1 and h0 be a generator of G2. Let n, s be two integers. The
first (n, s)-augmented multi-sequence of exponents decisional Diffie-Hellman ((n, s)-
aMSE-DDHA) problem related to S is as follows:
Input The vector −→x n = (x1, . . . , xn) defines the co-prime polynomials, of which
the components are pairwise distinct elements of Zp,
f(X) =
n−s∏
i=1
(X + xi), g(X) =
n∏
i=n−s+1
(X + xi),
the values 
g0, g
γ
0 , . . . , g
γn−2
0 , g
κ·γ·f(γ)
0 , (6.1.1)
gα0 , g
α·γ
0 , . . . , g
α·γn−s+1
0 , (6.1.2)
gω·γ0 , . . . , g
ω·γn−1
0 , (6.1.3)
h0, h
γ
0 , . . . , h
γs−2
0 , (6.1.4)
h
κ·g(γ)
0 , h
κ·γ·g(γ)
0 , . . . , h
κ·γn−s·g(γ)
0 , (6.1.5)
hα0 , h
α·γ
0 , . . . , h
α·γn
0 , (6.1.6)
hω0 , h
ω·γ
0 , . . . , h
ω·γs−1
0 , (6.1.7)
where κ,ω, α, γ are unknown random elements of Zp, an element Tb = e(g0,
h0)
κ·f(γ)∈ GT and a random group element T1−b ∈ GT while b is a fair coin.
Output a bit b′. The problem is correctly solved if the output is b′ = b.
The following statement is a corollary of Theorem 2.30. It provides an in-
tractability bound in the generic model, but in groups equipped with pairings. We
emphasise on the fact that, whereas the assumption has several parameters, it is
non-interactive, and thus easily falsifiable [Nao03].
Corollary 6.2 (Generic Security). For any probabilistic algorithm B that makes at
most qG queries to the oracles performing group operations in G1,G2,GT and the
bilinear map e(·, ·), its advantage in solving (n, s)-aMSE-DDHA problem is bounded
as
Adv
(n,s)-aMSE-DDHA
B (λ) ≤
(qG + 5n+ 3)
2 · d
2p
where d = 2n.
Second, we introduce the assumption for our CP-ABE-AR scheme. Let S = (p,
G1, G2, GT , e(·, ·)) be a bilinear map group system. Let g0 be a generator of G1
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and h0 be a generator of G2. Let n, s be two integers. The second (n, s)-augmented
multi-sequence of exponents decisional Diffie-Hellman ((n, s)-aMSE-DDHB) problem
related to S is as follows:
Input The vector −→x n = (x1, . . . , xn) defines the co-prime polynomials, of which
the components are pairwise distinct elements of Zp,
f(X) =
n−s∏
i=1
(X + xi), g(X) =
n∏
i=n−s+1
(X + xi),
the values 
g0, g
γ
0 , . . . , g
γn−2
0 , g
κ·γ·f(γ)
0 , (6.2.1)
gα0 , g
α·γ
0 , . . . , g
α·γ2n−s
0 , (6.2.2)
gω·γ0 , . . . , g
ω·γn−1
0 , (6.2.3)
h0, h
γ
0 , . . . , h
γs−2
0 , (6.2.4)
h
κ·g(γ)
0 , (6.2.5)
hα0 , h
α·γ
0 , . . . , h
α·γn
0 , (6.2.6)
hω0 , h
ω·γ
0 , . . . , h
ω·γs−1
0 , (6.2.7)
where κ, ω, α, γ are unknown random elements of Zp, element Tb = e(g0, h0)κ·f(γ)∈
GT and a random group element T1−b ∈ GT while b is a fair coin.
Output a bit b′. The problem is correctly solved if the output is b′ = b.
Corollary 6.3 (Generic Security). For any probabilistic algorithm B that makes at
most qG queries to the oracles performing group operations in G1,G2,GT and the
bilinear map e(·, ·), its advantage in solving (n, s)-aMSE-DDHB problem is bounded
as
Adv
(n,s)-aMSE-DDHB
B (λ) ≤
(qG + 5n+ s+ 4)
2 · d
2p
where d = 2(2n− s).
Full proofs of the intractability of Corollary 6.2 and 6.3 is given in Section 6.6.1.
6.3 Attribute Addition Construction
In this section, we shall present our ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
scheme that supports access policy update with operation indicator opt = Add.
This construction also adopts the algorithm Aggregate introduced in Section 4.3.
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6.3.1 Description
Setup(1λ,U) The PKG chooses a suitable encoding τ sending each attribute in U
onto (different) elements τ(Ai) = δ ∈ Zp. It also chooses a bilinear group
system S = (p,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·)). It picks at random two generators g of G1
and h of G2. Then, the PKG picks at random α, γ ∈ Zp and sets u = gαγ ,
and Y = e(gα, h).
The master secret key is then msk = (g, α, γ) and the public parameters are
params =
(
U , n, u, Y, h, {hαγi}i=0,...,n, τ
)
.
KeyGen(params,W,msk) Given any subset W ⊂ U of attributes, the PKG picks
r ∈ Zp at random, computes skW =
(
{g
r
γ+τ(Ai)}Ai∈W , h
r−1
γ
)
.
Enc(params,M,A) Given an AND-gate access structure of a set of attributes S ⊂ U
with s = |S|, and a message M ∈ GT , the sender picks at random κ ∈ Zp and
computes 
E0 = h
κ·α·
∏
Ai∈S(γ+τ(Ai)), E1 = E
γ
0 , . . . , En−s = E
γ
n−s−1
C1 = u
−κ,
Cm = Y
κ ·M
The ciphertext sent from its encryptor to the storage server is then CTp =
(E0, . . . , En−s, C1, Cm) while the part of CT = (E0, C1, Cm) will be accessed
by users for decryption.
Update(params, CT, “add”,U) Given a ciphertext CT with an AND-gate access struc-
ture of attribute set S and a set of attributes U = {A′1, . . . , A′t} with t = |U|
and U∩S = ∅, the proxy adds attributes in U to the AND-gate access structure
of the ciphtertext CT as follows.
Let F (x) be the polynomial in x as F (x) =
∏
A′i∈U
(x+τ(A′i)) = ftx
t+ft−1x
t−1+
· · ·+ f0.
Compute E ′0 = E
F (γ)
0 =
∏t
i=0E
fi
i . Then a new ciphertext is then CT
′ = (E ′0,
C1, Cm) with its AND-gate access structure A′ of attribute set S ∪ U .
Dec(params, CT, skW ) Any user with a set of attributes W such that W |= A can
use the private key to decrypt the ciphertext.
First, the user computes e(g, h)κ·α·r as follows. The user computes
Aggregate({g
r
γ+τ(Ai) , τ(Ai)}Ai∈S) = g
r∏
Ai∈S1 γ+τ(Ai) .
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With the output the user then computes e(g, h)κ·α·r = e(g
r∏
Ai∈S1 γ+τ(Ai) , E0).
After that, the user computes e(g, h)κ·α = e(C1, h
r−1
γ ) · e(g, h)κ·α·r. Finally, the
user recovers the message M = Cm
e(g,h)κ·α
.
6.3.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we are going to prove that our CP-ABE-AA scheme is secure against
selective chosen ciphertext attacks, assuming that the (n, s)-aMSE-DDHA problem
is hard to solve.
Theorem 6.4. Let λ be an integer. For any adversary A against the IND-sCPA
security of our CP-ABE-AA encryption scheme SAA, for an attribute universe P
of size n, and a challenge set S with s = |S|, there exists an algorithm B of the
(n, s)-aMSE-DDHA problem, such that
Adv
(n,s)-aMSE-DDHA
B (λ) ≥ Adv
IND-sCPA
A,SAA (λ).
Proof. We now give the details of the simulation. From now on, we will denote by
WS the subset W ∩ S.
Init B defines an attribute universe P = {A1, . . . , An} of cardinal n. A gives B the
challenge access structure A∗ defined by an AND-gate policy
∧
Ai∈S Ai where
S ⊂ U of respective cardinal s. Here we assume S = {An−s+1, . . . , An}.
Setup The algorithm B defines g := gf(γ)0 , h := h0. B then can compute
– the value u = gαγ = g
αγ·f(γ)
0 with line (6.1.2) of its input values, since the
exponent α · γ · f(γ) is a linear combination of {α, α · γ, . . . , α · γn−s+1} and
B knows the coefficients of the exponent polynomial;
– the value Y = e(g, h)α = e(g
α·f(γ)
0 , h0) with line (6.1.2) and line (6.1.4);
– elements in {hαγi = hα·γ
i
0 }i=0,...,n with line (6.1.6);
– the encoding τ is defined as τ(Ai) = xi for i = 1, . . . , n. It can be seen that
the encodings of the first n − s elements are the opposite of the roots of
f(X), the encodings of the attributes in S are the opposite of roots of g(X).
Finally, B sends toA the simulated public parameters:
(
u, Y, h, {hαγi}i=0,...,n, τ
)
.
Phase 1 The adversary A makes private key queries. To respond to a query on
attribute set W ⊂ U , where W 6|= A∗, the algorithm B must produce a tuple
of the form
(
{g
r
γ+τ(Ai)}Ai∈W , h
r−1
γ
)
.
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Observe that sinceW 6|= A∗ all allowed queries must satisfy |WS| < s. B defines
the polynomial QWS(X) =
1 |WS| = 0λi ·∏Ai∈WS(X + τ(Ai)) |WS| > 0, where λ =(∏
A∈WS τ(Ai)
)−1
, and simulates a private key for W as follows:
B picks at random yW in Zp, and defines r := (1 + ωyWγ)QWS(γ). B then
computes the elements for skW :
– For any attribute Ai ∈ W , g
r
γ+τ(Ai) = g
ωγyW ·
f(γ)QWS
(γ)
γ+τ(Ai)
0 · g
f(γ)QWS
(γ)
γ+τ(Ai)
0 . Since an
attribute Ai ∈ W can be in WS or U \S, (γ+ τ(Ai))|f(γ)QWS(γ). The first
factor can be computed with line (6.1.3) as its exponent is a polynomial in
γ of degree at most n− 1, and the second factor can be computed with line
(6.1.1) as its exponent is a polynomial in γ of degree at most n− 2;
– The value h
r−1
γ =h
ωyWQWS (γ)
0 · h
QWS
(γ)−1
γ
0 , where the first factor can be com-
puted from line (6.1.7) and the second factor can be computed from line
(6.1.4), since QWS(γ) is a polynomial with independent term 1 by its defi-
nition, thus
QWS (γ)−1
γ
is a linear combination of {1, γ, . . . , γs−2}.
Challenge Once A sends to B the two messages M0 and M1 as well as an update
attribute set U∗, B flips a coin β ∈ {0, 1}, and sets C∗m = Tb ·Mβ. To simulate
the rest of the challenge ciphertext, B implicitly defines the randomness for
the encryption as κ∗ = κ/α, and sets E∗0 = h
κ∗α·g(γ) = h
κ·g(γ)
0 which is given in
line (6.1.5) as well as E∗1 , . . . , E
∗
n−s. To complete the ciphertext, B computes
C∗1 = u
−κ∗ = g
−κγf(γ)
0 from line (6.1.1). B gives A the challenge ciphertext
CT ∗ = (E∗0 , E
∗
1 , . . . , E
∗
n−s, C
∗
1 , C
∗
m).
Phase 2 After the challenge step A may make other key extraction queries, which
are answered as before.
Guess A outputs a β′. If β′ = β, B outputs 0; otherwise B outputs 1.
Probability Analysis: Let I = (−→x n, γ, κ, ω, α, Tb, T1−b) be the input of the algo-
rithm B and the adversaryA break our CP-ABE scheme with advantage AdvIND-sCPAA,SAA (λ).
Below we analyse the simulation in two cases.
Case 1 : U∗ = ∅
Let κ = κ∗·α. One can verify that in this case, E∗0 = h
κ·g(γ)
0 = h
κ∗·α·
∏
Ai∈S
(γ+τ(Ai))
and C∗1 = g
−κ·γ·f(γ)
0 = g
−κ∗·α·γ·f(γ)
0 = u
−κ∗ . As for the C∗m, we also note that
if b = 0, Tb = e(g0, h0)
κf(γ), then C∗m = e(g0, h0)
κf(γ) ·Mβ = e(gα, h)κ
∗ ·Mβ =
Y κ
∗ ·Mβ. Therefore, the simulation of B is perfect, and the adversary A will
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guess the bit β with its advantage. Hence, if b = 0 we have
|Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− 1
2
| = AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
Else, if b = 1 and Tb is uniformly random in GT , C∗m is uniformly random and
independent in GT , and the value of β is independent from A’s view as well,
Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1] = 1
2
.
Thus, we have the advantage of B in solving the (n, s)-aMSE-DDHB problem
in Case 1 is
Adv
(n,s)−aMSE-DDHA
B (λ) = |Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1]|
≥ AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
Case 2 : U∗ = {A′1, A′2, . . . , A′t} 6= ∅
In this case, we first show that how a challenge ciphertext should be produced
in a real game. Formally, the correct procedures are as follows.
Let S ′ = S \ U∗. The encryption algorithm Enc(params,A′ =
∧
Ai∈S′ A,Mβ) is
run to get CT ∗. More precisely, it picks a randomness κ′ ∈ Zp and computes,
CT ∗ = (E∗0 , E
∗
1 , · · · , E∗n−s+t, C∗1 , C∗m)
= (hκ
′·α·
∏
Ai∈S′ (γ+τ(Ai)), . . . , hκ
′·α·γn−s+t·
∏
Ai∈S′ (γ+τ(Ai)), u−κ
′
, Y κ
′ ·M).
The Addition algorithm Update(params, CT ∗, “add”,U) is run to add the at-
tribute set U∗ to the access policy of the ciphertext CT ∗. It processes as
follows.
Let F ∗(x) be the polynomial in x as F ∗(x) =
∏
A′i∈U∗
(x + τ(A′i)) = f
∗
t x
t +
f ∗t−1x
t−1 + · · · + f ∗0 . Compute E ′0
∗ = (E∗0)
F ∗(γ) =
∏t
i=0(E
∗
i )
f∗i . Finally, the
challenge ciphertext in a real game is produced CT ′ = (E ′0
∗, C∗1 , C
∗
m).
Now we assume that the randomness κ′ used in producing CT ∗ is defined as
κ′ · α = κ. The challenge ciphertext CT ′ turns out to be as follows,
C∗m = Mβ · Y κ
′
= Mβ · Y
κ
α ,
E ′0
∗
= hκ
′·α·
∏
Ai∈S
(γ+τ(Ai)) = hκ·
∏
Ai∈S
(γ+τ(Ai)) = h
κ·g(γ)
0 ,
C∗1 = u
−κ′ = g
κ·γ·f(γ)
0 .
It can be seen that if b = 0, Tb = e(g0, h0)
κ·f(γ), the challenge ciphertext in
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a real game is exactly the same as the simulated challenge ciphertext. The
simulated game would be a perfect simulation if it can be proved that the
setting of κ′ is indistinguishable from a real random value from the view of A.
It will suffice as κ is random to A. Thus, if b = 0 we have
|Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− 1
2
| = AdvIND-sCPAA,SAA (λ).
On the other hand, if b = 1 and Tb is a random element from GT , C∗m is random
and independent from the view of A,
Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1] = 1
2
.
Thus, we have the advantage of B in solving the (n, s)-aMSE-DDHB problem
in Case 2 is
Adv
(n,s)−aMSE-DDHA
B (λ) = |Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1]|
≥ AdvIND-sCPAA,SAA (λ).
This completes the proof.
6.4 Access Policy Attribute Revocation
Construction
In this section, we shall present our ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
scheme that supports access policy update with operation indicator opt = Revoke.
6.4.1 Description
Setup(1λ,U) The PKG selects a suitable encoding τ sending each attribute in U
onto different elements τ(Ai) = δ ∈ Zp. It also chooses a bilinear group system
S = (p,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·)). It picks at random two generators g of G1 and h of
G2. Then, the PKG picks at random α, γ ∈ Zp and sets {ui = gαγ
i}i=1...n, and
Y = e(gα, h).
The master secret key is then msk = (g, α, γ) and the public parameters are
params =
(
U , n, {ui}i=1,...,n, Y, h, {hαγ
i}i=0,...,n, τ}
)
.
KeyGen(params,W,msk) Given any subset W ⊂ P of attributes, the PKG picks
r ∈ Zp at random, computes skW =
(
{g
r
γ+τ(Ai)}Ai∈W , h
r−1
γ
)
.
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Enc(params,M,A, l) Given an AND-gate access structure of a set of attributes S ⊂
U with s = |S|, a message M ∈ GT and an extra input which is a maximum
revocation number l ≤ s, the sender picks at random κ ∈ Zp and computes
E0 = h
κ·α·
∏
Ai∈S(γ+τ(Ai))
C1 = u
−κ
1 , . . . , Cl+1 = u
−κ
l+1,
Cm = Y
κ ·M
The ciphertext sent from its encryptor to the storage server is then CTserver =
(E0, C1, . . . , Ct+1, Cm) while the part of CT = (E0, C1, Cm) will be access by
users for decryption.
Update(params, CT, “revoke”,U) Given a ciphertext CT = (E0, C1, . . . , Ct+1, Cm)
for an AND-gate access structure A = ∧Ai∈SA, a revocation attribute set
U = {A′1, . . . , A′t} ⊆ S with t ≤ l and the public parameters params, the
revocation update algorithm works as follows.
Let F (x) be the polynomial in x as
F (x) =
1∏
A′i∈U
τ(A′i)
∏
A′i∈U
(x+ τ(A′i)) = ftx
t + ft−1x
t−1 + · · ·+ f0.
Compute
• C ′m = Cm · e(
∏t
i=1 C
−fi
i , h) = M · e(gκ·α·
∑t
i=0 fiγ
i
, h) = M · Y κ·F (γ),
• E ′0 = E
1∏
A′
i
∈U τ(A
′
i
)
0 = h
κ·α·
∏
Ai∈S\U (γ+τ(Ai))·F (γ),
• C ′1 =
∏t+1
i=1 C
fi−1
i = g
−κ·α·γ·F (γ) = u
−κ·F (γ)
1 .
The new ciphertext is then CT = (E ′0, C
′
1, C
′
m) with new randomness κ ·F (γ).
Dec(params, CT, skW ) Any user with a set of attributes W such that W |= A can
use the private key to decrypt the ciphertext.
First, the user computes e(g, h)κ·α·r as follows. The user computes
Aggregate({g
r
γ+τ(Ai) , τ(Ai)}Ai∈S1) = g
r∏
Ai∈S1 γ+τ(Ai) .
With the output the user computes e(g, h)κ·α·r = e(g
r∏
Ai∈S1 γ+τ(Ai) , E0). After
that, the user computes e(g, h)κ·α = e(C1, h
r−1
γ ) · e(g, h)κ·α·r. Finally, the user
recovers the message M = Cm
e(g,h)κ·α
.
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6.4.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we prove that our scheme is secure against selective chosen ciphertext
attacks, assuming that the (n, s)-aMSE-DDHB problem is hard to solve.
Theorem 6.5. Let λ be an integer. For any adversary A against the IND-sCPA
security of our CP-ABE-AR encryption scheme SAR, for an attribute universe P
of size n, and a challenge setS with s = |S|, there exists an algorithm B of the
(n, s)-aMSE-DDHB problem, such that
Adv
(n,s)-aMSE-DDHB
B (λ) ≥ Adv
IND-sCPA
A,SAR (λ).
Proof. We now give the details of the simulation.
Init B defines an attribute universe P = {A1, . . . , An} of cardinal n. A gives B the
challenge access structure A∗ defined by an AND-gate policy
∧
Ai∈S A where
S ⊂ U of respective cardinal s. Here we assume S = {An−s+1, . . . , An}.
Setup The algorithm B defines g := gf(γ)0 , h := h0. B then can compute
– the values ui = g
αγi = g
αγi·f(γ)
0 with line (6.2.2) of its input values, since
the exponent α · γi · f(γ) is a linear combination of {α, . . . , α · γ2n−s} and B
knows the coefficients of the exponent polynomial;
– the value Y = e(g, h)α = e(g
α·f(γ)
0 , h0) with line (6.2.2) for g
α·f(γ)
0 and line
(6.2.4) for h0;
– elements in {hαγi = hα·γ
i
0 }i=0,...,n with line (6.2.6).
– the encoding τ is defined as τ(Ai) = xi for i = 1, . . . , n. It can be seen that
the encodings of the first n − s elements are the opposite of the roots of
f(X), the encodings of the attributes in S are the opposite of roots of g(X).
Finally, B sends toA the simulated public parameters:
(
u, Y, h, {hαγi}i=0,...,n, τ
)
.
Phase 1 The adversary A makes private key queries. To respond to a query on
attribute set W ⊂ U , where W 6|= A∗, the algorithm B must produce a tuple
of the form
(
{g
r
γ+τ(Ai)}Ai∈W , h
r−1
γ
)
.
Observe that sinceW 6|= A∗ all allowed queries must satisfy |WS| < s. B defines
the polynomial QWS(X) =
1 |WS| = 0λi ·∏Ai∈WS(X + τ(Ai)) |WS| > 0, where λ =(∏
Ai∈WS τ(Ai)
)−1
, and simulates a private key for W as follows:
B picks at random yW in Zp, and defines r := (1 + ωyWγ)QWS(γ). B then
computes the elements for skW :
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– For any attribute Ai ∈ W , g
r
γ+τ(Ai) = g
ωγyW ·
f(γ)QWS
(γ)
γ+τ(Ai)
0 · g
f(γ)QWS
(γ)
γ+τ(Ai)
0 . Since an
attribute Ai ∈ W can be in WS or U \ (S), (γ + τ(Ai))|f(γ)QWS(γ). The
first factor can be computed with line (6.2.3) as its exponent is a polynomial
in γ of degree at most n − 1, and the second factor can be computed with
line (6.2.1) as its exponent is a polynomial in γ of degree at most n− 2.
– The value h
r−1
γ = h
ωyWQWS (γ)
0 · h
QWS
(γ)−1
γ
0 , where the first factor can be com-
puted from line (6.2.7) and the second factor can be computed from line
(6.2.4), since QWS1 (γ) is a polynomial with independent term 1 by its defi-
nition, thus
QWS (γ)−1
γ
is a linear combination of {1, γ, . . . , γs−2}.
Challenge Once A sends to B the two messages M0 and M1 as well as a attribute
set U∗ with t = |U∗| and U∗ ∩ S = ∅ including all attributes needed to be
revoked, B flips a coin β ∈ {0, 1}, and sets C∗m = Tb ·Mβ. To simulate the
rest of the ciphertext components, B sets E∗0 = h
κ·g(γ)
0 which is given in line
(6.2.5). Then, B computes C∗1 = (g
κγf(γ)
0 )
−1 from line (6.2.1). B gives A the
challenge ciphertext CT ∗ = (E∗0 , C
∗
1 , C
∗
m).
Here we observe that
if U∗ = ∅, t = 0 B should output to the adversary CT = Enc(params,A∗, 0,Mβ) =
(E0, C1, Cm) for access structure A∗, of which the challenge ciphertext
matches the form;
if U∗ 6= ∅ B should output CT ′ =Revoke(params, Enc(params, A′, t, Mβ),
U∗) = (E ′0, C ′1, Cm) for access structure A∗, of which the challenge ci-
phertext matches the form as well.
Phase 2 After the challenge step A may make other key extraction queries, which
are answered as before.
Guess A outputs a β′. If β′ = β, B outputs 0; otherwise B outputs 1.
Probability Analysis: Let I = (−→xn, γ, κ, ω, α, Tb, T1−b) be the input of the algo-
rithm B and the adversaryA break our CP-ABE scheme with advantage AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
Below we analyse the simulation in two cases.
Case 1 : U∗ = ∅
Let κ∗ = κ/α. One can verify that in this case, E∗0 = h
κ·g(γ)
0 = h
κ∗·α·γ·
∏
Ai∈S
(γ+τ(Ai))
and C∗1 = g
−κ·γ·f(γ)
0 = g
−κ∗·α·γ·f(γ)
0 = u
−κ∗
1 . As for the C
∗
m, we also note that
if b = 0, Tb = e(g0, h0)
κf(γ), then C∗m = e(g0, h0)
κf(γ) ·Mβ = e(gα, h)κ
∗ ·Mβ =
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Y κ
∗ ·Mβ. Therefore, the simulation of B is perfect, and the adversary A will
guess the bit β with its advantage. Hence, if b = 0 we have
|Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− 1
2
| = AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
Else, if b = 1 and Tb is uniformly random in GT , C∗m is uniformly random and
independent in GT , and the value of β is independent from A’s view as well,
Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1] = 1
2
.
Thus, we have the advantage of B in solving the (n, s)-aMSE-DDHB problem
in Case 1 is
Adv
(n,s)−aMSE-DDHB
B (λ) = |Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1]|
≥ AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
Case 2 : U∗ 6= ∅
In this case, we first show how a challenge ciphertext should be produced in a
real game. Formally, the correct procedures are as follows.
Let S ′ = U∗ ∪ S. The encryption algorithm Enc(params,A′ =
∧
Ai∈S′ A, t,Mβ)
is run to get CT ∗. More precisely, it picks a randomness κ′ ∈ Zp and computes,
CT ∗ = (E∗0 , C
∗
1 , · · · , C∗t+1, C∗m)
= (hκ
′·α·
∏
Ai∈S1 (γ+τ(Ai)), u−κ
′
1 , . . . , u
−κ′
t+1, Cm = Y
κ′ ·M).
The revocation algorithm Revoke(params, CT ∗,U∗) is run to revoke the at-
tribute set U∗ from the access policy of the ciphertext CT ∗. It processes as
follows.
Let F (x) be the polynomial in x as
F (x) =
1∏
A′i∈U∗
τ(A′i)
∏
A′i∈U∗
(x+ τ(A′i)) = ftx
t + ft−1x
t−1 + · · ·+ f0.
Compute C ′m = Cm · e(
∏l
i=1 C
fi
i , h) = Mβ · Y κ
′·F (γ).
Compute E ′0 = E
1∏
A′
i
∈U τ(A
′
i
)
0 = h
κ′·α·F (γ)·
∏
Ai∈S
(γ+τ(Ai)).
Compute C ′1 =
∏l+1
i=1C
fi−1
i = u
−κ′·F (γ)
1 .
Finally, the challenge ciphertext in a real game is produced CT ′ = (E ′0, C
′
1, C
′
m).
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Now we assume that the randomness κ′ used in producing CT ∗ is defined as
κ′ = κ
α
· 1
F (γ)
. Then let κ∗ = κ/α and the challenge ciphertext CT ′ turns out
to be as follows,
C ′m = Mβ · Y
κ
α = Mβ · Y κ
∗
,
E ′0 = h
κ·
∏
Ai∈S
(γ+τ(Ai)) = hκ
∗·α·γ·
∏
Ai∈S
(γ+τ(Ai)),
C ′1 = u
−κ
α
1 = u
κ∗
1 .
It can be seen that if b = 0, Tb = e(g0, h0)
κ·f(γ), the challenge ciphertext in
a real game is exactly the same as the simulated challenge ciphertext. The
simulated game would be a perfect simulation if it can be proved that the
setting of κ′ is indistinguishable from a real random value from the view of A.
It will suffice as κ is random to A. Thus, if b = 0 we have
|Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− 1
2
| = AdvIND-sCPAA,SAR (λ).
On the other hand, if b = 1 and Tb is a random element from GT , C∗m is random
and independent from the view of A, Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1] = 1
2
. Thus, we have
the advantage of B in solving the (n, s)-aMSE-DDHB problem in Case 2 is
Adv
(n,s)−aMSE-DDHB
B (λ) = |Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 0]− Pr[B(I) = 0|b = 1]|
≥ AdvIND-sCPAA,SAR (λ).
This completes the proof.
6.5 Comparison and Discussion
In this section, some of the previous CP-AB-PRE schemes [LCLS09, LHC10, LAS+14]
and our schemes are compared from the aspects of performance and functionality.
In Table 6.2 , general efficiency comparisons are made in terms of the public key
size, the private key size, the ciphertext size and the computation overheads of
re-encryption or update.
Although our proposed schemes have different applicable scenarios, they share
a same functionality with CP-AB-PRE schemes which is to modify the access policy
of a ciphertext. Compared with CP-AB-PRE, a significant difference is that our
proposed schemes do not require a re-encryption key to modify access policies, which
makes them less relied on encryptor personnel and resources of computation or
communication. On the other hand, advanced CP-AB-PRE schemes can support
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Table 6.2: Comparison to CP-AB-PRE schemes
Scheme params sk CT in server ReEnc/Update
[LCLS09] O(n) · LG1 O(n) · LG1 O(n) · LG1 O(n) · Ce
[LHC10] O(n2) · LG1 O(n) · LG1 O(n) · LG1 O(n) · Ce
[LAS+14] O(n) · LG1 O(|AU |) · LG1 O(|AC |) · LG1 O(|AU |) · Ce +O(|AU |) ·G
SAA O(n) · LG1 O(|AU |) · LG1 O(n− |AC |) · LG1 O(|AM |) ·G
SAR O(n) · LG1 O(|AU |) · LG1 O(|AC |) · LG1 O(|AM |) ·G
n : Total number of attributes in systems;
AC : The set of attributes included in the access policy of a ciphertext;
AU : The set of attributes included in a user’s private key;
AM : The set of attributes requested for addition or revocation update;
Ce: The cost of bilinear maps;
G: The cost of operation in group;
L∗: Bit length of element in *.
and modify more complicated access policies where simple addition and revocation
update from our proposed schemes is not sufficient.
In terms of performance, the proposed schemes enjoy the constant-size cipher-
text for users while ciphertexts produced in CP-AB-PRE are generally much longer.
In addition, updated ciphertext produced in proposed schemes could be further up-
dated without any length increment while most re-encrypted ciphertext in CP-AB-
PRE can either not be re-encrypted again or be re-encrypted with linear increment
in lenghth.
6.6 Intractability of the Proposed Assumptions
In this section, we provide the analysis of the intractability of (n, s)-aMSE-DDH
problem. The intractability analysis is based on the analysis in the generic group
model in [DP08].
6.6.1 (n, s)-aMSE-DDH
In this section, we prove the intractability of distinguishing the two distributions
involved in the (n, s)-aMSE-DDHA problem (cf. Corollary 6.2, Section 6.2.2) and the
intractability of the (n, s)-aMSE-DDHB problem (cf. Corollary 6.3, Section 6.2.2).
Proof of Corollary 6.2. To wrap up Corollary 6.2, we need to show that (n, s)-
aMSE-DDHA problem fits in the framework of Theorem 2.30. As mentioned above,
we consider our problem in the weakest case G1 = G2 = G and pose g0 = g, h0 = gβ.
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Our problem can be reformulated as decisional (P,Q, F )-GDHE Problem where
P =

1, γ, . . . , γn−2,
κ · γ · f(γ),
α, α · γ, . . . , α · γn−s+1,
ω · γ, ω · γ2, . . . , ωγn−1,
β, β · γ, . . . , β · γs−2,
βκ · g(γ), βκ · γ · g(γ), . . . , βκ · γn−s · g(γ),
βα, βα · γ, . . . , β · α · γn
βω, βω · γ, . . . , βω · γn,

Q = (1)
F = βκ · f(γ).
We need to prove the independence of F from 〈P,Q〉. By making all possible
products of two polynomials from P which are multiples of βκ, we want to prove
that the sum of any polynomials from the list R below does not lead to F :
R =

βκ · γ · A(γ)f(γ)
βκ ·B(γ)g(γ)
βκ · γ ·B(γ)g(γ)
...
βκ · γs−2 ·B(γ)g(γ)
where A, B are polynomials in γ.
After simplifying the list R, it can be seen that if F is not independent of 〈P,Q〉
we can then derive γ · f(γ) from following list: R′ =
{
γ · A(γ)f(γ)
B′(γ)g(γ)
where A, B′ are
polynomials in γ with 0 ≤ degA ≤ s− 2, 0 ≤ degB′ ≤ n+ s− 4.
Thus, we have the following equation:
f(γ) = γ · A(γ)f(γ) +B′(γ)g(γ)
which can then be re-written into (1−γ ·A(γ))f(γ) = B′(γ)g(γ) where 1−γ ·A(γ) 6=
0, degB′(γ) ≤ n + s − 4. Since f and g are coprime, we must have g(γ)|(1 − γ ·
A(γ)). However, deg (1− γ · A(γ)) < deg g(γ) will result in 1− γ ·A(γ) = 0, which
contradicts with the fact 1− γ · A(γ) 6= 0.
Proof of Corollary 6.3. To wrap up Corollary 6.3, we need to show that (n, s)-
aMSE-DDHB problem fits in Theorem 2.30 as well. As mentioned above, we con-
sider our problem in the weakest case G1 = G2 = G and pose g0 = g, h0 = gβ. Our
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problem can be reformulated as Decisional (P,Q, f)-GDHE Problem where
P =

1, γ, . . . , γn−2,
κ · γ · f(γ),
α, α · γ, . . . , α · γ2n−s,
ω · γ, ω · γ2, . . . , ωγn−1,
β, β · γ, . . . , β · γs−2,
βκ · g(γ)
βα, βα · γ, . . . , βα · γn
βω, βω · γ, . . . , βω · γs−1,

Q = (1)
F = βκ · f(γ).
We need to prove the independence of F from 〈P,Q〉. By making all possible
products of two polynomials from P which are multiples of βκ, we want to prove
that the sum of any polynomials from the list R below does not lead to F :
R =
{
βκ · γ · A(γ)f(γ)
βκ ·B(γ)g(γ)
where A, B are polynomials in γ.
After simplifying the list R, it can be seen that if F is not independent of 〈P,Q〉
we can then derive f(γ) from following list: R′ =
{
γ · A(γ)f(γ)
B(γ)g(γ)
where A, B are
polynomials in γ with 0 ≤ degA ≤ s− 2, 0 ≤ degB ≤ n− 2.
Thus, we have the following equation:
f(γ) = γ · A(γ)f(γ) +B(γ)g(γ)
which can then be re-written into (1−γ·A(γ))f(γ) = B(γ)g(γ) where 1−γ·A(γ) 6= 0,
degB(γ) ≤ n − 2. Since f and g are coprime, we must have g(γ)|(1 − γ · A(γ)).
However, deg g = s and deg (1− γ · A(γ)) < deg g(γ) will result in 1− γ ·A(γ) = 0,
which contradicts with the fact 1− γ · A(γ) 6= 0.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we considered the problem of access policy update in ABE schemes,
which make the ABE schemes become practical. When an ABE scheme is not
equipped with efficient access policy update, it cannot be used in practice as pol-
icy update is an essential feature in the dynamic environment. We outlined some
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trivial solutions including using AB-PRE system, and also pointed out the differ-
ence between access policy update and ciphertext re-encryption, which showed the
importance of a general efficient access policy update mechanism. We presented
notions of ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption supporting attribute addi-
tion and revocation, and subsequently presented two new CP-ABE schemes featured
with functionalities of adding and revoking attributes, respectively. We also pro-
posed a new selective CPA model for CP-ABE with these new features. Finally, we
also proved the security of our schemes. The proposed schemes are proven secure
against selective CPA under the assumptions that the augmented Multi-Sequence
of Exponents Decisional Diffie-Hellman problems are hard. The intractability of the
aMSE-DDH problems is proved in generic group model within the framework of
General Diffie-Hellman Exponent problem in [BBG05].
Chapter 7
Applications and Extensions
Applications of attribute-based encryption are largely beyond the scope of this the-
sis, but we pick two typical real-world scenarios to apply our proposed schemes. The
first scenario is to establish Stand-Alone Authentication (SAA) mechanism in Fog
Computing. In Fog Computing, fragile connection between Fog and Cloud causes
problems of the authentication and authorization. We propose a traceable CP-ABE
based on our key-delegation abuse resistance construction to handle not only the
authentication and authorization problem but also the potential abuse of illegal key
delegation and key duplication. The second scenario is to tackle attribute preserva-
tion problem within access policy update mechanism. Our previous proposed access
policy update mechanism restrict attribute revocation capability by limiting how
many attributes can be revoked. In this chapter, we propose an attribute revoca-
tion mechanism from a different construction concept with which encryptors can
assign preserved attributes preventing further revocation.
7.1 Traceable CP-ABE in Fog Computing
7.1.1 Motivation
Recently, a new concept of Fog Computing has been proposed, which can enable
applications on a large amount of devices connected in the Internet of Things to
run directly at the network edge [Bon11]. In Fog Computing, services that are
controlled from a Cloud can be hosted at end devices such as set-top-boxes, road
side nodes or access points. The infrastructure of this new distributed computing
allows users to enjoy the benefits of mobility support, geo-distribution, location-
awareness and low latency as applications are designated to run close to them. Such
Fog Computing concept connects user end smart devices such as smart phones,
tablets, smart vehicles, which usually are restricted with computation power, battery
and storage, with the Cloud at core by providing automated response. A three
layer hierarchical service delivery model formed by end devices, Fog Computing and
Cloud Computing that enhances quality of services and user experience makes Fog
a successful extension of Cloud.
Since Fog Computing introduces multiple Fog devices between users and the
Cloud, some security and privacy issues will impact the development of Fog Com-
puting if not well addressed [QMC14, RCC17, CMCA17, DCY17, LCH16, DMC15,
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MC14a, MC14b, MC13, MC12, QC14b, QC14a, QC13b, QC13c, QC13a]. One im-
portant security issue is that how to manage the problems of user authentication
and authorization in Fog Computing. Stojmenovic et al. [SW14] have pointed out
that different from Clouding computing [CDZ16] that can be well maintained Fog
devices will face with unstable connectivity to the remote Cloud for distributing au-
thentication information and collecting audit logs. This property of weak and fragile
connectivity in Fog Computing reduced the reliability of performing an authentica-
tion protocol on remote Cloud authentication server. As a potential solution they
introduced a new mechanism with Stand-Alone Authentication [HXB+14] to realise
user authentication to adapt the unstable connectivity situation. However, to adopt
Stand-Alone Authentication (SAA) the authentication information between users
and designated Fog devices need to be protected. A common approach to share
data securely with a designated party is encryption, but PKI-based authentication
is not efficient in Fog Computing. Because in Fog Computing, which usually in-
volves a large and dynamic information system for example the smart grid, there
are a large number of Fog devices that provides different types of services in dif-
ferent locations, while users’ access abilities to these Fog devices also vary due to
different roles or how much money they paid. As an example, Alice can have SAA
only with ‘Fog devices of Type A OR Type B in All Areas’, but another user Bob
can have SAA with ‘Fog devices of all types but only in Area C’. To overcome this
obstacle, a recently introduced cryptographic primitive Attribute-based Encryption
is adopted[YLL+15, YZL+16], which allows flexible one-to-many encryption without
prior knowledge of who will be receiving the data.
To solve the authentication problem with SAA in Fog Computing, CP-ABE fits
the situation perfectly. With CP-ABE, each user will be associated with a set of
attributes ω with a private key and the Fog device will be labelled with an access
policy A describing which kind of users can have SAA with it. A ciphertext on
authentication information will be encrypted with an access policy A can only be
decrypted by a private key for a user associated with a set of attributes ω that
satisfies the access policy.
However, CP-ABE that suffers from key-delegation abuse or key-duplication
abuse cannot be adopted to Fog Computing. In an environment that is implemented
with Fog Computing, authentication information stored in user mobile devices can
be easily duplicated or shared if a basic CP-ABE is adopted. In addition, splitting
or mixing components of basic CP-ABE keys may lead to the generation of new
illegal keys which can only worsen the situation. Theses misbehaviours should be
warded off in a CP-ABE system that is employed in Fog Computing, and there
needs to be an embedded subsystem to track malicious users if illegal duplication
or sharing happens. Otherwise, the application of CP-ABE in Fog Computing will
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be restrained.
7.1.2 Definition of Traceable CP-ABE
A traceable ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system consists of five al-
gorithms: Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec, and Trace.
Setup(1λ,P). The setup algorithm takes in the security parameters λ and the at-
tribute universe P . It outputs the public parameters params and a master
secret key msk.
Encrypt(params, M , A). The encryption algorithm takes in the public parameters
params, the message M , and an access structure A over the universe of at-
tributes. It will output a ciphertext CT such that only users with whose
private keys associated with attribute sets which satisfy the access structure
A can decrypt M . We assume that the ciphertext implicitly contains A.
KeyGen(msk, W ). The key generation algorithm takes as input the master secret
msk and a set of attributes W . It outputs a private key sk associated with W .
Decrypt(params, CT , sk). The decryption algorithm takes as input the public pa-
rameters params, a ciphertext CT , which contains an access structure A, and
a private key sk, which is a private key for a set of attributes W . If the at-
tribute set W satisfies the access structure A then the algorithm will decrypt
the ciphertext and return a message M .
Trace(params, sk′). The trace algorithm takes as input the public parameters params
and a valid private key sk′. It outputs the identity ID of the owner of the
private key or ⊥ if private key not valid.
7.1.3 Construction
In this subsection, we propose an application of our CP-ABE scheme against the
property of key-delegation abuse in Fog Computing. A traceable CP-ABE scheme,
which is a CP-ABE scheme that is equipped with a traitor tracing mechanism, is
constructed based on our CP-ABE with key-delegation abuse resistance scheme.
The main purpose of traitor tracing in ABE system is to guarantee that any user
who illegally shared his/her private key can be traced. Many works have explored
traceability in ABE schemes [LRK09, LHC+11, LCW13b, LCW13b]. Most of them
focused on tracing new keys generated in collusive way, but few can prevent one
user generating new workable keys in private. Based on our “key-delegation abuse”
resistant CP-ABE scheme, we can obtain a Traceable CP-ABE system that can
92 CHAPTER 7. APPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
trace privately generated illegal new keys with an extended attribute universe. Each
user is given an attribute set that consists of attributes from the original attribute
universe, which present his/her access right, as well as attributes from the extended
attribute set, which indicate his/her identity. To be specific, we first let the original
attribute universe be P := {A1, . . . , An} and a user identity space be I of size of
2l, and we have the extended universe P ′ := {A1, . . . , An+l} in which attributes
{A1, . . . , An} are used for describing access right and attributes {An+1, . . . , An+l}
are used to indicate identities. Next, when a private key for an attribute set ω
(which only consists of attributes {A1, . . . , An}) and a user identity ID is queried,
the user’s identity ID is mapped to a distinct binary string LID ∈ {0, 1}l by a
collision-resistant hash function. According to the identity binary string LID, if the
k-th digit is 1 the corresponding (n+k)-th attribute is added into a dummy attribute
set ωID. The private key is then generated based on attribute set ω
′ = ω ∪ ωID.
Since the decryption algorithm of our CP-ABE scheme requires corresponding key
components for all attributes in the extended universe and our CP-ABE scheme is
key-delegation abuse resistant, a user who wants to share his/her private key needs
to give away the whole key, which will also give away the unique dummy attribute
set. Thus, if a private key is shared, then the user will be traceable.
Using this technique, we can now describe our traceable CP-ABE construction
as follows.
Setup(λ, I,P , I) : Given a security parameter λ, a user identity space I of size
of 2l and an attribute universe P of size of n, the setup algorithm first sets
the new universe P ′ := {A1, . . . , An+l}. Next, it chooses a bilinear group
G of prime order p. It then chooses random numbers t1, . . . , t2(n+l), α ∈ Zp,
random group generators g0, h0 ∈ G, and computes Y = e(g0, h0)α, h1 =
ht10 , . . . , hn = h
t(n+l)
0 , hn+1 = h
tn+l+1
0 , . . . , h2(n+l) = h
t2(n+l)
0 . The public param-
eters are params = (h1, . . . , h2(n+l), Y, e,G,GT ,P). The master secret key is
msk = (g0, t1, . . . , t2(n+l), α).
Enc(params,M,A) : To encrypt a message M ∈ GT with an access structure A =∧
Ai∈S i where S ⊂ P , the following steps are taken. A random value r ∈
Zp is chosen uniformly. The ciphertext is then created as: CT = (A, E ′ =
MY r, {Ei = hri}Ai∈S, {Ei = hrn+i, E ′i = hri}Ai∈P ′\S).
KeyGen(params,msk,W, ID) : To generate a private key for attribute set W ⊆ P
and a user identity ID ∈ I the following steps are taken. First, compute the
identity binary string LID = H(ID) and store the tuple of 〈ID,LID〉 into
an internal list in the Trace algorithm. Next, a dummy attribute set WID
is generated by adding (n + k)-th attribute if k-th digit of LID equals to 1.
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Then, n + l − 1 random values x1, . . . , xn+l−1 are randomly chosen in Zp and
compute xn = α− x1 − · · · − xn−1 ∈ Zp. The private key for the attribute set
Ŵ = W ∪WID:
sk =
(
Ŵ , {Di = g
xi
ti
0 }Ai∈Ŵ , {Di = g
xi
tn+i
0 }Ai∈P ′\Ŵ
)
.
Dec(params, CT , sk) : Suppose that a ciphertext, CT , is encrypted with an access
structure A =
∧
Ai∈S Ai and we have a private key for attribute set Ŵ =
W ∪WID, where S ⊆ W .
Then, the ciphertext can be decrypted by following steps:∏
Ai∈S∪{P ′\W}
e(Di, Ei)
∏
Ai∈W\S
e(Di, E
′
i)
=
∏
Ai∈W
e(g
xi
ti
0 , h
r
i )
∏
Ai∈P ′\W
e(g
xi
tn+i
0 , h
r
n+i)
=
∏
Ai∈W
e(g
xi
ti
0 , h
tir
0 )
∏
Ai∈P ′\W
e(g
xi
tn+i
0 , h
tn+ir
0 )
= e(g0, h0)
r
∑
Ai∈P′
xi = e(g0, h0)
αr.
E′∏
Ai∈S∪{P ′\W}
e(Di, Ei)
∏
Ai∈W\S
e(Di, E
′
i)
= MY
r
e(g0,h0)αr
= M.
Trace(params, sk′) Let sk′ =
(
W ′, {D′i}Ai∈W ′ , {D′i}Ai∈P ′\W ′
)
be a valid decryption
key, which means that
∏
Ai∈W ′ e(D
′
i, hi)
∏
Ai∈P ′\W ′ e(D
′
i, hn+i) = Y . Then, it
reconstructs the user identity binary string LID′ ∈ {0, 1}l by setting k-th digit
to 1 if (n+ k) ∈ W ′; otherwise 0. Next, it searches the internal list for a tuple
〈ID,LID〉 where LID = LID′ and reveals the corresponding ID as the identity
of the traitor. If the input is not a valid key, it outputs ⊥.
Observe that the trace algorithm assumes that sk′ has the prescribed form. It
is possible to improve the trace algorithm to work with a black-box decryption
box. A trivial construction would be to test the balck-box device with ciphertexts
encrypted with access structure A =
∧
An+k where k-th digit of LID equals to 1
for all users’ ID. As a reverse to the real encryption where none of attributes in
{An+1, . . . , An+l} are used in access policies, the black-box device can only decrypt
the ciphertext related to the same user ID from whose private key the black-box
device is generated, since any key components dropped when generating the black-
box device for hiding identity will disable the decryption ability of the black-box
device.
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7.1.4 Security Analysis
Theorem 7.1. If the DBDH assumption holds, our Traceable CP-ABE scheme de-
fined in Section 7.1.2 is secure in the sense of Definition 2.22.
Proof. To prove the theorem, let us assume that there is an adversary A that can
break our traceable CP-ABE scheme in the security game of IND-sCPA security
model with non-negligible probability. We show how to use this adversary to con-
struct an algorithm B which breaks the DBDH assumption.
For the algorithm B breaking the DBDH assumption, we let the challenger set
the groups G and GT of prime p with an efficient bilinear map, e and generator g.
The challenger then flips a fair binary coin µ independent of B’s view. If µ = 0
the challenger sets (A,B,C, Z) = (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc); otherwise (A,B,C, Z) =
(ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z). At a high level, our simulation works as follows. We build
a simulator that simulates the joint distribution consisting of adversary’s view in
its attack in the security game, and the hidden bit β which is not a part of the
adversary’s view.
We will show that if the input comes as µ = 0, the simulation will be perfect,
and so the adversary will launch its full ability breaking our CP-ABE. We will also
show that if the input comes as µ = 1, then the adversary’s view is independent of
β, and therefore the adversary’s advantage is negligible. This immediately implies
B distinguishing the distribution of its input tuple: run the simulator and adversary
together, and if the simulator outputs β and the adversary outputs β′, B outputs
µ = 0 if β = β′, and 1 otherwise.
We now give the details of the simulator.
The input to the simulator is (p,G,GT , e, g, A = g
a, B = gb, C = gc, Z).
Init During the Init phase, the simulator receives the challenge access structure
A∗ =
∧
Ai∈S∗ Ai, where S
∗ ⊆ P , from the adversary A.
Setup Simulator set n′ = n + l and chooses random numbers υ, ν, θ1, . . . , θn′ , γ1,
. . . , γn′ ∈ Zp. Next, the simulator computes
g0 = g
υ, h0 = g
ν , hi|Ai∈P ′ = gνθi = h
θi
0 ,
hn′+i|Ai∈S∗ = Bνγi = h
bγi
0 , hn′+i|Ai∈P\S∗ = gνγi = h
γi
0 ,
Y = e(A,B)υν = e(g0, h0)
ab.
Since hi = h
ti
0 and hn′+i = h
tn′+i
0 for each attribute Ai ∈ P ′, the simulator
sets ti := θi ∈ Zp for each attribute Ai ∈ P ′, tn′+i := bγi ∈ Zp for each
attribute Ai ∈ S∗ and tn′+i := γi ∈ ZN for each attribute Ai ∈ P ′ \ S∗. Since
Y = e(u0, v0)
α, the simulator also sets α := ab ∈ Zp.
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The simulated public parameters are params = (h1, . . . , h2n′ , Y, e,G,GT ,P).
The master secret key is msk = (g0, t1, . . . , t2n′ , α).
Phase 1 The adversary A makes private key queries. The simulator responds to a
query on a set of attributes W ⊆ P with an identity ID ∈ I, where S∗ 6⊆ W , as
follows. Observe that there must exist an attribute Ak ∈ S∗ such that k 6∈ W .
The simulator first chooses such an attribute Ak. Next, the simulator chooses
r′1, . . . , r
′
n′−1 ∈ ZN uniformly at random and computes r′n′ = −
∑
i r
′
i. Then
the simulator sets ri := br
′
i for each attribute Ai 6= Ak ∈ P ′ and rk := ab+ br′k
for the attribute k. Fourth, the simulator checks if the pair 〈ID,LID〉 already
exists in the internal list; if not it computes LID = H(ID) and store the new
pair 〈ID,LID〉 into the list. After LID is obtained the simulator sets a dummy
attribute set WID generated by adding (n+k)-th attribute if k-th digit of LID
equals to 1 and merges it with W so that W ′ = W ∪WID.
Finally, the simulator computes
∀Ai ∈ W ′, Di = B
υr′i
θi = (gυ)
br′i
θi = g
ri
ti
0
∀Ai /∈ W ′, Ai ∈ S∗, i 6= k,Di = g
υr′i
γi = (gυ)
br′i
bγi = g
ri
tn′+i
0
∀Ai /∈ W ′, Ai ∈ S∗, i = k,Dk = A
υ
γk · g
υrk
γk = g
(ab+br′k)υ
bγk = g
rk
tn′+k
0
∀i /∈ W ′, Ai /∈ S∗, Di = B
υr′i
γi = (gυ)
br′i
γi = g
ri
tn′+i
0
and passes sk = (W ′, {Di}Ai∈P ′) onto A.
Here we check the correctness of the simulated private key.∑
Ai∈P ′
ri =
∑
Ai 6=Ak,Ai∈P ′
ri + rk = b
∑
Ai 6=Ak,Ai∈P ′
r′i + ab+ br
′
k = ab.
Challenge The adversary A outputs messages M0, M1. The simulator randomly
generates a bit β ∈{0, 1} and sends A the challenge ciphertext:
CT ∗ =
(
A∗, Cm = Mβ · Zυν , {Ci = Cνθi = hic}Ai∈S∗ ,
{Ci = Cνγi = hcn′+i, C ′i = Cνθi = hci}Ai∈P ′\S∗
)
.
Phase 2 A makes key queries, and the simulator responds as in Phase 1.
Guess Finally, the adversary outputs guesses β′. If β = β′, B outputs 0 indicating
that Z = e(g, g)abc; otherwise, it outputs 1.
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Perfect Simulation: When µ = 1 and Z = e(g, g)abc, we have
Cm = Mβe(g, g)
abcυν = Mβe(g0, h0)
abc = M · Y c.
Thus, CT ∗ is a valid ciphertext for A∗, and the public key and challenge
ciphertext issued by the simulator comes from a distribution identical to that
in the actual construction; however, we still must show that the private keys
issued by the simulator are appropriately distributed. To show that the keys
issued by the simulator are appropriately distributed, it suffices to show that,
from A’s view, the value ga, gb is uniformly random and independent. But this
follows from the fact that ga, gb is chosen uniformly at random in G from the
input.
Probability Analysis: We assume the adversary A breaks our CP-ABE scheme
with non-negligible probability ε. If Z = e(g, g)abc, then the simulation is
perfect, and A will guess the bit β correctly with probability 1/2 + ε. Else,
Z = e(g, g)z is uniformly random in GT , and thus Cm is uniformly random
and independent element in GT . In this case, with probability 1 − 1/p the
value of β is independent from A’s view. Thus, we have that
Pr[B(A,B,C, Z) = 1] ≥ 1
2
+ ε(1− 1/p),
and
AdvDBDHB (λ) ≥ ε(1− 1/p).
This concludes the proof of Theorem.
Theorem 7.2. Our Traceable CP-ABE scheme is secure against Key-delegation
Abuse Attacks of Definition 5.1 in the generic group model.
Proof. To prove the traceable CP-ABE scheme is secure against Key-Abuse At-
tack in generic group model, it needs to prove that after extended with l attributes
for a user identity space I of size of 2l the adversary cannot generate a new pri-
vate key that satisfies the winning conditions of the security game of Key-Abuse
Attacks without any contradiction. In the setting of traceable CP-ABE, l at-
tributes {An+1, . . . , An+l} that are used to indicate identities are added into the
attribute universe. Each private key is generated with an extended set of attributes
W ′ = W ∪ WID where attributes in WID do not affect the decryption procedure
since no ciphertexts require attributes from {An+1, . . . , An+l} in its access policy.
Therefore, the extended scheme does not gives the adversary any further advantage
in breaking the security game of Key-Abuse Attacks. We give the detailed proof as
following.
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In the generic group model, the adversary can only manipulate group elements
by using the canonical group operations, independent of the encoding for group
elements. Thus if the adversary is given group elements gδ1 , . . . , gδt ∈ G as its
only inputs, then each element of G output by the adversary must be of the form
gπ(δ1,...,δt), where π is a fixed multilinear polynomial.
Suppose the adversary gives a new private key sk∗ with a decryption algo-
rithm Dec∗(·) for an attribute set W ∗ and an identity ID∗, with which ciphertexts
encrypted with A∗ =
∧
Ai∈W ∗ Ai can be decrypted. First, for a ciphertext CT en-
crypted under A∗ =
∧
Ai∈W ∗ Ai the new private key can decrypt M from Cm if it can
be used to compute Y κ = e(g0, h0)
ακ. Thus, it contains a group element in G for
each attribute in P ′ to pair the corresponding Ci (or C ′i) in the ciphertext in bilinear
map. We denote these group elements by D∗i for attribute i in P ′ and the necessary
structure of the new private key can be presented as
(
Ŵ ∗ = W ∗ ∪WID∗ , {D∗i }Ai∈P ′
)
.
After narrowing down the necessary construction for sk∗, we note that D∗i needs
to be constructed based on key components D
(j)
i from j-th queried private key sk
(j)
for attribute set Wj ∪WIDj since there is no other given group elements related to
the unknown master secret key α for the adversary. Nevertheless, we also note that
because of the difference of the queried attribute sets, for the same attribute Ai the
key components D
(j)
i might be generated based on different sets of group elements,
which makes them irreconcilable to be combined together. Thus, the new private
key sk∗ can only depend on one queried private key skj where W
∗ ⊂ Wj. But this
will result in that sk∗ can be used to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted with Wj that is
an attribute set beyond the supposed W ∗, which contradicts the second condition
in the security game’s definition.
We consider two random encodings ψ0, ψT of the additive group Zp respectively,
that is injective maps ψ0, ψT : Zp → {0, 1}L, where L > 3 log(p). We write G =
ψ0(x) : x ∈ Zp,GT = ψT (x) : x ∈ Zp. We are given oracles to compute the induced
group action on G,GT and an oracle to compute a non-degenerate bilinear map
e : G×G→ GT . We refer to G as a generic bilinear group.
We now proceed with the proof, following the standard approach for generic
groups with ψ0, ψT , G,GT defined as above. Let g = ψ0(1)(we will write g
x to
denote ψ0(x), and e(g, g)
x to denote ψT (x)).
For any generic-group adversary, the security game against key-delegation abuse
is considered carried out by a simulator as follows. For each group element seen
or created by the adversary, this simulator keeps track of its discrete logarithm by
means of a multivariate rational functions in the following indeterminate formal
variables: ∑
= {υ, ν} ∪ {ti}Ai∈P ′ ∪ {r
(j)
i }Ai∈P ′,j∈[q].
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The simulation also associates each group element with some rational function.
For each distinct rational function in its collection, it inputs the value of the rational
function to corresponding encoding ψ0 or ψT and gives the result to the adversary
as the encoding of that particular group element. The functions are associated with
the group elements in the simulation as follows:
First, we suppose g0 = g
υ, h0 = g
ν . Let n′ = n+ l.
• Public parameters params generated by Setup
params = (h1, . . . , h2n′ , Y ).
1. {νti}Ai∈P ′ , representing hi = h
ti
0 = g
νti .
2. {νtn′+i}Ai∈P ′ , representing hi = h
tn′+i
0 = g
νti .
• Private key components given by KeyGen. Let skj be the j-th queried private key
for the attribute set Wj and the j-th identity.
skj =
Ŵj = Wj ∪WIDj , {D(j)i = g r(j)iti0 }Ai∈Ŵj , {D(j)i = g r
(j)
i
tn+i
0 }Ai∈P ′\Ŵj

1. { υ
ti
r
(j)
i }j∈[q],Ai∈Ŵj , representing D
(j)
i = g
r
(j)
i
ti
0 .
2. { υ
tn+i
r
(j)
i }j∈[q],Ai∈P\Ŵj , representing D
(j)
i = g
r
(j)
i
tn+i
0 .
Nevertheless, in the actual game, the values of the formal variables are chosen
uniformly at random in Zp. Two distinct functions may in that case evaluate to the
same value. The simulation is faithful to the standard interaction in a generic group,
except in the event that two of the distinct functions evaluate to the same value on
a random assignment to the formal variables. For any two distinct functions of the
form listed above, the probability of this happening is at most O(q)/p, since the
degree of distinct multivariate polynomials is at most O(q). Since this probability
is negligible, we ignore this case.
Now the adversary outputs a purported new private key sk∗ for a new set of pol-
icy attributes W ∗ for the identity ID∗ with a suitable decryption algorithm Dec∗(·).
We first observe that to decrypt a ciphertext CT encrypted with an access structure
A =
∧
Ai∈S Ai, where S is equal to or a subset of W
∗. The new private key sk∗
should contain a group element for each attribute to pair the corresponding group
element Ci (or C
′
i) in the ciphertext in bilinear map for Y
κ = e(g0, h0)
ακ. We denote
these group elements by D∗i and the necessary structure of the new private key can
be presented as (W ∗, {D∗i }Ai∈P). On the other hand, as long as the new private key
satisfies the winning conditions the adversary can construct the new key sk∗ the way
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it wants to make it look different, which means the adversary can construct the new
private key component D∗i using a linear combination of the functions listed above.
Here, we note that if the adversary tries to construct D∗i using any functions
other than D
(j)
i , then using this part of D
∗
i in bilinear map will result in meaningless
group element in GT for decryption, which also needs to be eliminated by computing
it separately; since it needs to be eliminated afterwards, we do not include it in
following discussion.
Without loss of generality, we assume the new private key sk∗ contains the
following least structure for each attribute Ai:
D∗i = πi(D
(1)
i , . . . , D
(q)
i ) := (D
(1)
i )
βi,1(D
(2)
i )
βi,2 · · · (D(q)i )βi,q
= u
1
ti
∑
Ai∈Wj
βi,jr
(j)
i +
1
tn+i
∑
Ai /∈Wj
βi,jr
(j)
i
0
where πi(D
(1)
i , . . . , D
(q)
i ) := (D
(1)
i )
βi,1(D
(2)
i )
βi,2 · · · (D(q)i )βi,q represents a function in
G using components D
(j)
i from queried private keys.
Then we can represent D∗i as
υ
ti
∑
Ai∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i +
υ
tn+i
∑
Ai /∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i .
To win in the game, D∗i needs to meet following conditions:
1.
∑
Ai∈P
∑
j∈[q] βi,jr
(j)
i = α.
2. ∀Ai ∈ W ∗,
∑
i/∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i = 0.
3. ∀Ai /∈ W ∗,
∑
j /∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i 6= 0 and
∑
Ai∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i = 0.
The rest of our proof proceeds by assuming the new private key sk∗ satisfies
the conditions above, and obtaining a contradiction: that the new private key sk∗
can be used to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted with a queried attribute set Wj which
contradicts the second condition in the security game’s definition.
Considering condition 1,
∑
Ai∈P
∑
j∈[q] βi,jr
(j)
i = α. Since
∑
i r
(j)
i = α for j ∈ [q]
and r
(j)
i is chosen uniformly at random in Zp, we have
β1,j = β2,j = · · · = βn,j.
We denote them by βj.
Considering condition 2, for all Ai ∈ W ∗,
∑
Ai /∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i =
∑
Aj ,Ai /∈Wj βjr
(j)
i =
0. Since r
(j)
i is chosen uniformly at random in Zp, it can be concluded that
if ∃Ai ∈ W ∗ and Ai /∈ Wj, βj = 0
which is equivalent to
if βj 6= 0,W ∗ ⊆ Wj.
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Considering condition 3, for all Ai /∈ W ∗,
∑
Aj /∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i =
∑
Aj /∈Wj βjr
(j)
i 6= 0
and
∑
Ai∈Wj βi,jr
(j)
i =
∑
Ai∈Wj βjr
(j)
i = 0. Since r
(j)
i is chosen uniformly at random
in Zp, it can be concluded that
if ∃Ai /∈ W ∗ and Ai ∈ Wj, βj = 0
which is equivalent to
if βj 6= 0,Wj ⊆ W ∗.
So W ∗ equals to a queried attribute set Wj, which results in either the adversary
cannot generate a new key as W ∗ 6= Wj for j ∈ [q] or the new key will be able to
decrypt ciphertexts encrypted with Wj as well since only one queried private key
skj can be used. Therefore, our assumptions cannot be true. The adversary cannot
successfully generate a new private key sk∗ to win the game.
7.1.5 Summary
This section presented an application of CP-ABE in the scenario of Fog Computing
where a user interacts with many Fog devices that require different access privileges.
In the scenario, Fog devices with different functionalities are distributed in a large
area and users authenticate using smart devices with any viable private keys in-
cluding those generated from illegal delegation or simple duplication. To tackle this
problem, we proposed a traceable CP-ABE scheme based on the CP-ABE scheme
with key-abuse delegation resistance. In proposed scheme, private keys cannot be
split or combined to illegally delegate new keys. In addition, dummy attributes are
used to represent user identities so that any successful authentication will leave a
trace of user identity which then can be used for detection of private key duplica-
tions.
7.2 Access Policy Update with Preserved
Attributes
7.2.1 Motivation
In CP-ABE, access control is enabled by access policies enforced with ciphertexts.
Despite the fact that user private keys are associated with many descriptive at-
tributes, certain attributes can be essential to an access policy so that the access
control can work as designed. If a CP-ABE scheme that supports efficient access
policy update but the essential attributes are not preserved, authorities may mis-
takenly revoke some from access policies which results in undesired access control
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to the shared data. It can be seen that with a mature access policy update mecha-
nism an encryptor should be able to preserve certain attributes in an access policy
so that unintended recipients will not be able to decrypt the ciphertext after some
attributes revoked.
Thus, in this section we provide the first construction of revocable CP-ABE with
preserved attributes. The construction is provably secure under Decisional Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman assumption in the introduced security model.
7.2.2 Construction
In this subsection, we present our revocable CP-ABE scheme that supports at-
tributes preservation. In our construction revoked attributes will be replaced with
certain dummy attributes in the access policy of a ciphertext, as well as the corre-
sponding ciphertext components. These dummy attributes are owned by all users
so that when an attribute is replaced by a dummy attribute the new ciphertext can
then be decrypted. For simplicity, let this dummy attribute universe extends as
D := {An+1, . . . , A2n}, and Di = {An+1, . . . , An+i} for i ≤ n. Hence, the general
attribute universe for the construction will be P ′ = P ∪ D = {1, . . . , 2n}.
7.2.2.1 Description
Our revocable CP-ABE scheme that supports attributes preservation follows the
definition in Sec 6.2.1.
Setup(1λ,P ′) : The setup algorithm chooses a bilinear group system S = (p, G1,
G2, GT , e(·, ·)) where G1 = G2 = G. It then randomly chooses a generator g
as well as a set of exponents t1,0, . . . , t2n,0, t1,1, . . . , t2n−1,1, α, β ∈ Zp.
The master secret key is then msk = (α, t1,0, . . . , t2n,0, t1,1, . . . , t2n−1,1) and
the public parameters are
params = (S, g, Y = e(g, g)α, {Ti,j = gti,j}i=1,...,2n−1,j=0,1).
KeyGen(msk,W ) : To generate a private key for attribute set W ⊆ P the following
steps are taken. Choose two polynomials q0(x) and q1(x) with degree d0 = d1 =
n − 1; set q0(x) = α and q1(x) = q0(2n). Randomly pick other |W | + n − 1
points to complete q0(x) as well as |W |+ n− 1 points for q1(x). Compute the
private key for W :
sk = ({Di,0 = g
q0(i)
ti,0 }Ai∈W∪Dn−1 , {Di,1 = g
q1(i)
ti,1 }Ai∈W∪D).
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Enc(params,M,A, l) : Encryption with the AND-gate access policy A =
∧
Ai∈S Ai
with a set of attributes, messageM ∈ GT and the maximum allowed revocation
number l ≤ k proceeds as follows. Let S1 ⊆ S be the set of fixed attributes
and S2 ⊆ S be the set of revocable attributes. Randomly pick r ∈ Zp. The
output ciphertext to users is then
CT =

S,
CM = MY
r,
{Ci,0 = T ri,0}Ai∈S1∪Dn−|S1|−1 ,
{Ci,1 = T ri,1}Ai∈S2∪Dn−|S2| .
Afterwards, the algorithm computes ∀i ∈ {2n − |S2| + 1, . . . , 2n − |S2| + l} :
Ci,1 = T
r
i,1 and send them to the proxy together with the ciphertext CT as
CTp.
Update(params, CTp, “revoke”,U) : To revoke a set of attributes U from the AND-
gate attribute set S = S1 ∪ S2 of a ciphertext CTp, where U ⊂ S2, the proxy
proceeds the revocation algorithm as follows. For j-th attribute Ai ∈ U ,
the corresponding ciphertext components Ci,1 is replaced with C2n−|S2|+j,1.
Therefore, after revoking a set U of attributes, the AND-gate attribute set
of the ciphertext will become S ′ = S1 ∪ S ′2 where S ′2 = S2 \ U . The output
ciphertext after revocation is then
CT =

S ′,
CM = MY
r,
{Ci,0 = T ri,0}Ai∈S1∪Dn−|S1|−1 ,
{Ci,1 = T ri,1}Ai∈S′2∪Dn−|S2|+|U| .
Dec(sk, CT ) : Suppose a ciphertext CT that can be parsed as (S ′, CM ,
{Ci,0}Ai∈S1∪Dn−|S1|−1 , {Ci}Ai∈S′2∪Dn−|S2|) and a private key for attribute set W ,
where W satisfies the access policy.
Let S ′1 = S1 ∪ Dn−|S1|−1 ∪ {2n}. Then, the ciphertext can be decrypted by
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following steps: ∏
Ai∈S′2∪Dn−|S2|
e(Di,1, Ci,1)
∆Ai,S′2∪Dn−|S2|
(0)
= e(g, g)q0(2n)r
(e(g, g)q0(2n)r)
∆A2n,S′1
(0)·e(g, g)q0(2n)r
= e(g, g)α·r
CM
e(g, g)αr
= M
7.2.3 Security Analysis
We shall prove the following theorem.
Theorem 7.3. If the DBDH assumption holds, our CP-ABE scheme defined in
previous subsection is secure in the sense of Definition 6.1.
Proof. To prove the theorem, let us assume that there is an adversary A that can
break our CP-ABE scheme with non-negligible probability. We show how to use
this adversary to construct an algorithm B which breaks the DBDH assumption.
For the algorithm B breaking the DBDH assumption, we let the challenger set
the groups G and GT of prime p with an efficient bilinear map, e and generator g.
The challenger then flips a fair binary coin µ independent of B’s view. If µ = 0
the challenger sets (A,B,C, Z) = (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc); otherwise (A,B,C, Z) =
(ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z). At a high level, our simulation works as follows. We build
a simulator that simulates the joint distribution consisting of adversary’s view in
its attack in the security game, and the hidden bit β which is not a part of the
adversary’s view.
We will show that if the input comes as µ = 0, the simulation will be perfect,
and so the adversary will launch its full ability breaking our CP-ABE. We will also
show that if the input comes as µ = 1, then the adversary’s view is independent of
β, and therefore the adversary’s advantage is negligible. This immediately implies
B distinguishing the distribution of its input tuple: run the simulator and adversary
together, and if the simulator outputs β and the adversary outputs β′, B outputs
µ = 0 if β = β′, and 1 otherwise.
We now give the details of the simulator.
The input to the simulator is (p,G,GT , e, g, A = ga, B = gb, C = gc, Z).
Init During the Init phase, the simulator receives the challenge access structure
A∗ =
∧
Ai∈S∗ i from the adversary A, where S
∗ = S∗1 ∪ S∗2 ⊆ U and attributes
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in S∗1 cannot be revoked while ones in S
∗
2 can be revoked.
Setup First simulator chooses random numbers γ1,0, . . . , γn,0, γ1,1, . . . , γn,1 ∈ Zp.
Next, the simulator defines ti,0 = γi,0 for Ai ∈ S1 ∪ Dn−1−|S1|, ti,0 = b · γi,0
otherwise; ti,1 = γi,1 for Ai ∈ S2 ∪ Dn−|S2|, ti,1 = b · γi,1 otherwise. The
simulator then computes
Ti,0 =
gti,0 = gγi,0 , Ai ∈ S1 ∪ Dn−1−|S1|gti,0 = BγAi,0 , otherwise ,
Ti,1 =
gti,1 = gγi,1 , Ai ∈ S2 ∪ Dn−|S2|gti,1 = Bγi,1 , otherwise ,
Y = e(A,B) = e(g, g)ab.
Since Y = e(g, g)α, the simulator implicitly sets α := ab ∈ Zp.
The public parameter passed onto the adversary A is
params = (U , G,GT , e, {Ti,j}1≤i≤n,0≤j≤1).
Phase 1 The adversary A makes private key queries. The simulator responds to a
query on W , where W 6|= A∗, as follows. The simulator first defines two sets
ω0 =
S1 ∩W ∪ Dn−|S1|−1, S2 6⊆ WS1 ∩W ∪ Dn−|S1|−1 ∪ {2n}, S2 ⊆ W ,
ω1 = S2 ∩W ∪ Dn−|S2|.
Observe that |ω0| ≤ n − 1. Next, the simulator defines a polynomial q0 of
degree n−1 such that q0(0) = a. For Ai ∈ ω0 the procedure chooses a random
point λi ∈ Zp and sets q0(i) = λi,0. After |ω0| points set, it fixes the remaining
n− 1− |ω0| points of q0 randomly to completely define q0. Now the simulator
defines Q0(·) = b · q0(·), and computes
Di,0 =
g
Q0(i)
ti,0 = g
bλi,0
γi,0 = B
λi,0
γi,0 , Ai ∈ J ,
g
Q0(i)
ti,0 = g
bq0(i)
bγi,0 = g
q0(i)
γi,0 , otherwise,
where J = S1 ∩W ∪ Dn−|S1|−1. (We note that Di,0 can be computed in both
situations since B and ga = A are both known by the simulator.)
In terms of {Di,1}, the simulator defines a polynomial q1 of degree n − 1
such that q1(0) = q0(2n) which can be either a known random number λ2n if
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S2 ⊆ W or defined by a group element in G associated with a computable with
A. If q0(2n) is a known random number, the procedure then sets rest of the
points randomly to completely fix q1; otherwise chooses a random point λi,1
for Ai ∈ ω1 and then fixes the remaining n−1−|ω1| points of q1 to completely
define q1. After q1 fixed, the simulator defines Q1(·) = b · q1(·) and computes
• If q1 is completely known:
Di,1 =
g
Q1(i)
ti,1 = g
bq1(i)
γi,1 = B
q1(i)
γi,0 , Ai ∈ ω1,
g
Q1(i)
ti,1 = g
bq1(i)
bγi,1 = g
q1(i)
γi,1 , otherwise,
• Otherwise:
Di,1 =
g
Q1(i)
ti,1 = g
bλi,1
γi,1 = B
λi,1
γi,0 , Ai ∈ ω1,
g
Q1(i)
ti,1 = g
bq1(i)
bγi,1 = g
q1(i)
γi,1 , otherwise,
Finally, the simulator passes sk = (W , {Di,0}Ai∈W∪Dn−1 , {Di,1}Ai∈W∪D) onto
A.
Challenge The adversary A outputs messages M0,M1 as well as the revocation
attribute set U∗. The simulator randomly generates a bit β ∈ {0, 1} and sends
A the challenge ciphertext:
CT ∗ =

C∗M = Mβ · Z,
{C∗i,0 = T ci,0 = Cγi,0}Ai∈S1∪Dn−|S1|−1 ,
{C∗i,1 = T ci,1 = Cγi,1}Ai∈S2∪Dn−|S2|
Phase 2 A makes key generation queries, and the simulator responds as in Phase
1.
Guess Finally, the adversary outputs guesses β′. If β = β′, B outputs 0 indicating
that Z = e(g, g)abc; otherwise, it outputs 1.
Probability Analysis:
Let I = (g, A,B,C, Z) be the input of the algorithm B and the adversary A
break our CP-ABE scheme with advantage AdvIND-sCPAA (λ). Below we analyse the
simulation in two cases.
Case 1 : U∗ = ∅
One can verify that in this case, if µ = 0, Z = e(g, g)abc, then C∗M = Mβ ·
e(g, g)abc = Mβ · e(g, g)αc. Therefore, the simulation of B is perfect, and the
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adversary A will guess the bit β with its advantage. Hence, if µ = 0 we have
|Pr[B(I) = 0|µ = 0]− 1
2
| = AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
Else, if µ = 1 and Z is uniformly random in GT , C
∗
M is uniformly random and
independent in GT , and the value of β is independent from A’s view as well,
Pr[B(I) = 0|µ = 1] = 1
2
.
Thus, we have the advantage of B in solving the DBDH problem in Case 1 is
AdvDBDHB (λ)
= |Pr[B(I) = 0|µ = 0]− Pr[B(I) = 0|µ = 1]|
≥ AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
Case 2 : U∗ 6= ∅
In this case, we first show how a challenge ciphertext should be produced in a
real game. Formally, the correct procedures are as follows.
Let S ′ = U∗ ∪ S. The encryption algorithm Enc(params, A′ =
∧
Ai∈S′ i, Mβ,
|U∗|) is run to get CT ∗. More precisely, it randomly picks r ∈ Zp and computes,
CT ∗ =

C∗M ,
{C∗i,0 = T ri,0}Ai∈S1∪Dn−|S1|−1 ,
{C∗i,1 = T ri,1}Ai∈S2∪U∗∪Dn−|S2|−|U∗|
as well as {Ci,1 = T ri,1}i∈{2n−|S2|−|U∗|+1,...,2n−|S2|} for attribute revocation.
The revocation algorithm Update(params, CT ∗, “revoke”, U∗) is run to revoke
the attribute set U∗ from the access policy of the ciphertext CT ∗. It updates
attribute set S2 by replacing the subset U∗ by a set of dummy attributes of the
same size {2n−|S2|−|U∗|+1, . . . , 2n−|S2|}, and substitute the corresponding
Ci,1 of dummy attributes for the ones in the original ciphertext. Thus, the
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output ciphertext is
CT ∗ =

C∗M ,
{C∗i,0 = T ri,0}Ai∈S1∪Dn−|S1|−1 ,
{C∗i,1 = T ri,1}Ai∈S2∪Dn−|S2|−|U∗| ,
{Ci,1 = T ri,1}i∈{2n−|S2|−|U∗|+1,...,2n−|S2|}.
=

C∗M ,
{C∗i,0 = T ri,0}Ai∈S1∪Dn−|S1|−1 ,
{C∗i,1 = T ri,1}Ai∈S2∪Dn−|S2| .
Now we assume that the randomness r used in producing CT ∗ is defined as
r = c and the challenge ciphertext CT ′ turns out to be as follows,
CT ∗ =

C∗M = Mβ · Z,
{C∗i,0 = T ci,0 = Cγi,0}Ai∈S1∪Dn−|S1|−1 ,
{C∗i,1 = T ci,1 = Cγi,1}Ai∈S2∪Dn−|S2| .
It can be seen that if µ = 0, Z = e(g0, h0)
c, the challenge ciphertext in a real
game is exactly the same as the simulated challenge ciphertext. The simulated
game would be a perfect simulation if it can be proved that the setting of r is
indistinguishable from a real random value from the view of A. It will suffice
as c is random to A. Thus, if µ = 0 we have
|Pr[B(I) = 0|µ = 0]− 1
2
| = AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
On the other hand, if µ = 1 and Z is a random element from GT , C
∗
M is
random and independent from the view of A,
Pr[B(I) = 0|µ = 1] = 1
2
.
Thus, we have the advantage of B in solving the DBDH problem in Case 2 is
AdvDBDHB (λ) = |Pr[B(I) = 0|µ = 0]− Pr[B(I) = 0|µ = 1]|
≥ AdvIND-sCPAA (λ).
This completes the proof.
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7.2.4 Summary
This section gives a different approach for efficient access policy update mechanism
considering practical usage and real-world design. The importance of the existence
of attributes in an access policy, especially in an AND-gate access policy, varies
since different attributes represent different types of access privileges. A new CP-
ABE scheme is proposed where attributes in the access policy of a ciphertext can
be designed as a preserved attribute. Such type of attributes cannot be revoked
through the access policy update mechanism while other attributes are not affected.
In the proposed solution, the ability of revoking attributes has been retrained with
which encryptors can design access policies with more flexibility and rely on the
update mechanism with further reassurance.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This chapter summaries the main contributions and concludes the thesis. It also
discusses several potential directions of future work.
8.1 Summary of Contributions
This thesis explores the attribute-based encryption aiming at exploiting innova-
tive approaches and techniques for efficient and practical one-to-many encryption
schemes. The contributions of the work are concluded as follows:
• Chapter 4 has focused on the dilemma of efficiency and expressiveness in attribute-
based encryption. We propose a CP-ABE scheme with short ciphertexts that can
support access policy of a threshold and an AND-gate. In the proposed scheme,
encryptors can efficiently construct access policies with mandatory and optional
attributes, and the encrypted message can only be recovered when all mandatory
and certain number of optional attributes are included in the private key. This
advanced feature is also favoured in many real world scenarios since it mitigates
the problem in the assignment of key attributes. The proposed scheme takes a
step forward beyond existing schemes and gives a modest but important advance
in the field of attribute-based encryption.
• Chapter 5 has investigated the issue of key-delegation abuse in attribute-based
encryption. The nature of attribute-based encryption results in the possibility of
simple key-delegation, which can be friendly adopted for hierarchical key delega-
tion or be maliciously used for illegal key generation. Concerning many scenarios
where the latter usage causes severe undesired consequences, we defined a new
security notion for the issue of key-delegation abuse and a formal security model
against key-delegation abuse attacks. To tackle the problem, we proposed a CP-
ABE scheme where a user cannot split or combine private key components to
generate illegal keys for subsets of the original attribute set. The proposed scheme
addresses the problem of key-delegation abuse by randomly breaking apart key
randomness to pieces and combine them with key components preventing being
used separately. Addressing the issue of key-delegation abuse helps enhance the
security of applications that adopt attribute-based encryption for fine-grained ac-
cess control.
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• Chapter 6 has looked into practical need of access policy update mechanism in
ABE systems. Most ABE schemes allow one-to-many encryption with static ac-
cess control and only a few with the property of Proxy Re-encryption can update
the access policy of a ciphertext with a re-encryption key. We proposed CP-ABE
schemes where attributes can be efficiently added to (or revoked from) access poli-
cies of existing ciphertexts by a proxy server. The process of access policy update
does not need any extra key from encryptors. Ciphertexts stored in server includes
extra components that are used for access policy update, while a constant-sized
part will be accessible for user-end decryption. We defined a new notion for this
new mechanism and formalised the security requirements for the notion. The
proposed solutions offer a novel approach to the problem of access policy update
and make the ABE schemes become more versatile and practical.
• Chapter 7 has presented some applications and extensions of proposed schemes
and mechanisms in Chapter 5 and 6 in real-world scenarios. The first part of this
chapter focuses on the issue of key-delegation abuse in Fog Computing. We dis-
cussed how CP-ABE fits in the setting of Fog Computing and the key-delegation
abuse could sabotage its security. We proposed a new traceable CP-ABE scheme
with key-delegation abuse resistance. The proposed solution adopts the fea-
ture that user identities are embedded into indivisible private keys via dummy
attributes. Differently from existing traceable CP-ABE schemes, the proposed
scheme focused more on tracing new keys generated in private.
The second part of this chapter deals with new challenges in applying the proposed
proxy access policy update mechanism. Although the proposed scheme supports
efficient access policy update, it leads to concerns on the subject of the extent of
attribute revocation when updating an access policy. The mechanism embedded
in the scheme proposed in Chapter 6 can only restrain the number of attributes
that can be revoked, but it is more desired to restrain which ones can or cannot
be revoked. Faced with this challenge, we proposed an efficient CP-ABE scheme
with attribute revocation functionality in which encryptors can preserve certain
attributes in the access policy. This solution is constructed with a different concept
compared with schemes proposed in Chapter 6.
8.2 Future Work
The work proposed in this thesis can serve as the base for further research. Some
of the potential directions are described in this section.
• In Chapter 4, the proposed CP-ABE scheme with short ciphertexts supports the
access policy of an AND-gate and a threshold. On the one hand, it remains an
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open problem to obtain an ABE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts supporting
more expressive access policies. In spite of the difficulty between efficiency and
expressiveness, it is worth trying to construct schemes for different access policies
at the same level besides an AND-gate and a threshold that correspond to more
practical situations. On the other hand, the security of proposed scheme is proven
secure under the newly introduced assumption, which leads to further research on
security proof under standard assumptions.
• In Chapter 5, the problem of key-delegation abuse is newly introduced and a
CP-ABE scheme is constructed against key-delegation abuse attacks. A future
work could be aimed at CP-ABE schemes with key-delegation resistance sup-
porting more expressive access policies. In addition, the security proof against
key-delegation abuse attacks is provided in the generic group model. It remains
an open problem to prove security against key-delegation abuse attacks under
standard assumptions.
• In Chapter 6, the problem of access policy update in ABE system is studied. The
proposed schemes are embedded with efficient access policy update mechanism
but support only AND-gate access policy. It remains an open problem to obtain
a scheme integrated with efficient access policy update mechanism supporting
more expressive access policies which can be proven secure under a more general
computational assumption.
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